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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The current thesis aimed to evaluate and extend research into children’s interpretation 
of violations of physical laws of causality. A central question of this thesis was: what 
factors might govern children’s scepticism versus credulity with respect to magical 
causality? Specifically, why are some children more easily fooled than others? Study 
1 provided evidence of age differences in children’s beliefs with respect to mental-
physical causality. Older children (11-12-year-olds) were more sceptical about the 
efficacy of wishing than younger children (4-5 and 6-7-year-olds). Moreover, older 
children were less likely than younger children to claim that mental processes can 
directly affect the physical world. Subsequent studies in the thesis focused on various 
factors that might contribute to individual differences in children’s interpretation of a 
conjuring trick (i.e. an event that ostensibly involved a violation of object 
permanence). Study 2 found that 4-6-year-olds made a distinction between real magic 
and tricks, but that direct social influence in the form of repetitive questioning 
influenced children’s offered verbal causal explanations. In contrast, Study 3 found 
that the majority of 9-11-year-olds interpreted the demonstration as a trick, had a clear 
understanding of conjuring as trickery and were less likely to conform to 
experimenter pressure in the form of repetitive questioning. Study 4 results suggested 
that 4-6-year-old children’s verbal responses are a true representation of beliefs as 
evidenced by verbal judgments correlating with behavioural reactions. However, an 
indirect social influence in the form of a visual clue that hinted at trickery influenced 
level of verbal scepticism. Furthermore, children’s level of social confidence was 
linked to their level of active exploration. The final two studies in the thesis offered 
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support for individual differences in children’s responses that may be related to theory 
of mind ability. Study 5 found a link between 4-6-year-olds’ level of advanced theory 
of mind and responses, as well as an age-related increase in scepticism. Study 6 found 
a link between 5-7½-year-olds’ first-order theory of mind and understanding of 
trickery that was not affected by age. It was, therefore, concluded that young 
children’s acknowledgement of trickery and level of scepticism about magical events 
is not characterized by a simple age-related developmental influence. Importantly, 
socio-cognitive skills may play a role. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
“And above all, watch with glittering eyes the whole world around you because the 
greatest secrets are always hidden in the most unlikely places. Those who don’t 
believe in magic will never find it”.  (Roald Dahl) 
 
One man’s “magic” is another man’s engineering. “Supernatural” is a null word.  
(Robert A. Heinlein) 
 
 
An important task of childhood is to separate the real from the unreal and to assign 
entities and events to their proper (real or not real) categories. The ability to 
differentiate between what is real and what is not is basic to human cognition. Much 
of the knowledge we acquire in childhood is learned from the testimony of other 
individuals. Children learn a lot from accepting what they are told by adults. Yet 
children in contemporary Western society are often exposed to stories, films and 
cultural practices that focus on and contradict what they have been told is impossible 
regarding physical causal principles. For instance, parents tell and encourage young 
children to believe in the existence of certain fantasy characters such as Santa Claus 
who, they are told, rides a sleigh in the sky, climbs down chimneys and visits millions 
of homes in a single night to deliver presents. Children are bombarded with 
contradictory information intended to deceive. How and when do children work out 
that such information contradicts what they have been taught in other contexts? More 
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to the point, how do they make a distinction between reality and make-believe, fact 
and fiction, truth and falsehood? 
One area where children are deceived but invited to make such a distinction is 
in the context of conjuring. Conjuring creates illusions of seemingly impossible or 
supernatural feats that appear as if they are real and based upon purely natural means. 
These feats are called magic tricks, effects or illusions. By using trickery, a person 
appears to be able to control and violate the laws of nature. Adults do not necessarily 
know how a conjuring trick is done, but know that they are being fooled and that it is 
a trick. How does the child get to that point? Why are some children quick at getting 
there and others slow? In other words, why and to what extent are some children more 
easily fooled than others? 
 
 
Purpose of thesis and its academic rationale 
The current thesis aims to provide an examination of, and therefore to better 
understand, the factors that influence how a particular anomalous event will be 
interpreted by children. The thesis is also concerned with understanding children’s 
explanations of “magic” by systematically differentiating between “real magic” and 
“trick magic” in relation to a conjuring context.  The background context for the thesis 
can be traced to early work by Piaget (1929, 1930). Until quite recently, there has 
been a general acceptance of Piaget’s claim that children’s thinking is fundamentally 
different to that of adults in that children tend to think “magically” until about the age 
of twelve. It was claimed that children lack an awareness of the distinction between 
the physical and mental worlds. It would follow from this that they would be more 
likely than adults to accept that certain people could themselves suspend the laws of 
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physics and make objects disappear or pass through solid barriers. Indeed, as 
mentioned previously, the social world in which children grow up actively encourages 
such magical beliefs (e.g., Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy). These views have been 
questioned recently, not on the grounds that children never think magically but on the 
grounds that both children and adults sometimes entertain fantastical beliefs and 
engage in magical thinking.  
 Research has established that children do acquire an understanding of physical 
causality and can differentiate reality from non-reality. The challenge, therefore, is to 
better understand the factors that influence how a particular anomalous event will be 
interpreted by children. Recent research shows that children manifest behavioural and 
psychophysiological signs of surprise when laws of physics appear to be violated in 
laboratory situations and many respond that it is “magic”. However, there are inherent 
doubts about giving definitive answers regarding young children’s responses, as it is 
unclear whether young children mean that such violations are caused by a genuine 
suspension of the laws of physics (i.e. “real magic”) as opposed to being a conjuring 
trick. Therefore, it is important that developmentalists ensure that children do not 
confuse the term “magic” with “trick” and are able to make the distinction. The 
findings of previous studies (e.g., Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Johnson & Harris, 
1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994), while attempting to differentiate between 
children’s beliefs about trick magic and real magic, do not systematically address 
which of these more subtle descriptions most accurately characterizes children’s 
responses.   
 Children’s understanding of magic in a conjuring context has, for the most 
part, been ignored by developmental psychologists. How do children interpret 
apparent violations of laws of physics in such contexts?  It seems likely that they may 
18 
 
initially accept that some individuals can perform “real magic” but that at some point 
they will begin to suspect that at least some instances of conjuring are based upon 
deception. Some will eventually conclude that all such instances are based upon 
deception – but some will believe that they have witnessed a genuine magical event. 
The main issue that this thesis is concerned with exploring is possible factors that may 
contribute to individual differences in children’s interpretation of a conjuring trick.  
Much of the previous research in this area has presented classic magic tricks 
and shown differences in children’s interpretation of them but has not explored the 
underlying reasons for those differences. Examples of these will be discussed further 
in Chapter 1. Those that have addressed underlying reasons have been mainly 
descriptive and focused on external factors, such as contextual issues which affect 
children’s tendency to refer to such demonstrations as “magic”. Very few studies have 
addressed internal factors. These warrant more systematic examination.  
 There is a distinction between obvious “parlour magic” versus the kinds of 
things developmental psychologists have typically done without any of the obvious 
trimmings of a “magic trick”. Yet deception is being performed in both instances. 
Therefore, the issue is one of why some children are more easily fooled than others. 
Specifically, a key question is, what factors contribute to children not thinking in 
terms of “real” magic? Understanding deception requires a fairly sophisticated 
“theory of mind”, e.g., the ability to appreciate that people may sometimes 
deliberately mislead others into drawing false conclusions. Once children realize that 
they themselves and other people can have false beliefs, they can also become aware 
of the possibility of deceptive behaviour. Therefore, the main proposal for the thesis is 
that advanced forms of socio-cognitive ability may contribute to children’s 
understanding that they are witnessing trickery. The current thesis is the first to put 
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forward the suggestion of a link between advanced theory of mind (AToM) ability 
and responses towards a conjuring demonstration and is the first empirical assessment 
of the proposed association between the two areas for preschool aged children.  
 
 
Main research questions 
There are two main questions that are relevant to the thesis: firstly, is there an 
underlying difference between children labelling an event that apparently violates 
laws of physics “magic” or “trick”? Secondly, what individual difference factors are 
relevant to the interpretation of a conjuring trick?  Specifically, are children with 
higher levels of theory of mind more likely to invoke “trick” to a conjuring context? 
 The main focus will be on investigating why and to what extent some children 
are more adept at detecting trickery than others. What factors apart from the 
acquisition of the knowledge that magical events are incompatible with physical 
events enable children to understand they are being fooled (i.e. tricked)? What factors 
increase suspicion (i.e. levels of verbal scepticism) toward an event being trickery? 
The thesis aims to address these concerns in two ways: firstly, by attempting to 
examine external factors such as methodology used (i.e. task issues). For instance, 
some children may detect trickery more effectively by attending to visual clues that 
hint at trickery. Alternatively, children’s verbal responses may not be accompanied by 
appropriate behavioural responses. Secondly, the thesis includes investigations of 
potential internal factors. There are many developmental skills that may underpin the 
transition from magic to trick interpretations of a conjuring demonstration. Some are 
cognitive and others social. It is not possible to incorporate all of these in the current 
thesis. Nevertheless, some are more pertinent than others. The following cognitive 
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factors were considered: level of theory of mind, spatial monitoring, and verbal 
ability. Social factors included confidence, Machiavellianism, lie-telling ability, and 
ability to discriminate between lies and truth-telling in other children. 
 
 
The format of the thesis 
Six experimental studies were carried out: one study involved interviewing children 
about their belief in wishing (i.e. a specific violation of physical laws by direct 
mental-physical causality), and five studies presented children with a violation of 
object permanence in a conjuring context. The experiments presented conjuring tricks 
and children were asked whether they thought they were witnessing “real magic” or 
trickery (great care was taken to ensure that by “magic” the children did not mean any 
form of sleight of hand or trickery but a real violation of physical laws). Children 
were also interviewed about their understanding of the possibility of magic in the real 
world.   
The final two studies attempted to assess children’s understanding of 
conjuring from a “theory of mind” (ToM) perspective. This concept refers to a child’s 
ability to appreciate what other people think, believe and know (and that this may 
differ from the child’s own mental states). For example, much research has been 
directed at children’s understanding of false beliefs in others (e.g., using the “Sally-
Anne task”; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). An understanding of false beliefs is 
essential to an appreciation of the possibility of deception and trickery. Standard first-
order tasks were administered to children of varying ages to assess the sophistication 
of each child’s ToM, as well as empirically assessing the suggested role of AToM in 
children’s understanding.  
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 Changes across different age ranges were tracked. The main focus was on 4-6-
year-olds, but also included older children (up to twelve years of age) as a comparison 
in some studies. The reasons for the age choices will be made apparent in Chapter 1. 
Suffice it to say at this point that much research into magical thinking indicates that 
between the ages of four and six children change from thinking of magic as real to 
thinking of it as a trick (for a review, see Woolley, 1997). This thesis explores the 
underlying social and cognitive causes for the developmental transition from real 
magic to trick interpretations. 
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CHAPTER 1 – An introduction to children’s understanding of magic 
 
 
The first chapter of the thesis provides an introduction to children’s magical concepts 
(i.e. entities and processes involved) and magical thinking (i.e. belief in and 
subscribing to magical causality). The studies carried out in the thesis are mainly 
concerned with children’s interpretation and causal reasoning in relation to apparent 
violations of physical laws in a conjuring context. In order to address this in a clear 
and systematic way, it will be appropriate to initially clarify possible types of causal 
reasoning in children. The chapter then outlines models that have been theorized to 
account for children’s magical thinking. Following on from this, previous research 
dealing with children’s understanding of magic is reviewed. Although research on 
children’s magic concepts will be addressed, the main focus is on magical causal 
thinking as it is relevant to the studies carried out in the thesis. In doing so, possible 
factors that might influence individual differences in children’s causal reasoning will 
be presented. Finally, proposals for future research are briefly discussed. 
 
Types of Causal Reasoning 
Almost every aspect of reasoning involves making some sort of causal inference. For 
example, from a developmental perspective, the grasp of such skills as conservation, 
categorization or object permanence involves making causal inferences. This always 
involves a certain theory explaining the connection between a cause (A) and an effect 
(B). In other words, if the occurrence of event B is in some way contingent upon 
event A happening, this implies a causal relationship between events A and B. 
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Western cultures are based on a strong belief in scientific rationality. 
According to this belief, all natural events are universally based on physical laws and 
governed by physical causality (see Frazer, 1922; Tambiah, 1990). Hence, natural-
physical causality concerns causal relationships between two or more external 
physical events. 
According to Keinan (1994, p. 48), “Any explanation of a behaviour or an 
experience that contradicts the laws of nature may be considered as reflecting magical 
thinking”. There are numerous definitions of magical thinking in the literature. 
Usually, it is characterised as involving attribution of causal effects on real events by 
either thought or an action that is physically unconnected to the events (Rothbaum & 
Weisz, 1988; Zusne & Jones, 1989).  
Subbotsky (1984, 1997) proposed one more type of causal reasoning which is 
neither magical nor natural-physical but potentially open to both forms of 
interpretation: phenomenalistic causality. According to Subbotsky, this is an 
elementary form of causal reasoning that is later developed. Children may 
acknowledge that an effect has occurred but be unable to give a specific cause. They 
reject a plausible physical explanation but cannot give an explanation and accept that 
an action is associated in some way although not via an obvious physical connection. 
Subbotsky also suggested that older children might be less likely to make 
phenomenalistic judgments than younger children would simply because they are 
more firmly committed to a belief in the physical causes in nature. It should be noted 
that Piaget (1929, 2009) originally adopted the notion of “phenomenist” explanations 
in the form of a “primitive magico-phenomenist stage” of causal reasoning in 
children. According to this stage, children give explanations that are magical and 
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phenomenist: things are linked to certain gestures without any link that is spatial or 
intelligible.  
 
Magical Events 
There are different views on what kinds of events should be considered as magical or 
scientific (Boyer, 1997; Frazer, 1922; Jahoda, 1969; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 
1986; Seligman, 1948; Tambiah, 1990). Subbotsky (1997, 2001) reported several 
types of events that are usually classified as magical because they violate known 
physical laws. That is, all of them are types of causation that are incompatible with the 
concept of physical causality. An event is considered magical if it involves a sudden 
acquisition of spontaneous feelings or independent movements by a non-animate 
physical object (“coming to life magic”). The belief that certain objects can directly 
affect other objects or events (through physical contact or simple resemblance) can 
also be viewed as magical (“participation” or “sympathetic magic”). These include 
certain objects (e.g. mascots) and actions (e.g. crossing fingers) bringing luck or 
affecting the flow of natural events. A third type of magical event involves a violation 
of the fundamental law of object permanence: if a physical object spontaneously 
changes in shape, appears out of thin air or disappears without a trace and without a 
clear physical mechanism being a reason for this (“non permanence magic” or 
“transformation magic”). Lastly, another type of magical event involves a direct effect 
of mental processes on physical objects like moving or creating physical objects by 
sheer effort of will or thought (“consciousness over matter” or “thought over matter 
magic”, or “mental-physical causality”). Wishing, thinking, or casting magic spells 
fall into this category.  
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For the purpose of this thesis, children’s interpretation of one particular 
violation is mainly explored: a violation of object permanence in a conjuring context. 
Piaget (1954/1986) defined the concept of object permanence as the belief that a 
physical object continues to exist after it disappears from the perceptual field and 
claimed that children begin to understand object permanence by the age of two years. 
According to Piaget, around two years of age children start handling manual objects 
in accord with the objects’ physical and spatial properties. Subsequently, children’s 
developing beliefs in object permanence have been studied in great depth by a number 
of researchers but are beyond the scope of the current thesis (for reviews, see 
Baillargeon, 1987; Bower, 1971; Goswami, 2000; Subbotsky, 1991, 2005).  
 
Theories regarding Children’s Causal Thinking 
Before reviewing relevant research and empirical findings regarding children’s 
magical thinking, a discussion of causal theories must be undertaken. There is some 
debate as to whether magical thinking is a stage that children progressively pass 
through on their way to logical, scientific rationality, or that from an early age 
children use both what they regard as everyday causal principles and magical 
principles that violate those everyday ones (Bolton, Dearsley, Madronal-Luque, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2002). 
 
Replacement Theory 
Piaget, in his early works, quite often referred to a replacement model with regard to 
magical and physical causal judgments. According to this model, the development of 
thinking about causality goes through a series of progressive stages. Piaget 
(1928/2009, 1929, 1930) investigated children’s explanations of cause and effect and 
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through his studies theorised successive stages or types of causal reasoning which a 
child will exhibit regardless of the phenomenon in question. So, the child generalises 
and displays the same type of causation across a variety of contexts and domains 
(Harris, 2009). During this process, early modes of causal thinking (pre-causal) are 
gradually replaced by more rational beliefs in physical causality.  
In an experiment, children were shown a pipette full of water and instructed to 
make a little sign with their finger when they wanted water to fall (Piaget, 
1928/2009). When the child moved their finger Piaget made a small amount of water 
fall from a pipette but did not allow the child to see how this was done.  He identified 
three orientations of mind that are possible: a critical attitude, “I don’t understand it, 
but there must be a trick. It must be you and not me who makes the water fall” (p. 
211), or a magical attitude, “it’s me who makes the water fall because I forced it to 
fall and it obeys me” (p. 211), or a phenomenist attitude, e.g. there is a “link between 
the movement of my finger and the fall of the water, but I have nothing to do with it. 
Probably, my finger moves the air” (p. 211).  
For Piaget, children’s early notions of causation are “imbued with magical 
thinking” (Harris, 2009, p. 229). Young children up to seven years of age are severely 
limited in their understanding of causal relations in the world and so are especially 
susceptible to magical thought. Only at around the age of eight, do they adopt 
predominantly mechanical explanations for events. Piaget’s (1929, 1930) interviews 
with children suggested that magical beliefs are present until nine or ten years of age.   
A progressive shift from pre-causal to causal thinking was observed by other 
researchers as well (e.g., Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962; Samarapungavan, 1992; 
Schultz, Fisher, Pratt, & Rulf, 1986; Smith, Carey, & Wiser, 1985). For instance, in 
their replication of Piaget’s (1928) early work, Laurendeau and Pinard reported that 
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some time between five and eleven years of age, children undergo this change in their 
beliefs about the physical world. So, physical explanations of natural phenomena 
gradually replaced “pre-causal” explanations. However, Huang (1943) opposed 
Piaget’s theory and in an extensive review concluded that children’s dominant mode 
of explanation is in terms of physical causes. Their explanations may be naive or 
incorrect but they rarely invoke magic.  
 
Coexistence Theory 
As an alternative to Piaget’s (1929, 1930) traditional view that preschoolers and the 
youngest of school-aged children are prone to errors of magical thinking that they 
later outgrow, Subbotsky (1984, 1985) hypothesised that children possess two belief 
systems. These consist of both magical thinking and scientific (physical) thinking that 
coexist throughout the life span. He suggested that a particular belief system will 
surface depending on the situation encountered: naturalistic (physical) causal thinking 
dominates everyday reality and unusual circumstances (transformations) encourage 
children’s latent magical beliefs to surface (Subbotsky, 1994). Furthermore, rational 
(physical) causal thinking governs at the level of verbal judgments while magical 
causality rules at the level of practical actions. 
In keeping with a coexistence theory, Johnson and Harris (1994) proposed that 
a particular causal belief is either suppressed or accepted according to the child’s 
predominant belief system. Thus credulous children offer explanations for unexpected 
events by reverting to magical beliefs while non-credulous children refer to physical 
laws and practical considerations to explain these events. Johnson and Harris suggest 
that children still develop a category of metaphysical or magical phenomena which 
penetrates their everyday world from time to time. This will allow them to bracket off 
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certain outcomes as special or magical, precisely because they do not fit in with 
everyday expectations. 
 
Research on Children’s Magical Beliefs and Thinking  
In the last twenty years a good deal of cognitive developmental research and theory 
has provided what appears to be strong evidence to support the view that the dominant 
mode of young children’s thinking is rational and highly constrained by belief in 
natural physical and biological laws (e.g., Baillargeon, 1991; Lee, Cameron, Doucette, 
& Talwar, 2002; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish, & 
McCormick, 1991; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling, & 
Gelman, 1994). For instance, Lee et al. (2002) demonstrated that 5- and 6-year-old 
children have knowledge of physical constraints governing objects and actions: 
children rejected implausible claims made by adults such as that a chair had come 
alive and broken glass.  
Various studies, in attempting to address children’s causal explanations for 
events, have shown that they are capable of differentiating between possible and 
impossible events in the light of physical laws of nature at an early age (e.g., 
Baillargeon, 1991; Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & 
Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Rosengren et al., 1991, 1994). For 
instance, Rosengren et al. (1994) found that 4- and 5-year-olds consistently denied the 
possibility of events that violated common biological principles, like animals growing 
younger or growing smaller, but did not deny the possibility of events that conformed 
to those principles (i.e. like growing older or growing bigger). Research also 
indicates, to quote Sharon and Woolley (2004), that ‘‘young children have clear ideas 
about the kinds of things real entities can and cannot do’’ (p. 294). For instance, 
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Johnson and Harris (1994) presented 3-5-year-olds with pairs of hypothetical events 
in which one event violated a physical principle (e.g., a picture appearing by itself) 
and one event did not (e.g., drawing a picture) and asked the children to decide which 
event had been performed by an ordinary person and which event had been performed 
by a magic fairy. Children of all ages tended to claim that the possible event in each 
pair was performed by an ordinary person and the impossible event was performed by 
a magic fairy, and they did so for events that violated four different physical 
principles (i.e. inertia, object permanence, object continuity, and the conservation of 
matter).  
Despite evidence for this dominant rational thinking, there is a vast body of 
research indicating that children hold and maintain a variety of beliefs about the 
reality of magic. These beliefs include the existence of magical beings such as Santa 
Claus, as well as magical events (e.g. Johnson & Harris, 1994; Prentice, Manosevitz, 
& Hubbs, 1978; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Rosengren et al., 1994). In a survey 
conducted by Rosengren et al., parents of children aged between four and six reported 
a substantial degree of belief in specific event-related figures (Santa Claus, the Easter 
Bunny, and the Tooth Fairy) and supernatural fantasy figures (fairies, magicians, 
ghosts, witches, monsters and dragons). Interview data from children by Johnson and 
Harris (1991) corroborate these perceptions. When asked about their beliefs in the 
existence and magical powers of Santa Claus, God, fairies and witches, 3- and 4-year-
olds most often regarded Santa and God as real, fairies as both real and magical and 
witches as magical but not real.  
An increasing amount of research has explored children’s credulity toward 
magic and when and to what extent children resort to magical explanations. In most 
cases this has involved establishing children’s scientific, rational thoughts and then 
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challenging their adherence to the belief in physical causality by presenting them with 
actual events that appear to violate principles of familiar physical laws. In doing so, 
when questioned with hypothetical transformations, children are able to identify 
events that are possible versus impossible in the light of physical laws of nature. Yet 
when they witness seemingly impossible events before their very eyes, like making an 
object shrink or making an object disappear, many give magical explanations (e.g., 
Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; 
Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Subbotsky, 2004). For instance, Chandler and Lalonde 
asked children between the ages of three and four whether one object (a screen) could 
pass through another object (a box). Although children of all ages denied the 
possibility of this event when it was described to them verbally, 67% changed their 
mind after “witnessing” the event first hand. That is, they insisted that the event they 
had witnessed was not a trick but was actually “real magic”.  
Much research suggests that credulity toward magic is age-related and 
supports Piaget’s view that children develop into rational, sceptical thinkers, as 
evidenced by magical beliefs and explanations declining with age (e.g., Johnson & 
Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Subbotsky, 
2001, 2004, 2005, 2007; Woolley, Phelps, Davis, & Mandell, 1999). Specifically, 
evidence points to 4-year-olds being credulous towards magic (Rosengren & 
Hickling, 1994; Subbotsky, 2004) and 5-8-year-olds being increasingly sceptical 
towards it (Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Subbotsky, 2004). 
Phelps and Woolley have found that between the ages of four and six, children 
significantly change from thinking of magic as real to thinking of it as a trick. 
Rosengren and Hickling found this as well and specifically reported a change between 
the ages of four and five.  
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However, there are conflicting views regarding the age that children change 
from viewing anomalous phenomena as being caused by magic as opposed to 
trickery. Whereas Rosengren and Hickling (1994) found that 4-year-olds believe in 
magic causality and 5-year-olds claim deception, Chandler and Lalonde (1994) found 
that most 3- and 4-year-olds initially gave “magic” responses, but they quickly shifted 
from “magic” to “trick” responses when allowed repeated viewing of an unusual 
event and the opportunity to examine apparatus. Yet Subbotsky (2004) reported that 
5-year-olds do not depart from “magic” explanations when they witness anomalous 
events even when they are given a hint of trickery.  
Contrasting results of studies also show considerable age differences in 
children’s credulity toward magic and highlight that there is not a clear cut 
developmental trend. For instance, Rosengren and Hickling (2000) claim young 
preschool children show little if any familiarity with magic. In a pilot study of 
preschoolers’ magical explanations for physical events, they found children younger 
than age four did not know or use the term “magic”. Similarly, Rosengren et al. 
(1994) found that not only do 4- and 5-year-old children make a clear distinction 
between possible and impossible transformations of animals in pictures, they did not 
invoke magical means to produce any outcome. That is, they do not spontaneously 
claim that impossible outcomes such as an animal getting smaller in size can occur by 
magic. Yet 4-5-year-olds endorsed the idea of a magician being able to perform this 
type of outcome, with few claiming that magicians used trickery.  
However, Rothbaum and Weisz (1988) described a “magical stage” from ages 
two to six, whereby children truly believe in magical entities (e.g., fairies) and 
magical events (e.g., wishing). Indeed, Johnson and Harris (1994) found that children 
aged three to five judged violations of familiar physical principles as magical. Data by 
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Subbotsky (2001, 2005) have shown that even 6- and 9-year-olds are still vulnerable 
to magical causation: they suspend their belief in object permanence in a situation 
where a concealed replacement is made that is difficult to explain in a rational way 
(i.e. according to known laws of physics). Rosengren and Hickling (2000) consider 
two possible time courses: one in which magical thinking declines with age from 
nought to twelve years, the other in which it rises between nought and five years and 
then declines.  
It is important to note that while attempting to explore children’s magical 
thinking, many of the studies reviewed have varied widely in terms of the 
methodology and the context used to test children. This may account for the 
conflicting age differences found. As such, this issue cannot be dismissed as will be 
made evident further on in this chapter. Suffice it to say at this point, that children in 
Rosengren et al.’s (1994) study were merely shown pictures about violations of causal 
principles that were unfamiliar to them, rather than observing an empirical 
demonstration. So there was no assurance that children’s responses were based on 
their perceptions of magic in the real world.  
 
Factors that may Account for Magical Thinking in Children  
There are a number of characteristics that are considered to provide the basis 
for the emergence of and prevalence of magical thinking in children: lack of 
information, conditions of uncertainty, and inability to explain phenomena (Jahoda, 
1969; Zusne & Jones, 1989).  
Early researchers examining young children’s causal reasoning have suggested 
that children often revert to non-naturalistic causal explanations based on magic when 
they are unfamiliar with the objects or events about which they are questioned (e.g., 
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Berzonsky, 1971; Nass, 1956). Thus, an event was considered to be familiar if 
children could have possibly experienced directly the process and causal outcome of 
the event. Unfamiliar events were those where the underlying mechanism causing an 
event was “remote” or not readily observable. For instance, Berzonsky found that 6- 
and 7-year-olds provided more non-naturalistic (magical) explanations when asked to 
explain remote events (e.g., what makes the stars shine?) or events where the 
children’s expectations were violated (e.g., a weighing scale failing to tilt to the 
heavier side when support was withdrawn) than when asked to explain familiar events 
(e.g., a boat sinking in a tub of water due to a hole in the bottom).  
However, Huang (1930) reported that 4-10-year-old children rarely used 
magical or supernatural causality to explain unfamiliar phenomena. In this 
investigation, children aged four to ten years were presented with a set of events with 
unexpected outcomes. These events included a few magic tricks and several 
perceptual illusions (e.g., the Muller-Lyer illusion), but the majority of the events 
involved physical phenomena with relatively unfamiliar mechanisms (e.g., a glass 
filled with water is covered with a piece of paper and the water remains in the glass 
when the glass is turned upside down). Despite this apparent violation of gravity, 
fewer than 3% of children’s explanations of the events made reference to magical or 
supernatural causality. Instead, they sought plausible physical explanations (e.g., “the 
paper sticks to the tube because it is wet”; “there is some glue on the rim of the tube”).  
More recent researchers claim that children quite often use the word “magic” 
simply to mark phenomena for which they lack immediate physical explanations (e.g., 
Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994). Phelps and Woolley argue that 
children with more physical knowledge about an event should be less likely to invoke 
magic. Indeed, they found that children of all ages still invoked magic to explain 
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otherwise inexplicable physical events. As 4-, 6-, and 8-year-old children’s 
knowledge of the causal mechanisms underlying specific events increased, their use 
of magical explanations for those events decreased. According to Chandler and 
Lalonde (1994), one way of achieving this is to allow examination of the apparatus 
used or to allow repeated viewing of an event. Both Baillargeon (1994) and Chandler 
and Lalonde have shown (as discussed previously) that when given the opportunity to 
investigate apparatus, 3- and 4-year-old children reinterpret what has happened and 
change from “magic” to “trick” responses. Therefore, responses of “magic” may 
simply be a stop-gap until further information is gathered that elicits a rational 
explanation.  
Subbotsky (1997) proposed that it may be more appropriate to view children 
as engaging in phenomenalistic causal thinking for an unusual phenomenon if it is 
difficult to give an immediate physical explanation. He showed that 6- and 9-year-old 
children acknowledge that experimenter manipulation of cutting a piece of paper in 
half and finding a stamp in a box cut in half are causally connected but they are not 
sure how. Although most claimed it was the same stamp that had been placed whole 
in the box as the one cut in half, few gave spontaneous magic explanations. Hence 
they revealed a belief in phenomenalistic causal explanation. A further study revealed 
that when asked directly whether the event was “magic or not magic”, children were 
inclined to change their phenomenalistic causal judgment into acknowledgement of 
magical causation.  
Studies have shown that children of all ages (including 4-year-olds) have no 
difficulty in distinguishing between magical and ordinary outcomes (non-magical 
events) (Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Subbotsky, 2004). Yet, 
children have only been given a causal choice of “magic or not magic” (e.g., Phelps & 
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Woolley, 1994; Subbotsky, 1997, 2004), or whether an event “could happen with or 
without magic” (e.g., Johnson & Harris, 1994). As a result, it is not clear if children 
label events as magical only to contrast with ordinary events and not because they 
view them as instances of real magic, particularly if they have not been given an 
alternative choice to magic, such as trickery. For instance, in Johnson and Harris’ 
study, 3-year-old and 4-year-old children were shown drawings of pairs of events as 
having already occurred, within which one event conformed to a given principle and 
the other violated it, e.g., drawing a picture versus a picture appearing by itself, and 
children were asked whether each event was caused by “a magic fairy” wishing or 
giving verbal commands (i.e. magical means), or by a real person (“Jack or Jill”, i.e. 
everyday means, regular but not magic). Three- and 4-year-olds judged the non-
violation events to be ordinary (caused by Jack or Jill) and the other outcomes as 
magical (caused by a magic fairy). However, only one alternative, that is “magic”, 
was offered as an explanation as opposed to whether the outcome could happen in the 
manner described.  
Subbotsky (2004) points out that the capacity of children to distinguish 
between magical and ordinary outcomes does not necessarily mean that they can also 
distinguish between real magic and similar looking tricks. In one study  he found that 
children aged four, six, and nine show understanding of the difference between real 
magic (e.g., a story of a postage stamp disappearing in a box after magic words were 
spoken) and ordinary events (e.g., a story of a stamp not disappearing in a box after 
magic words were spoken). However, in another study children aged five, six, and 
nine failed to distinguish between real magic and similar looking trick events (i.e., a 
story of a wizard hiding a postage stamp in a briefcase versus a wizard saying a magic 
spell to make a postage stamp disappear in a briefcase). He interpreted these findings 
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as suggesting that children distinguished between magical and ordinary events not 
because they understood the true nature of magic, but because the wording of the 
interview only involved the change of an object in magical items (objects appeared or 
disappeared after magic spell words were said) but not in ordinary items (magic words 
were said but nothing happened).  
Many investigators (e.g., Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; 
Rosengren & Hickling, 1994) point out that the real issue when addressing children’s 
conceptions of apparent violations of expectations is the extent to which children 
engage in magical thinking (i.e., truly believe magic to be a real, supernatural force) 
as opposed to only being an explanation referring to “tricks” as in “parlour magic”. 
Rosengren and Hickling provided a wide range of classic, professional quality magic 
tricks which could undergo seemingly impossible transformations (e.g., putting two 
pieces of rope together by just pulling on them), to see whether 4-5-year-old children 
view them as truly magical or whether they view these events as merely involving 
tricks or deception. Although prior to viewing these transformations, most denied the 
reality of impossible transformations, after witnessing them in reality, many 4-year-
olds changed their minds and acknowledged these events to be really magical whereas 
5-year-olds insisted that they were tricks in the form of deception. Follow-up 
interviews also revealed that most 4-year-olds viewed magic as real and possible 
under the control of an agent (magician) with special powers, whereas most 5-year-
olds viewed magic as tricks that anyone can learn.  
Rosengren and Hickling’s (1994) findings imply that scepticism towards 
magical occurrences is age-related. However, Johnson and Harris (1994) suggested 
that although most children distinguish magical events from other types of events, 
children under the age of seven vary in the extent of their credulity or scepticism. 
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They asked 3-7-year-olds to pretend that an object was in a box and then specifically 
categorized them as either credulous (they wonder if an entity is actually in the box) 
or sceptical (claimed the box is empty). Half opened the box and responded as if they 
wondered whether the object was in the box and half claimed the box was empty.  
Yet, there are conflicting reports about what children actually mean by 
“magic”. In some studies on children’s magical thinking it remains unclear if 
responses meant real magic that involved supernatural powers or just tricks (Chandler 
& Lalonde, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994). In other studies children’s responses 
indicated their growing awareness of magic as events different from tricks and 
involving violations of fundamental physical laws. For instance, Phelps and Woolley 
(1994) refer to behavioural reactions displaying magical thinking and propose that 
exhibiting true surprise (such as wide eyes and audible gasps) and reluctant 
admittance on the part of some children that the things they saw must be magic may 
be taken as anecdotal evidence in support of children saying and believing the events 
they witness may be really referring to the supernatural. Yet, Chandler and Lalonde 
(1994) propose that children’s behavioural reactions may be due to an event being 
unexpected and not because children regard it as necessarily magical, particularly as 
they have found children change from “magic” to “trick” causal responses, despite 
initially exhibiting surprise. 
Subbotsky (2004) highlights the fact that studies such as Johnson and Harris 
(1994), Phelps and Woolley (1994), and Rosengren and Hickling (1994), while 
attempting to differentiate between children’s beliefs concerning trick magic and real 
magic, do not systematically address which of these most accurately reflects 
children’s responses. Furthermore, they do not assess the robustness of children’s 
tendency to invoke magic. Much research into magical thinking has focused on 
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children aged between three and six years of age. There has been relatively little 
research on older children. Subbotsky has been the most prolific by testing children 
aged six and nine years of age. 
Subbotsky (2004) claims that in order to examine a person’s magical beliefs, 
and the extent to which they adhere to magic, it is necessary to first establish 
conceptual and ontological views. Conceptually, a person has to be able to understand 
the difference between magical and ordinary (non-magical) events. That is the person 
has to have a concept of magical events as events that violate known physical laws. 
An ontological judgment of magic involves believing an event can happen in the real 
world. Once these two judgments are established, if children change beliefs after 
witnessing an anomalous event, then beliefs are not “entrenched”. Specifically, 
scepticism toward magic (i.e., disbelief) can be considered entrenched if children do 
not then produce or accept magical explanations, even if shown an anomalous causal 
event that looks like an instance of magic. Conversely, magical beliefs can be referred 
to as “deeply entrenched” if children stick to magical explanations even after a hint 
that an event is a trick (by explaining the mechanism).  
In a series of experiments Subbotsky (2004) tested the entrenchment of causal 
beliefs in preschool and various school-aged children. He found that in 4- and 5-year-
olds the belief in the reality of magic is deeply entrenched, whereas the belief in the 
universal power of physical causality (and scepticism toward magic) is not. 
Specifically, 4-year-olds tended to retain magical explanations when confronted by an 
event that looked like magic (e.g., a transformation of a crumpled stamp into a brand 
new one in an apparently empty box after a magic spell was cast on the box). Five-
year-olds tended to retain magical explanations even after they had been encouraged 
to abandon them by prompting and explaining the mechanism of the trick. Six-year-
39 
 
olds fit the category of non-believers with a “not entrenched” pattern: although they 
denied that magic can occur in real life, their disbelief was not entrenched as most of 
them changed their scepticism toward magic for credulity as soon as they were 
confronted with the event showing the magical effect of a spell. However, children 
who did believe in the reality of magic were swayed by the suggestion of an event 
being a trick. In comparison, 9-year-olds have an entrenched disbelief (i.e. scepticism) 
in magic causation and entrenched belief in the universal power of physical causality. 
Not only did the majority of 9-year-old children deny the reality of magic in their 
ontological judgments, but a large number refused to accept magical causal 
explanations when confronted with the aforementioned transformation. Almost all 9-
year-olds who accepted or produced magical explanations abandoned these 
explanations as soon as they were prompted and given an explanation of the 
mechanism of a trick event.  
Subbotsky has carried out substantial research into conditions that evoke 
magical explanations of events concerning violations of object permanence. Many of 
his experiments have used a version of the invisible replacement task (Bower, 1971). 
As briefly mentioned previously, it uses a specially constructed trick box that could 
create the impression of a physical object’s disappearance or appearance from thin air 
or transformation into another object in such a way that the object’s non-permanence 
seemed genuine. Under these conditions children aged four years and older, including 
9-year-olds (Subbotsky, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2004), and even adults (Subbotsky, 1991, 
1993, 1997, 2001; Subbotsky & Trommsdorff, 1992) are prepared to suspend initially 
strong beliefs in the permanence of perceived objects. Specifically, they revealed a 
considerable degree of credulity towards the experimenter destroying or transforming 
physical objects by sheer will power.  
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Subbotsky (2004), in reviewing past research that examined children’s verbal 
reactions about magic, concluded that most studies suggest that children’s and adults’ 
tendency to engage in magical practices during an experiment is a function of the 
“cost” of these practices. In their verbal judgments, schoolchildren and adults usually 
show scepticism towards magic. Yet 6- and 9-year-old children (Subbotsky, 2001) 
and even adults (Rozin, Markwith, & Nemeroff, 1992; Rozin, Markwith, & Ross, 
1990; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986; Subbotsky, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2010; 
Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002) show behaviours compatible with magical thinking if 
they are put in a context where disregarding the possibility of magic involves a 
potentially high cost. For instance, Subbotsky (2001) found that magic was still 
viewed by many 9-year-olds as a real threat to the safety of their valuable objects, as 
evidenced in refusing to put a personal object in a “magic box” for fear of damage. 
However, Subbotsky did not consider the possibility that in their refusal children 
might still fear that their treasured possessions might be damaged even if it is not real 
magic. Subbotsky (1994) has also shown that children exhibit magical thinking in 
their actions if there is the possibility of reward as well as high cost. Specifically, he 
found that the majority of 4- and 5-year-olds and some 6-year-olds tried to pass their 
hand through a glass wall (in order to obtain an attractive object in a box) and refused 
to drink “magic water” (fearing to become a toddler again). At the end of the 
experiment most of the children acknowledged that the box and the water were 
“magic”.  
Woolley (1997) and Subbotsky (1997, 2007) state that a task issue that must 
be considered when investigating children’s magical thinking is whether 
experimenters request verbal judgments or observe a child’s behaviour. Although 
much research supports Piaget’s view that magical explanations decline (and 
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disappear) in later childhood, findings may be due in part to researchers’ reliance on 
children’s verbal responses (Subbotsky, 2001). When children’s behaviour is 
examined in addition to their verbal judgments they show a considerably stronger 
credulity towards magic (e.g., Johnson & Harris, 1994; Subbotsky, 1985, 2001). For 
instance, in their actions, 9-year-olds demonstrated a significantly stronger credulity 
that a magic spell can destroy a postage stamp in a box than that a connected physical 
device can (Subbotsky, 2001).  
In some instances children manifest a belief in magical causality in their 
actions while proclaiming disbelief in their verbal judgments (Subbotsky, 1985, 1993, 
2001, 2004). In one study, Subbotsky (1985) told children aged four, five, and six 
years a story of a girl who had a magic box that could turn pictures into real objects 
when magic words were chanted. Despite the majority of the children denying the 
possibility in real life, when left alone with a box, they chanted magic words. 
Subbotsky interpreted these findings as indicative of the existence of two inconsistent 
belief systems: children’s verbal behaviour reflected rational scientific thought, 
whereas their subsequent actions reflected magical thought. Yet this seemingly 
magical behaviour decreased significantly between the ages of four and six, 
demonstrating their increasing reluctance to grant credibility to magical forces 
operating in the real world.  
Various studies have shown that the credibility of the person performing 
magic may be a factor in influencing children’s causal explanations of a supposed 
violation (e.g., Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Subbotsky, 1994). Chandler and Lalonde 
found that 9-13-year-old children were prepared to entertain the possibility that the 
laws of conservation could be seemingly suspended by the experimenter (e.g., 
changing the shape of a ball of moulding clay could cause it to weigh more or less 
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than it had previously) when exhibiting the persona of a magician (wearing a cape, 
having a wand). Subbotsky (1993, 1994) also indicates that explicitly talking about 
magic and using magic words in conjunction with an event may create a context in 
which children perceive magic to be real and play a crucial role in changing children’s 
beliefs. He asked 4-6-year-olds whether saying magic words can transform a drawing 
of something into an object it depicted. Almost all denied the possibility of magic in 
an interview. Yet 90% attempted some form of magical transformation when left 
alone with the box.  
It should be noted that research has shown other social factors that may 
account for an individual’s magical thinking, including cultural differences (e.g., 
Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002) and parental influence (e.g., Rosengren, Hickling, 
Jurist, & Burger, 1997). Rosengren et al. suggest that the age of the child modulates 
parental encouragement of magical beliefs, with less support as children get older. 
Indeed, Harris (2009) acknowledges that Piaget toyed with the possibility that the 
child’s early disposition towards magic or scientific thinking is nurtured and 
elaborated depending on the surrounding community. However, these are not 
discussed further due to the constraints of the thesis and the fact that they are not 
relevant to the studies carried out in the thesis. The reader is directed towards Woolley 
(1997) for an extensive review. 
 
Summary  
The research reviewed in this chapter suggests that magic is an active category in 
children’s thinking (i.e. it is not uncommon for children to hold beliefs in the reality 
of supernatural beings and label certain events as “magic”). Research has been 
undertaken with the aim of helping to understand children’s magical thinking. 
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Unfortunately, evidence that is already available is neither clear nor consistent and 
highlights several unresolved issues. Some researchers are in agreement with Piaget 
(1929, 1930) that preschoolers and the youngest of school-aged children progressively 
move from pre-causal (magical) thinking to rational thinking (natural physical laws of 
causality). Alternatively, other researchers (e.g., Chandler & Lalonde, 1994) discount 
claims about magical thinking and propose that such claims are based upon adult 
interpretations of children’s reactions, such as physical surprise. Finally, Subbotsky 
(2004) claims that belief systems for magical and everyday events coexist throughout 
the life span and that in some situations magic beliefs come to the forefront. Indeed, 
Harris (2000) argues that magical thinking can persist into adulthood in ways that 
Piaget did not acknowledge and that young children’s magical explanations are 
“occasional rather than systematic” (p. 231).  
Studies have shown that young children are more likely than not to interpret 
impossible or unexpected events as “magic” and label them accordingly (e.g., 
Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Johnson & Harris, 1994). Some have identified 
insufficient knowledge and a lack of understanding of logical physical relationships as 
the most important determinants of children’s magical responses when shown an 
apparent violation of a physical law (e.g., Berzonsky, 1971; Chandler & Lalonde, 
1994; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994). Hence, the more knowledge 
a child possesses about physical phenomena, the less likely they are to resort to 
magical explanations. Yet there are conflicting reports about what children actually 
mean by “magic”. In some studies of children’s magical thinking it remains unclear if 
responses meant real magic that involved supernatural powers or just tricks (Chandler 
& Lalonde, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994). In other studies, children’s responses 
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indicated their growing awareness of magic as events different from tricks and 
involving violations of fundamental physical laws. 
Research shows that some children explain anomalous events in terms of 
magic whereas others explain them in terms of physical causality. A number of 
studies reviewed in this chapter suggest that individual differences between credulous 
and sceptical children are developmentally sensitive and support Piaget’s replacement 
theory of the development of causal thinking (e.g., Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & 
Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994). For instance, Johnson and Harris 
postulated that belief in magic and associated magical thinking may be especially 
prevalent in young children and may be used as a form of explanation when scientific 
knowledge is absent.  
However, there is a conflict in responses regardless of age and people do not, 
once they understand physical laws of nature, subscribe to a rational view in their 
causal ideas about the physical world all the time. In fact, research has shown that 
children of all ages (and even adults) are still vulnerable to magical causation and can 
still exhibit magical tendencies. They suspend belief in physical causation by giving 
“magic” causal responses for events that look like real magic (i.e., appear to genuinely 
violate principles of physics, such as object permanence) especially when these 
unusual events are presented in a supernatural context (e.g., by using magical words; 
Subbotsky, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2004). Furthermore, their behaviour often shows that 
they believe a violation can occur (e.g., Subbotsky 2001, 2004). Therefore, children’s 
causal thinking is not a replacement whereby they develop out of magical thinking. 
Bourchier and Davis (2000) comment that the existence of both believers and sceptics 
suggests that there is not a simple developmental progression (e.g. from belief through 
to scepticism) that characterizes children’s responses to information about magical 
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events during early childhood. Rather, what children believe, and how consistently 
they believe it, appears to also be influenced by individual differences among children 
of the same age. 
 
Aims of Future Research 
The central question to my area of research is “Do children think under certain 
circumstances that natural laws of physics can be suspended?” If so, in order to 
address this question, future research will need to address whether magical thinking is 
at the heart of children’s explanation for these possible changes. Children do have a 
grasp of scientific concepts, with their notions of science being quite robust. 
Furthermore, they have a very good knowledge of the way the world works. Yet, 
research reviewed shows evidence of magical thinking in children. For example, 
Chandler and Lalonde (1994) have presented a basic idea about magical thinking that 
disappears and reappears in the context of magic tricks. Future research will also need 
to explore in depth what is meant by children’s responses of “magic”. Are children 
referring to notions of the supernatural? Are they referring to “tricks” as in parlour 
magic? In particular, research needs to investigate the distinction between magic and 
tricks (i.e. children’s knowledge of conjuring as deception). 
 The majority of the studies reviewed have used demonstrations of apparatus 
that violate expectations of physical laws that have not been witnessed before, such as 
a solid object passing through a wall. Only a few studies (Phelps & Woolley, 1994; 
Rosengren & Hickling, 1994) have explored the extent to which children give magical 
explanations for transformations involving prototypical magic tricks or deception. 
Magic tricks are more ecologically valid than the apparatus used in previous studies, 
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as most children will have experienced a magic show at either birthday parties or on 
the television.   
Past research has mainly assessed external factors that may evoke “magic” 
responses. A key question that has not been addressed in the magical literature is, 
“what internal factors contribute to children not thinking in terms of magic?” In 
particular, no studies have addressed why some children are quicker than others at 
realizing that what they are witnessing is a trick, apart from physical knowledge of the 
laws of causality. There is a substantial amount of data available that shows individual 
differences between adults who believe and do not believe in magical causation in 
relation to personality traits, mental health, and intellectual ability (e.g., Haidt, 
McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Nemeroff & Rozin, 1992; 1994; Rozin et al., 1992). There 
is also a wealth of research into the relationship between paranormal belief and 
intelligence. One pertinent study was undertaken by Jones, Russell, and Nickel (1977) 
who found a positive correlation between intelligence and global paranormal belief. 
However, results on this are very inconsistent with other studies finding negative 
correlations or no relationship (see review by Irwin, 2009). Both personality and 
intelligence are multi-faceted and too diverse a topic to discuss in depth in the current 
thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
STUDY 1 - Age differences in children’s beliefs about wishing 
 
 
Star light, star bright, 
The first star I see tonight, 
I wish I may, I wish I might, 
Have the wish I wish tonight.   
(unknown author) 
 
 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I outlined many instances in which the members of 
Western society seem to encourage a belief in magic in young children. Parents will 
often go to great lengths to inculcate and support a belief in magical entities such as 
Father Christmas, the Tooth Fairy and the Easter Bunny. One concept closely related 
to such magical belief is wishing. Young Western children are often encouraged to 
treat wishing as a magical process. For example, adults will sometimes encourage 
children to make a wish when they blow out the candles on their birthday cake. They 
are even told not to tell anyone the content of their birthday cake wish or, “it won’t 
come true”. The birthday cake ritual carries the clear intimation that wishes can come 
true and thereby affect events in the physical world. What do children understand 
about such practices? Do they believe that wishes really can affect physical events? 
As a first foray into children’s magical beliefs, Study 1 of the current thesis explored 
children’s understanding of wishing. In addition, the association between children’s 
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beliefs about the efficacy of wishing and another potential form of direct mental-
physical causality (i.e. imagination) was explored. 
Most adults know that mental effort alone cannot directly alter the physical 
world. Simply wanting something or thinking about something does not cause it to 
occur: some physical action needs to be taken. Similarly, research has shown that 
even 3-year-olds understand that a mental effect on the physical world is mediated 
rather than direct. For instance, Schult and Kalish (1993) found that children denied 
that just wanting to walk through a wall instead of around it would allow this action to 
occur. Estes, Wellman and Woolley (1989) also report that children as young as three 
understand that one cannot physically transform an object just by thinking about it 
and that actual physical contact is needed to achieve such results.  
Although much research on children’s theories of mind indicates that children 
as young as three have some understanding of the relationship between thoughts and 
things, evidence indicates that they also hold magical beliefs in direct mental-physical 
causality (e.g., Rothbaum & Weisz, 1988). Wishing is an everyday childhood 
phenomenon (with most children’s birthday parties involving blowing out the candles 
on a cake and making a wish), and is a specific form of violation of a physical law 
whereby there is a perception that mental effort alone may directly alter the physical 
world. Theoretical, anecdotal, and empirical accounts suggest that most children 
believe in the efficacy of wishing to some degree and that children think of it as a 
magical process, requiring skill (e.g., Vikan & Clausen, 1993; Woolley, Phelps, & 
Davis, 1995; Woolley, Phelps, Davis, & Mandell, 1999). Furthermore, Woolley et al. 
(1999) have also found that wishing appears to have an intentional mental state 
component (i.e., one must be thinking of something). Woolley et al. (1995) found that 
many 3-6-year-old children believe wishing to be an effective means for bringing 
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about changes in physical reality but are sceptical after age six. Similarly, Vikan and 
Clausen (1993) reported considerable beliefs in wishing in 4-6-year-olds, but firmer 
belief in the younger children.  
The existence of belief in the efficacy of wishing in young children supports 
Piaget’s (1929, 1930) suggestion that young children (up to eight years of age) engage 
in illogical, magical thinking, and believe they can cause some event merely through 
their own thoughts or gestures, i.e. “magic by participation between thought and 
things” (Piaget, 1929, pp. 133-134). However, these wishing beliefs conflict with 
empirical evidence from the theory of mind literature, which points to a sophisticated 
level of understanding of mental-physical causal relations in children as young as 
three. Woolley et al. (1999) suggest that children’s beliefs in its efficacy may be 
situated within the domain of emerging beliefs about magic rather than a part of their 
theory of mind (ToM).  
Woolley et al. (1999) contrasted beliefs about wishing with beliefs about 
imagination and found that younger children (in a 3-6½-years old age range) are more 
likely than not to claim that the mental (i.e., wishing and imagining) can affect the 
physical. Their results also indicate that for children there is no conceptual difference 
between imagination and wishing. These findings conflict with previous research on 
children’s understanding of imagination whereby it has been found that by the age 
three or four, children understand that simply imagining something cannot directly 
produce an effect in reality or in the physical world (Golomb & Galasso, 1995; Harris, 
Brown, Marriot, Whittall, & Harmer, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Woolley & 
Phelps, 1994; Woolley & Wellman, 1993a, 1993b). Despite their findings, Woolley et 
al. still maintain that children’s beliefs about wishing potentially lie at the intersection 
of two domains of thought – their theories of mind and their beliefs about magic.  
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Study Aim 
On the basis of the experimental evidence from Woolley et al.’s (1999) study, the aim 
of the current study was to explore further children’s concepts of wishing and their 
beliefs in its efficacy. In doing so, it was hoped that evidence would be presented on 
children maintaining a belief in a common phenomenon that is perceived to be able to 
violate a physical law. The age range of the children tested was extended to include 
participants aged up to 12 years old (as well as including 4- and 6-7-year-old 
children). No previous studies have conducted research with regards to the concept 
and efficacy of wishing on this older age group and it may give a greater insight into 
children’s growing scepticism. In addition, relations between children’s beliefs about 
different types of direct mental-physical causality were assessed (i.e. imagination, 
imagination with the intention of trying to get something, and wishing) to determine 
whether children do distinguish the mental from the physical, and in particular 
whether wishing is believed to be a more effective means of producing a result than 
imagination. In doing so, I planned to assess whether wishing beliefs might be 
considered situated outside their ToM as it violates the basic tenets of the theory 
whereas children may consider the effects of imagination in the context of their 
everyday ToM knowledge. In other words, wishing beliefs might belong in a separate 
domain from imagination and, therefore, not be part of a ToM domain.  
Imagined objects can be considered as really occurring by the mere fact that 
they can be conceived in thoughts. Like Woolley et al., by including explicit mention 
of the word “trying” to imagination stories, children will not just consider that the 
character in a story is thinking about something, but also involves intentionality in the 
sense of actively trying to get something. This might increase claims of children’s 
beliefs in its efficacy. Hence, children’s belief in the efficacy of imagination actually 
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producing a direct effect on the external physical world would be clearly assessed. In 
Study 1, explicit mention of the word “trying” in imagination stories is referred to as 
“imagination plus trying”, and merely thinking of something mentally is referred to as 
“imagination only”.   
 Woolley et al. only concentrated on claims of efficacy of a character 
obtaining one item as a result of wishing, imagining, or imagining plus trying. Study 1 
aimed to assess the extent of children’s beliefs in the efficacy of these different 
processes by also varying the quantities of items. If children claim that ten items are 
just as likely to be produced by wishing as one item, then there are no limits to its 
efficacy. The size of the target set may also affect the probability of success of 
wishing (as opposed to imagining), as the more items involved may result in children 
believing in at least one item appearing.  
 
It was hypothesised that: 
1) There will be an age-related increase in familiarity of wishing and an age-related 
decrease in beliefs about its efficacy. Specifically, older children (11-12-year-olds) 
will be more familiar with the concept of wishing and report less belief in its efficacy, 
than younger children (4-year-olds and 6-7-year-olds).   
 
2) Older children will be less likely to claim the possibility of success of direct 
mental-physical causality than younger children (i.e. imagination only, imagination 
plus trying, wishing).  
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3) There may be a difference in the success of direct mental-physical causality 
according to the type of mental process. Children may be more likely to claim success 
in wishing if they consider it to be a magical process rather than a type of imagining. 
 
4) There may be a difference in belief in the extent of success in wishing according to 
the quantity of items (i.e. wishing for ten items compared to one item). 
 
 
Method 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted to help select the youngest age to be used in the 
experimental study. A sample of ten children aged 3-3.5 years (five white and five 
black, with equal numbers of males and females) was presented with a sample of 
Woolley et al.’s (1999) semi-structured interview questions assessing children’s 
concepts of wishing. Finally, other potential forms of direct mental-physical causality 
were assessed by presenting illustrated picture stories, replicated from Woolley et al.’s 
study. Modifications included presenting pictures depicting the possibility of 
obtaining ten items versus one item. The procedure is described more thoroughly in 
the Materials and Procedure section below. 
Results showed that children of three years of age did not understand 
questions about wishing. Also, only two children aged 3.5 years of age were able to 
answer questions about wishing, such as “Can you tell me what it means to make a 
wish?” It was concluded that children as young as 3.5 years of age have difficulty 
explaining the concept of wishing and therefore the lower age range was set at four 
years.  
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Participants  
Eighty-four children (42 males and 42 females) took part in the study. They ranged in 
age from four to twelve years of age. There were three age cohorts consisting of thirty 
4-year-olds (mean 52.47 months), thirty 6-7-year-olds (mean 76.77 months) and 
twenty-four 11-12-year-olds (mean 137.25 months). Equal numbers of males and 
females were tested in each age group. The children in the study attended a S.E. 
London primary school and a S.E. London comprehensive school and were 
predominantly from middle class backgrounds although this was not directly assessed. 
Ethnicity was not systematically recorded (although anecdotally the children were 
predominantly white).  
 
Design 
An independent-participants design was employed comparing across the three age 
cohorts. All statistical tests were two-tailed unless otherwise indicated. 
 
Materials 
A modified and shortened semi-structured interview based on Woolley et al.’s (1999) 
study (following results of the pilot study) was used to explore children’s concepts of 
wishing as well as their beliefs in the efficacy of wishing (details are presented in the 
Procedure section below). Six A4 sized illustrated picture stories depicting potential 
forms of direct mental-physical causality were also used consisting of “Imagination 
only”, “Imagination plus trying”, and “Wishing” (see Procedure section for 
illustrations and details). Please note that “imagination plus trying” refers to explicit 
mention of trying to obtain an item by imagining whereas “imagination only” does 
not. 
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Procedure 
Wishing Interview  
All the children were interviewed individually in a quiet place (i.e. in a separate room 
or corridor away from the classroom). In order to address children’s concepts of 
wishing, they were asked questions such as, “Do you know what it means to wish?” 
Unlike Woolley et al. (1999), children were also asked, “Have you ever had a birthday 
cake with candles on and been asked to make a wish and blow out the candles?” This 
was used as a prompt for children who had claimed not to know what it means to 
make a wish as it was considered to be a common situation for wishing. It was also 
used as further clarification for children who had claimed to know what it means to 
make a wish. Children were also asked, “Have you ever made a wish?” Children were 
not interviewed further if they did not know what a wish was, responded “No” to the 
prompt question, and to ever having made a wish. All other children were asked, 
“Let’s say you made five wishes right now, what would you wish for?” On beliefs in 
the efficacy of wishing, children were asked questions such as, “Did your wish(es) 
come true?”, “Can wishes come true always, sometimes, never or don’t know?” and, 
“How many wishes out of five would come true?” Other questions assessed possible 
magical aspects of wishing, such as who or what children thought made wishes come 
true, if wishes can be made any time or only on special occasions, if a special object is 
needed, if something needs to be said when making a wish, if something needs to be 
done when making a wish, and if there is someone they know who makes wishes. The 
complete interview questions were asked in the following order: 
 
 
 
55 
 
1) Do you know what it means to make a wish?  
2) Have you ever had a birthday cake with candles on and been asked to make a wish 
and blow out the candles?  
3) Have you ever made a wish, wished for something? (If the response is “yes”, ask 
“What have you wished for?” If the response is “no” to this question but “yes” to 
question 1or 2, go on to question 4. If the response is “no” to this question and “no” 
to question 1and 2, do not ask any more questions.) 
4) Did your wish(es) come true?  
5) Can wishes come true: Always, sometimes, never or don’t know?  
6) Let’s say you made five wishes right now, what would you wish for? 
7) How many wishes out of five would come true: All, some or none? 
8) If wishes come true is it because somebody or something makes it come true or 
because it just happens? (If the response is “somebody or something”, ask “who or 
what makes your wishes come true?”) 
9) When can you make a wish, anytime or just on special occasions? (If the response 
is, “special occasions”, ask “when?”) 
10) When making a wish, do you need to use something like a special object? (If the 
response is “yes”, ask “what?” If the response to question 9 is “no”, prompt with 
“do you need a magic wand?”, “rubbing a lamp for a genie?”, “birthday candles?”, 
“stars as in wishing on stars?”) 
11) Is there anything you have to do when making a wish? (If the response is “yes”, 
ask “what?”) 
12) Is there anything you have to say when making a wish? (If the response is “yes”, 
ask “what?”) 
13) Does anyone you know make wishes? (If the response is “yes”, ask “who?”) 
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Mental-Physical Causality Task 
Relations between children’s beliefs about different types of other potential forms of 
direct mental-physical causality were assessed by presenting illustrated picture stories, 
designed to replicate Woolley et al. (1999). However, two modifications were 
introduced. Firstly, pictures depicting the possibility of ten items versus one item were 
shown. Therefore, six illustrated stories were used instead of three. Secondly, 
Woolley et al. stated in two of the picture stories that a character “likes” and in two 
other picture stories that a character “wants”. The current study stated for all stories 
that a character “wants” for reasons of consistency throughout and to convey a desire 
to obtain an item in all story types.  
Quantities of items per set of picture stories were randomly presented. One set 
of illustrated stories consisted of “Imagination only” – about a child wanting a puzzle 
and imagining it. A second set of stories showed a story about a child wanting ten 
puzzles and imagining them. The third set of stories consisted of “Imagination plus 
trying” – about a child imagining to try and get a ball to appear under a bed. A fourth 
set of stories showed a story about a child imagining plus trying to get ten balls to 
appear under a bed. The fifth set of stories consisted of “Wishing” – a child wishing 
for a rabbit behind a tree. The sixth set of stories showed a child wishing for ten 
rabbits behind a tree. After each story, children were asked if what the children in the 
stories were imagining, imagining plus trying, or wishing for would really be in the 
specified location when he or she looked for it. The item choices were deliberately 
exaggerated in order to assess the extent children might be willing to accept mental-
physical causality that was presented in fiction.  
Instead of showing the whole picture relating to a story at once, parts were 
revealed to the children that related to each section of the story as it was read out. For 
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example, in one of the stories for the “imagination only” condition, children were first 
only shown the girl in the picture and told “This is Sally”. Then they were shown the 
closed chest of drawers and told, “Sally looks in the drawer but there’s nothing there. 
She wants a puzzle”. Next, children were shown the girl and the thought bubble 
containing a puzzle in a chest of drawers, and told, “So she’s imagining that there’s a 
puzzle in the drawer”. Finally, children were shown the girl near the closed chest of 
drawers again and asked, “Now, when she looks in the drawer, will there really be a 
puzzle there?” Stories were presented in a random order. Details of each of the 
pictures and story types were as follows: 
 
 
 
“This is Sally. Sally looks in the drawer but there’s nothing there. She wants a puzzle. 
So she’s imagining that there’s a puzzle in the drawer”. 
Test Question: Now, when she looks in the drawer, will there really be a puzzle there? 
 
Figure 1.1: Story type for Imagination only - one item   
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“This is Peter. Peter looks under the bed but there’s nothing there. Peter wants a ball. 
So he’s going to use his imagination to try to get a ball”.   
Test Question: Now, when he looks under the bed, will there really be a ball under 
there? 
 
Figure 1.2: Story type for Imagination plus Trying - one item   
 
 
“This is Claire. Claire looks behind a tree but there’s nothing there. Claire wants a 
rabbit. So she’s wishing for a rabbit behind the tree”. 
Test Question: Now, when she looks behind the tree, will there really be a rabbit 
there? 
 
Figure 1.3: Story type for Wishing - one item   
59 
 
Results 
The present study employed measures in the area of assessing various aspects of 
children’s concepts of wishing as well as their beliefs in the efficacy of wishing, 
followed by measures of children’s responses concerning the efficacy of other forms 
of direct mental-physical causality (i.e., imagination only, imagining plus trying, 
wishing). Initially the results section addresses and presents the descriptive data for 
the responses to the interview questions specifically related to wishing followed by 
consideration of differences between the three age groups in relation to responses. 
Next, descriptive data are presented for children’s responses related to picture stories 
depicting direct mental-physical causality, followed by differences between the 
efficacy of the different types of causality. Non-parametric statistics are used 
throughout in the form of chi-square analyses unless otherwise mentioned.  
 
Interview 
The results for the interview questions on wishing can be found in Table 1.1 and 
Table 1.2. In these and other tables throughout the study, N represents the number of 
children who were questioned and answered a particular question. As only a very few 
children refused to answer a question, or responded with “Don’t know”, statistical 
analyses were only carried out on definite responses. It should be noted that children 
were not interviewed further on wishing if: 1) They did not know what a wish meant, 
and had not blown out candles on a birthday cake; 2) If they did not know what a wish 
meant and had not wished in the past; 3) They did know what a wish meant but had 
not blown out candles on a cake and had not wished in the past. (N = eight 4-year-
olds, six 6-7-year-olds, zero 11-12-year-olds). 
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The interview questions (that are presented in Table 1.1) showed that all three 
age groups were familiar with the concept of wishing, but greatest familiarity was 
found in the oldest group (11-12-year-olds). There was a significant age difference 
with regards to children claiming to know what it means to make a wish (²(2, N = 
84) = 15.55, p = .0001). More children in the 11-12-years old age group (79%) than in 
the 4-years-old age group (40%) and the 6-7-years old age group (27%) stated they 
knew what it meant. There was also a significant age difference in relation to children 
responding positively when prompted by the experimenter to help them decide if they 
had ever made a wish (²(2, N = 84) = 21.01, p  = .0001). When asked if they had ever 
had a birthday cake with candles on and blown them out and made a wish, fewer 11-
12-year-olds (25%) claimed to have done this compared to 4-year-olds (80%) and 6-
7-year-olds (77%). This implies that knowledge of wishing was not associated with 
having blown out candles on a birthday cake for the oldest age group. They may have 
either outgrown this or may have no memory of having done so whereas the opposite 
appears to be true for the two youngest age groups. Following on from this, the 
majority of children in all three age groups claimed to have made a wish in the past, 
with no significant differences being found (²(2, N = 83) = 3.84, p = .15).  
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Table 1.1: Frequency and Percentages of 4-12-year-olds’ Understanding of 
Wishing 
 
Question  
 
Age Group  
 4 years 
N=30 
6-7 years 
N=30 
11-12 years 
N=24 
Knows what it means to make a wish: 
Yes 
No 
 
12 (40%) 
18 (60%) 
 
8 (27%) 
22 (73%) 
 
19 (79%) 
5 (21%) 
Had a birthday cake and blown out candles and made 
a wish: 
Yes 
No 
 
 
24 (80%) 
6 (20%) 
 
 
23 (77%) 
7 (23%) 
 
 
6 (25%) 
18 (75%) 
Has wished in the past 
Yes 
No 
Don’t Know 
 
21 (70%) 
9 (30%) 
0 (0%) 
 
22 (73%) 
7 (23%) 
1 (3%) 
 
22 (92%) 
2 (8%) 
0 (0%) 
 
 N = 21 N = 22 N = 22 
(Those children who responded “Yes” to having 
wished in the past) - Has wished for: 
Materialistic items 
Altruistic items 
Career 
Cannot remember / Don’t know 
 
 
16 (76%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
5 (24%) 
 
 
14 (64%) 
5 (23%) 
1 (4%) 
2 (9%) 
 
 
10 (45%) 
8 (36%) 
3 (14%) 
1 (4%) 
(Those children who responded “Yes” to having 
wished in the past) - Past wishes came true: 
Yes 
No 
Cannot remember 
 
 
15 (71%) 
2 (10%) 
4 (19%) 
 
 
10 (45%) 
10 (45%) 
2 (10%) 
 
 
7 (32%) 
13 (59%) 
2 (9%) 
 
 
 
Regarding the types of things children have wished for in the past, Figure 1.4 
shows that more children in all three age groups claimed to have wished for 
materialistic items such as toys, sweets or bicycles. Whilst some 6-7-year-olds and 
11-12-year-olds responded that they had wished for altruistic things such as peace or 
for family members, and a few for a career, no 4-year-olds did so and this may have 
influenced age differences in response to whether past wishes had come true or not.  
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Figure 1.4: Frequency of 4-12-year-olds’ Past Wishes 
 
 
Table 1.2 presents further responses to questions regarding concepts of 
wishing and its efficacy. Although 11-12-year-olds were more familiar with the 
concept of wishing they tended to be more sceptical about its efficacy. An age-related 
decrease in efficacy was found: significantly more 4-year-olds stated that their past 
wishes came true (71%) compared to 6-7-year-olds (45%) and 11-12-year-olds (32%), 
(Fisher’s 2x3 Exact Test, N = 57; p = .0004, two-tailed). Furthermore, there was a 
significant difference between the age groups regarding their beliefs that all or some 
of the five wishes (that they would make) would come true (Fisher’s 3x3 Exact Test, 
N = 60; p = .00009, two-tailed). A higher percentage of 4-year-olds (50%) and 6-7-
year-olds (54%) believed that all the wishes would come true whereas no 11-12-year-
olds claimed that all of them would come true. 
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There was an age-related increase in children being more sophisticated in their 
responses by stating that wishes “sometimes” come true and that “some” wishes out 
of five would come true. A higher percentage of 11-12-year-olds claimed “some” 
wishes would come true (77%) compared to 4-year-olds (39%) and 6-7-year-olds 
(46%). Furthermore, significantly fewer 11-12-year-olds claimed that wishes always 
come true (0%) compared to 4-year-olds (32%) and 6-7-year-olds (18%), (3x3 
Fisher’s Exact Test, N = 64; p = .002, two-tailed). Again, more 11-12-year-olds were 
sophisticated in their responses by claiming that wishes “sometimes” come true (83%) 
compared to 4-year-olds (32%) and 6-7-year-olds (59%). 
 
64 
 
Table 1.2: Frequency and Percentages of 4-12-year-olds’ Understanding of 
Wishing and its Efficacy 
Question Age Group  
 4 years 
N=22 
6-7 years 
N=22 
11-12 years 
N=23 
Wishes come true: 
Always 
Sometimes 
Never 
Don’t know 
 
7 (32%) 
7 (32%) 
7 (32%) 
1 (4%) 
 
4 (18%) 
13 (59%) 
5 (23%) 
0 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 
19 (83%) 
2 (9%) 
2 (9%) 
 N = 22 N = 24 N = 24 
If were to make five wishes right now, would wish 
for: 
Materialistic items 
Health, wealth, happiness 
Altruistic (peace) 
Mixture 
Don’t know 
 
 
18 (82%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
4 (18%) 
 
 
20 (83%) 
1 (4%) 
3 (13%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
 
 
4 (17%) 
12 (50%) 
4 (17%) 
2 (8%) 
2 (8%) 
 N = 18 N = 24 N = 22 
(Those children who gave examples of what they 
would wish for) - How many wishes out of five would 
come true:  
All 
Some 
None 
Don’t know 
 
 
 
9 (50%) 
7 (39%) 
1 (6%) 
1 (6%) 
 
 
 
13 (54%) 
11 (46%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
 
 
 
0 (0%) 
17 (77%) 
2 (9%) 
3 (14%) 
 N = 18 N = 24 N = 24 
Who makes wishes come true: 
Someone/something 
Just happens 
Both 
Don’t know 
 
5 (28%) 
12 (67%) 
0 (0%) 
1 (5%) 
 
8 (33%) 
16 (67%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
 
9 (38%) 
10 (42%) 
3 (12%) 
2 (8%) 
 N = 19 N = 23 N = 24 
Can wish: 
Anytime 
Special occasions 
Cannot 
Don’t know 
 
8 (42%) 
9 (47%) 
1 (5%) 
1 (5%) 
 
8 (35%) 
14 (61%) 
0 (0%) 
1 (4%) 
 
17 (71%) 
6 (25%) 
0 (0%) 
1 (4%) 
 N = 20 N = 23 N = 24 
Special object needed 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
 
18 (90%) 
2 (10%) 
0 (0%) 
 
12 (52%) 
10 (43%) 
1 (4%) 
 
4 (17%) 
19 (79%) 
1 (4%) 
 N = 20 N = 24 N = 24 
Need to do something 
Yes 
No 
Don’t Know 
 
13 (65%) 
7 (35%) 
0 (0%) 
 
16 (67%) 
6 (25%) 
2 (8%) 
 
10 (42%) 
12 (50%) 
2 (8%) 
 N = 21 N = 24 N = 24 
Need to say something 
Yes 
No 
Don’t Know 
 
14 (67%) 
6 (29%) 
1 (5%) 
 
21 (88%) 
2 (8%) 
1 (4%) 
 
18 (75%) 
6 (25%) 
0 (0%) 
 N = 20 N = 21 N = 24 
Someone you know makes wishes 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
 
12 (60%) 
8 (40%) 
0 (0%) 
 
12 (57%) 
8 (38%) 
1 (55) 
 
13 (54%) 
9 (38%) 
2 (8%) 
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With regards to the types of things which the three age groups would wish for, 
the majority of the 4-year-olds (82%) and 6-7-year-olds (83%) wished for 
materialistic items such as toys, whilst 11-12-year-olds most frequently wished for 
health, wealth, happiness and a career (50%). Figure 1.5 illustrates children’s item 
choices.  
m
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Figure 1.5: Frequency of Items 4-12-year-olds would Wish for 
 
 
The oldest age group was more flexible in their use of wishing, in that more 
11-12-year-olds stated wishing could be done any time (71%) as opposed to special 
occasions (25%). Slightly more 4-year-olds stated that they could wish on special 
66 
 
occasions (47%) as opposed to anytime (42%). Likewise, more 6-7-year-olds claimed 
they could wish on special occasions (61%) as opposed to anytime (35%). Overall, 
there was a significant difference between the age groups (²(2, N = 62) = 6.73, p = 
.03). This indicates that although wishing is initially tied to specific situations, with 
age and experience it becomes something one can do any time. 
There were no significant age differences with regards to children claiming 
that someone or something makes wishes come true as opposed to them just 
happening (²(2, N = 60) = 1.44, p = .49). Children in all three age groups most often 
claimed that wishes just happen. Regarding components of wishing, significantly 
more 4-year-olds responded that a special object needed to be used when making a 
wish (90%) compared to 6-7 year olds (52%) and 11-12-year- olds (17%), (²(2, N = 
65) = 22.67, p = .0001). There were no significant age differences with regards to 
children responding that something needs to be said when making a wish (2x3 
Fisher’s Exact Test, N = 67; p = .18, two-tailed). All three ages groups mostly stated 
that something does need to be said. No significant age differences were found with 
regards to children believing that something needs to be done when wishing (²(2, N 
= 64) = 3.64, p = .16). Most 4-year-olds (65%) and 6-7-year-olds (67%) claimed that 
something does need to be done whilst fewer 11-12-year-olds (42%) claimed this. 
Finally, no significant age differences were found in response to, “Does anyone you 
know make wishes?” (²(2, N = 62) = 0, p = 1). Most children in all three age groups 
responded “yes” to this question and gave either family members or friends as 
examples. 
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Mental-Physical Causality Stories 
Descriptive statistics relating to the picture stories can be found in Table 1.3. These 
stories compared children’s beliefs about wishing to their beliefs about other potential 
forms of direct mental-physical causality. 
 
 
Table 1.3: Frequency of 4-12-year-olds claiming that the Mental could affect the 
Physical 
 
Pictures Age Group  
 4 years 
N=30 
6-7 years 
N=30 
11-12 years 
N=24 
Imagination only (1 item) 13 (43%) 15 (50%) 2 (8%) 
Imagination only (10 items) 19 (63%) 14 (47%) 3 (13%) 
Imagination + Trying (1 item) 18 (60%) 19 (63%) 6 (25%) 
Imagination + Trying (10 items) 15 (50%) 14 (47%) 3 (13%) 
Wishing (1 item) 14 (47%) 16 (53%) 5 (21%) 
Wishing (10 items) 16 (53%) 11 (37%) 2 (8%) 
 
 
As can be seen from the above table, 11-12-year-olds were the least likely to 
claim that imagination, imagination plus trying, or wishing, could cause a direct 
physical occurrence. Significant age differences in beliefs about mental-physical 
causality were found for all story types apart from wishing for one item: Imagination 
only (one item): (²(2) = 11.16, p = .004), Imagination only (ten items): (²(2) = 
13.61, p = .001), Imagination plus trying (one item): (²(2) = 8.63, p = .013), 
Imagination plus trying (ten items): (²(2) = 9.41, p = .009), Wishing (ten items): 
(²(2) = 10.9, p = .004). Older children (11-12-year-olds) were less likely to claim 
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success in obtaining both one item and ten items by imagining only, and imagining 
plus trying, and wishing (ten items) than younger children (4-year-olds and 6-7-year-
olds). No significant age difference was found for Wishing (one item) (²(2) = 4.62, p 
= .099).  
Following on from this, a series of Pearson 2x2 chi-square analyses and 
Fisher’s Exact Tests of probability were carried out and that revealed no significant 
differences within each age group between claiming success for one item or ten items 
according to a specific mental causality. This implies that success of mental causality 
was not dependent on the quantities of items to be obtained.  
Overall, children appeared to treat the six types of stories similarly. Table 1.4 
shows that for all story types (apart from imagination plus trying for one item) 
children appeared to be more likely to claim that mental processes cannot produce an 
item(s). 
 
 
Table 1.4: Overall Total Frequency of 4-12-year-olds’ Positive or Negative 
Responses for the Mental affecting the Physical  
 
Pictures Yes No 
Imagination only (1 item) 30 54 
Imagination + Trying (1 item) 43 41 
Wishing (1 item) 35 49 
Imagination only (10 items) 36 48 
Imagination + Trying (10 items) 32 52 
Wishing (10 items) 29 55 
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Chi-square analyses revealed no significant differences overall between the 
three story types regarding obtaining one item as opposed to not obtaining one item 
(²(2) = 4.91, p = .09) or between the three story types regarding obtaining ten items 
or not (²(2) = 1.11, p = .57). Furthermore, there were no significant differences 
overall between claiming success in obtaining one item or ten items for each story 
type (²(2) = 2.14, p = .34). The non-significant findings between the different story 
types imply that children, overall, did not consider wishing to be more likely to cause 
direct changes than imagination only or imagination plus trying and may indicate 
similarity in beliefs about these forms of mental-physical causality. It also implies 
children’s understanding of what mental states cannot do and that many of the 
children have rational beliefs about the mind and mental-physical causality. However, 
a sizeable minority of children believed that the items would appear and may be an 
indication of those children having irrational beliefs about the mind and mental-
physical causality. 
 
Cautionary Note 
The results of the multiple comparisons carried out in Study 1 should be accepted 
with some caution as multiple statistical analyses conducted on the same data set can 
lead to the increased possibility of Type I errors, whereby the use of several statistical 
tests on one data set can increase likelihood of any one of these producing a spurious 
statistically significant result. The same caution should be borne in mind for all of the 
multiple analyses conducted in the current thesis. 
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Discussion 
The main aim of Study 1 was to assess children’s concepts of wishing and its efficacy 
by comparing three age groups and in so doing to provide a partial replication and 
extension of the work of Woolley et al. (1999). Evidence of developmental changes 
was found in the current study that supports Woolley et al.’s findings. As expected, 
the oldest age group (i.e. 11-12-year-olds) showed greatest familiarity with wishing as 
demonstrated in their response to knowing what it means to make a wish and having 
wished in the past, implying that knowledge about wishing increases with age. The 
current study also found some indication of an age-related decrease in belief in the 
efficacy of wishing as evidenced by the positive response across age groups regarding 
whether past wishes came true. Furthermore, there was also an age-related decrease in 
the number of children asserting that wishes “always” come true, with the vast 
majority of the 11-12-year-old’s taking the more realistic position that wishes 
“sometimes” come true. An age-related decrease in belief in the efficacy of wishing 
may come about because older children may simply be becoming more critical or 
sceptical in general. Alternatively, their scepticism may be empirically based and 
specific to wishing; they may have tried numerous times to wish for things without 
success and simply deduced that it does not work. It may also be that the sort of things 
that younger children wish for are simpler and more likely to be obtained anyway, 
giving younger children the illusion that their wishing is working, whereas older 
children’s wishes are more complex and so less likely to be realised through other 
means. Indeed, in the current study there was an age difference regarding the choice 
of wishes children have made in the past and wishes they would make; most 4-year-
olds wished for both toys and animals, 6-7-year-olds most frequently wished for toys 
71 
 
and equipment such as a bicycle and 11-12-year-olds most frequently wished for 
health, wealth, happiness and a career.   
The two youngest ages were less flexible in their use of wishing by claiming 
that wishes can only be done on special occasions. However, when probed further for 
an example, of those children who claimed that wishing can only be done on special 
occasions, 12 out of 29 of them stated that wishes can occur on a particular day (such 
as Wednesday or Sunday), or time (such as morning, afternoon, or evening), 
“sometimes”, or “when you’re feeling desperate or sad”. These statements illustrate 
difficulty in distinguishing between “any time” and “special occasions” as they may 
be interpreted as both representing the same concept due to the fact that the responses 
are specific days, times, or emotions and not necessarily special occasions. Somewhat 
unexpectedly, only seven out of 29 children who claimed that wishes can be done on 
special occasions gave Christmas time, birthdays or Easter as an example (with four 
of them being responses from 6-7-year-olds and three from 11-12-year-olds). 
Although this fits with most of the 11-12-year-olds responses that they have never had 
a birthday where they have blown out candles on a cake and made a wish, it goes 
against those 4-year-olds who claimed that they had, as none of them gave birthday as 
an example for a special occasion. Further contradiction was found when seven out of 
eighteen 4-year-olds claimed that a special object was needed when making a wish, in 
the form of candles on a birthday cake. These findings conflict with those found by 
Woolley et al., whereby wishing was found to be tied to Christmas and birthdays. It 
should be noted that differences between the two studies may be due to Woolley et al. 
specifically asking if Christmas and birthdays were good times to make a wish.  
Although the current study confirms Woolley et al.’s (1995, 1999) finding that 
there is a growing awareness with age of the concept of wishing and an age-related 
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decrease in beliefs about its efficacy, it lends only tentative support towards an age-
related decrease in children’s beliefs in a magical aspect of wishing. The 11-12-year-
olds were the least likely to claim that a magical being makes wishes come true, that a 
special object is needed, that magical words need to be spoken, that a magical action 
needs to be done, or a magical explanation for when a wish can be made. In contrast, 
4-year-olds were the most likely to perceive wishing as involving magic. 
Extrapolating detailed responses to certain questions revealed wishing involving 
elements of magic. Yet the findings did not indicate a high degree of belief in the 
magical nature of wishing and interpreting some children’s responses proved difficult 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, regarding components of wishing, significantly more 
4-year-olds and 6-7-year-olds claimed that a special object was needed in contrast to 
11-12-year-olds who most often claimed that a special object was not needed. 
Although this points towards the oldest age group not associating wishing with magic, 
the apparent magical interpretations of younger participants should be treated with 
caution. All children had been prompted with examples of special objects when being 
asked if a special object was needed to make a wish (e.g., a magic wand, candles on a 
cake). When children were then asked what object was needed, 14 out of 34 children 
(i.e. nine out of eighteen 4-year-olds and five out of twelve 6-7-year-olds) gave a 
magic wand as an example. While this may be considered a magical item and 
specifically linked to wishing, younger children may be more susceptible to social 
influence. As such, they may simply have been imitating or seeking to please the 
experimenter by providing the same example rather than accurately representing their 
magical beliefs.  
A second example of ambiguous interpretation is related to the assertion that 
wishes coming true “just happens”. Children in all three age groups most often 
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claimed that wishes just happen rather than someone or something makes them come 
true. However, children’s understanding of the meaning of the phrase “just happens” 
is not clear. It could just as well be associated with chance as with magic. 
Furthermore, Corrigan (2004) examined American English-speaking children’s 
production of “happen/happens/happening/happened” and found they were 
increasingly likely to use “happen” to describe negative contexts (e.g. accidents, 
something dreadful) as children's language progressed.  
Of those children who did claim that someone or something makes wishes 
come true, only a few children responded that a magical entity is involved in the form 
of fairies, Father Christmas, or elves (i.e. two 4-year-olds and three 6-7-year-olds). No 
11-12-year-olds gave a specific magical being as an example, and this was the only 
age group (apart from one 4-year-old) to claim that wishes are actualized by someone 
providing a sought after item, such as when a parent will give a child a specific item 
that has been bought (i.e. five out of eight children). Therefore, it would seem that as 
children get older they perceive wishing to be a uniquely human activity. It should be 
noted that some children in all three age groups ascribed God to making wishes come 
true (i.e. one 4-year-old, five 6-7-year-olds and three 11-12-year-olds), but the 
children’s understanding of the concept of ‘God’ is unclear as it was not investigated 
directly. Specifically, do children think of God in human terms or superhuman terms 
that may reference a magical force? Woolley et al. (1999) reported numerous religious 
intrusions into children’s beliefs about wishing. Some children when asked who 
makes wishes come true responded “Jesus” or when asked to teach a puppet to wish 
said that he “needs to ask God”. Some children even explicitly confused wishing and 
praying when asked if they knew what wishing was. Long, Elkind, and Spilka (1967) 
found there was an increased recognition in 9-10-year-old children that “God [was] a 
74 
 
helper and not a magic genie who simply [made] one’s wishes come true,” (p. 107) 
implying that this latter form was the way in which younger children conceived of 
God. See Richert and Barrett (2005) for an in-depth review of the development of 
children’s understanding of God.” 
Finally, only a very few children gave explicitly magic-related responses. For 
example, two 4-year-olds asserted that wishes could only be made, “If you’ve got 
magic in your fingers” or, “If you see a wishing star”. Four 4-year-olds and one 6-
year-old asserted that one needs to “do a spell”, have a “special power” or “wave a 
wand about” in order for a wish to come true. Two 4-year-olds thought one had to say 
something special such as “abracadabra”. Finally, when probed to explain who they 
know that grants wishes, only one 4-year-old and three 6-7-year-olds responded with 
a magical entity such as fairies or witches. 
As only a few 4-year-olds (and even fewer 6-7- and 11-12-year-olds) gave a 
magically relevant response to these specific questions, it does not greatly provide 
support for Woolley et al.’s (1999) claim that most children under six years of age 
involve magic in wishing. The present findings bring into question whether children 
really do believe in a magical aspect of wishing as claimed by Vikan and Clausen 
(1993) and Woolley et al. However, it should be noted that there is a regrettable 
oversight in the present study. At no point were children asked directly about the link 
between wishing and magic. Instead, the link with magic can only be inferred from 
the children’s responses to certain questions, such as whether one needs to use a 
special object such as a magic wand for a wish to come true. Future studies may 
benefit from asking children directly about their thoughts on the link between wishing 
and magic. Furthermore, the study only interviewed children about wishing. It did not 
use a task that involved making a wish and showing an actual physical outcome that 
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could be linked to magical causality. Woolley et al., in a second study, presented a 
trick box that appeared to be empty and encouraged children to make a wish for a 
penny. On reopening the box and finding a penny inside children were asked if their 
wish had made it happen and if it was real magic or a trick. Results indicated that for 
most children who believed in the efficacy of wishing it is a magical process, as 
evidenced by them giving a “real magic” causal explanation. 
Various findings in the current study do not point strongly towards wishing 
appearing to have an intentional mental state component, since very few children 
verbally related the act of wishing to actual thought processes. Whilst age appears to 
be a factor in children associating the act of wishing with thinking about something in 
their head (with 11-12-year-olds most likely to acknowledge a link), responses in line 
with this were few. All three age groups most often claimed that something needs to 
be said when making a wish, and when probed further most were literal in their 
responses by saying that the words needed are, “I wish out loud” (27 out of 53 
children) or, “Say please and thank you” (seven out of 53 children). Overall, only a 
few specifically acknowledged that certain thought processes were needed as in, 
“Think in your head” (i.e. one 4-year-old, one 6-7-year-old and four 11-12-year-olds). 
It is unclear whether some children’s responses represented a link between wishing 
and the necessity to just think of something mentally, or a link between wishing and 
speaking out loud (i.e. four children in response to the question, “Is there anything 
you have to say when making a wish?”stated, “What wished for”). Furthermore, when 
probed on what needs to be done when making a wish, only three children (i.e. one 4-
year-old and two 11-12-year-olds) gave an explanation in the form of mental 
processes, such as, “think in your head” or, “believe it” or, “be positive”. In fact, more 
children considered wishing to be simply a physical act, as the most frequent 
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explanation overall was that, “You need to close your eyes” (i.e. 10 out of 39 
children). These findings do not appear to strongly support Woolley et al.’s (1999) 
suggestion that wishing involves beliefs about mental-physical causality as they found 
that children implicate thinking in wishing. However, a different methodology was 
used in the current study compared to Woolley et al. that may have contributed to 
these contrasting results. In the present study, the questions were not geared 
specifically towards thinking and whether they consider it to be more than simply a 
physical act (e.g., closing one’s eyes) and so did not provide information on whether 
children believe thinking to be an essential component of wishing. Woolley et al. 
included control stories that assessed potential distinctions between wishing and 
wanting and other goal directed behaviour (i.e. looking). It should be noted that Study 
1 of this thesis did not aim to assess children’s views of wishing as a mental process. 
However, had children been asked, “Do you have to say something out loud or only 
think about something in your head” rather than, “Do you have to say something?” 
and “Do you have to do something?” children’s belief or disbelief in the efficacy of 
wishing in terms of mental causation would be clarified. 
Another aim of Study 1 was to assess possible relations in children’s beliefs 
about wishing with another form of potential direct mental-physical causality, namely 
imagining. As with Woolley et al. (1999), the stories were designed to assess 
differences in children’s claims about wishing and imagination and to determine 
whether adding explicit mention of intention to imagination stories (i.e. imagining 
plus trying) would increase claims of efficacy. A fairly consistent pattern in line with 
what was anticipated, and that supports Woolley et al.’s claim of age-related changes, 
was found. Significant age differences in beliefs about mental-physical causality were 
found for all but one of the six story types (i.e. wishing for one item). Specifically, 11-
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12-year-olds were less likely than 4-year-olds and 6-7-year-olds to claim that the 
mental could affect the physical. This seems to reflect children’s increasing 
understanding of physical laws of nature and more developed theories of mind. These 
findings, together with results showing an age-related decrease in the efficacy of 
wishing, support other research that has found a belief in the efficacy of mental-
physical causality decreases with age (Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & 
Hickling, 1994; Subbotsky, 2005; Woolley, 2000).  
Children appeared to treat the six types of stories similarly; no significant 
differences were found overall between the three story types regarding success in 
obtaining one item or not, or between the three story types regarding success in 
obtaining ten items or not. More importantly, the findings show that children did not 
significantly consider wishing to be more likely to cause direct changes than 
imagining and may indicate similarity in beliefs about these forms of mental-physical 
causality. However, as Woolley et al. suggest, the presentation of the stories may be 
too structurally similar and so findings reflected this rather than actual conceptual 
differences. Alternatively, it may be that the fact that the stories were hypothetical 
influenced the children’s concepts. Furthermore, the findings may have been 
influenced by the context in which the task was presented (i.e. fiction). Responses to 
hypothetical stories may differ from real wishing or imagining situations. For 
instance, Subbotsky (1994) found that almost all 4- and 5-year-olds deny that 
permeability of a solid body (glass wall of a box) could occur in real life but under the 
influence of a fairy tale, the majority of 4- and 5-year-olds revealed their credulity. In 
Study 1 of this thesis, children were merely shown pictures regarding mental-physical 
causality rather than observing an empirical demonstration. So there was no assurance 
that children’s responses were based on their perceptions of wishing and imagination 
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efficacy in the real world. This might be better addressed in future work by presenting 
children with actual imagining and wishing situations that are separated by a filler 
task or in different sessions (e.g., children are shown a box and the experimenter 
states that he or she is going to wish for something in the box).  
Children may have been focusing on the type of object being sought in the 
picture stories rather than the mental process being applied. Perhaps if the same item 
for each story type had been presented that is commonly associated with wishing, 
such as an illustration of a gift-wrapped item, this may yield differences between the 
mental processes. Perhaps younger children may not be familiar with the convention 
of thought patterns presented in pictures in the format of thought bubbles. If this were 
the case, they may have looked at the pictures depicting imagining, and imagining 
plus trying, and failed to realize that these depicted thought processes within thought 
bubbles. Instead, they may literally see the item in the picture (i.e. a puzzle in a 
bubble) and respond “Yes” when asked if a puzzle(s) will really be in a drawer as a 
result of imagining, or a ball(s) will really be under a bed as a result of imagining plus 
trying. However, research has found that young children as young as three years of 
age are capable of understanding the concept of thought bubbles as reflecting mental 
states (e.g., Custer, 1996; Schult, Hollander, & Wellman, 1994). For instance, Custer 
utilized thought bubbles to investigate young children’s understanding of various 
mental representations (beliefs, pretenses, and memories) that contradict reality. 
Three- and 4-year-olds chose “thought pictures” (depicting either the mental 
representation or reality) that reflected the mental state of story protagonists. While 4-
year-olds performed “relatively well” on all scenario types, 3-year-olds chose the 
correct thought picture more often for pretense and memory scenarios than for false 
belief scenarios. Furthermore, whilst children conceptualized pretense as involving 
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mental representations, they had more difficulty understanding contradictory mental 
representations that purported to correspond to reality. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, some children in the oldest age group stated that 
imagination could cause a physical occurrence. However, this does not necessarily 
reflect actual belief in its efficacy or lack of understanding that using one’s 
imagination is not an effective way to alter physical reality. Indeed, three 11-12-year-
olds stated that if the character imagined hard enough they could imagine a ball under 
a bed as opposed to it actually occurring. Alternatively, acknowledgment may depict 
their suspicion of the question being asked and wondering if there was a deliberate 
catch to the question rather than an actual belief in its efficacy.  
The lack of significant differences overall between claims of efficacy in 
wishing versus imagination, and the fact that children overall were less likely to 
believe in the efficacy of mental-physical causality highlights the fact that most 
children do have an understanding of what mental states cannot do. It does not appear 
to lend support to Woolley et al.’s proposal that wishing beliefs are not subject to a 
theory of mind (ToM). It also does not point towards supporting claims that wishing 
beliefs may lie at an intersection between magic and theories of mind, or that wishing 
beliefs may lie in a magic domain that is separate from a ToM domain in which 
imagination belongs. However, as the current study did not specifically assess 
children’s beliefs in a magical aspect of wishing, one cannot conclusively dismiss 
these claims. The fact that some children (even older children) acknowledged that 
both wishing and imagination can bring about direct change implies that, irrespective 
of age, these children may not have a fully developed ToM. I will be returning to 
issues of ToM in more detail and from a different perspective in Studies 5 and 6 of 
this thesis.  
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Conclusion 
Study 1 of this thesis provides further empirical documentation of the existence of an 
everyday childhood phenomenon that has previously received primarily anecdotal 
support - the development of children’s beliefs about wishing. The results of the 
current study on wishing confirm, in line with Woolley et al. (1999), that there is a 
growing awareness with age of the concept of wishing and an age-related decrease in 
beliefs about its efficacy. As predicted, older children (11-12-year-olds) were more 
familiar with the concept of wishing and tended to be more sceptical about its efficacy 
than younger children (4-year-olds and 6-7-year-olds). The current study did not find 
strong evidence in support of the suggestion that young children believe that wishing 
is a magical process or necessarily attribute it to thought processes (i.e. thinking 
mentally rather than speaking out loud).  
Significant age differences were also found in children’s beliefs about the 
efficacy of other potential forms of direct mental-physical causality. Overall, 11-12-
year-olds were less likely than 4-year-olds and 6-7-year-olds to claim that the mental 
(i.e. wishing, imagination, imagination with explicit mention of trying to actually 
obtain something) could affect the physical (apart from wishing for one item). These 
findings are in line with other research that has found that a belief in the efficacy of 
mental-physical causality decreases with age. However, children overall treated all 
story types similarly: there were no differences in the effectiveness of wishing over 
imagination and children were generally unlikely to believe that these processes can 
directly create physical objects. 
Study 1 did not find substantial evidence of children’s beliefs in magical 
causality in relation to wishing. Yet there was an implication that younger children 
were more likely than older children to think magically (i.e. believe in mental-
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physical causality). Children were only presented with stories in a fictional format and 
so this study did not address children’s interpretation of an actual violation of physical 
laws. Therefore, it is of interest to further explore young children’s magical thinking 
directly. The next two studies in the current thesis will present children with a 
conjuring demonstration and focus on their interpretation of the event and address 
their concept of “magic”. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
STUDY 2 - Does repetition of a question regarding a magical demonstration  
alter children’s causal explanations? 
 
 
 “Constant repetition carries conviction”. (Robert Collier) 
 
 
Children are exposed to repetition in many ways. For instance, learning multiplication 
tables at school or songs such as “ten green bottles sitting on a wall” both involve 
repetition. Chandler and Lalonde (1994) have used this principle of repetition to 
examine the extent to which preschool-aged children are willing to invoke magic to 
explain an event that appears to violate a known physical law. They claim that 
repetition of an unusual event causes young children to quickly shift from “magical” 
to “trick” explanations. However, the current study proposes that children may 
misinterpret repetition as conveying a necessity to alter their responses or respond 
inconsistently or in an appropriate way to satisfy what they perceive is expected. 
Therefore, Study 2 of the current thesis was concerned with investigating the effects 
of repetition on young children’s interpretation of a coin trick. Specifically, it focused 
on the possible influence of a specific task demand in the form of repetitive 
questioning on young children’s causal explanations of the event. In so doing, it 
aimed to critically evaluate Chandler and Lalonde’s claim that young children will 
think in terms of trickery as opposed to magic after a series of trials because of 
repetitive viewing and when given the opportunity to examine apparatus. The current 
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study tested an alternative proposal that children may change their responses over a 
series of trials because of repetitive questioning.  
A good deal of work in cognitive development has suggested that young 
children rapidly start to interpret events in the light of appropriate causal principles 
based on laws of physics (Gelman & Wellman, 1992). Magical events violate 
everyday causal principles. One type of implies violation of the fundamental law of 
object permanence, such as if a physical object spontaneously disappears without a 
trace and without a clear physical mechanism being a reason for this. Subbotsky 
(2001) refers to this as “non-permanence magic”. Piaget (1954/1986) defined the 
concept of object permanence as the belief that a physical object continues to exist 
after it disappears from the perceptual field. He established that children understand 
object permanence around the age of two years, when they start handling manual 
objects in accord with the objects’ physical and spatial properties.  
Numerous studies have examined under what conditions children are willing 
to label events as “magic” that violate some law of physics (e.g., Chandler & Lalonde, 
1994; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Subbotsky, 2004). As was 
discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, various researchers have suggested that children 
often revert to non-naturalistic causal explanations (based on magic) when they are 
unfamiliar with a phenomenon and are unable to explain it in any reasonable physical 
manner (e.g., Berzonsky, 1971; Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994). 
Both Chandler and Lalonde, and Phelps and Woolley claim that children aged four, 
six, and eight years quite often use the word “magic” simply to mark phenomena for 
which they lack immediate physical explanations. Therefore, insufficient knowledge 
and lack of understanding appear to be the most important determinants of children’s 
magical responses when shown an apparent violation of a physical law. It seems that 
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the more knowledge a child possesses about physical phenomena, the less likely they 
are to resort to magical explanations.  
Chandler and Lalonde (1994) presented young children with a display similar 
to that used in one of Baillargeon’s infant habituation studies (Baillargeon, 1991). 
They found that when 3-5-year-old children initially witnessed what appeared to be 
one solid object passing unhindered through a space already occupied by another solid 
object (i.e. a blatant violation of a physical principle), over half of them labelled the 
event as magical. Yet over the course of three repeated viewings and further 
questioning almost all judged it to be a trick. They suggest that when faced with a 
clear violation of expectation, children are initially willing to label an event as 
“magic” but abandon this explanation when given the opportunity to consider 
alternative explanations by examining the apparatus. The authors propose that the 
initial responses of “magic” only refer to parlour magic because if the children had 
used “magic” as a reference to the notion of the truly supernatural, then after offering 
a magical account in trial one they should not apparently abandon this explanation in 
subsequent later trials by going on to search for evidence of trickery. In a review, 
Harris (1994) proposes that what children meant by describing the event as “magic” 
was precisely that it violated a firmly held physical principle (one solid object cannot 
pass through another). Children know this to be impossible even though it has 
happened before their eyes. At this point, therefore, children are categorizing the 
event as one that creates a conflict between what they have seen and what they know 
to be possible. They are not offering any explanation for how the conflict has come 
about, such as supernatural powers. Only when given an opportunity to explore the 
apparatus do they discover the explanation: the experimenter is using trick apparatus. 
These researchers imply that children use the term “magic” when they are unaware of 
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the mechanism behind an apparent violation of an event or that the underlying causal 
mechanism is not readily observable.  
However, the switching of the child’s response in Chandler and Lalonde’s 
(1994) study from “magic” to “trick” may have nothing to do with their responses 
representing a true belief or realization of the demonstration as being a trick. Instead it 
may simply reflect the child’s expectation of what they think the experimenter wants 
to hear, as a consequence of repeated questioning. They may mistakenly think that the 
experimenter asks the question again because he or she wants a different answer. The 
most prominent search for the effects of demand characteristics of a task has been 
explored in experiments on conservation whereby researchers have found that 
children change answers to repeated questions (e.g., Dent & Stephenson, 1979; 
Donaldson, 1978; Goodman & Reed, 1986; Moston, 1990; Pratt, 1990; Rose & Blank, 
1974; Siegal, 1997; Siegal, Waters, & Dinwiddy, 1988). One of the most powerful 
empirical demonstrations was provided by Rose and Blank. They varied the 
traditional number conservation experiment slightly by asking one question rather 
than two. The usual procedure is to show the child two identical rows of counters 
side-by-side and ask whether they are the same in number (the answer almost 
invariably is “yes”) and then to lengthen or shorten one of the rows and ask the same 
question once again. Rose and Blank’s variation was to drop the pre-transformation 
question and only to ask the child to compare the rows after the transformation. 
Children who failed the traditional task often succeeded when one question only was 
asked. Samuel and Bryant (1984) suggest that the child’s error in the conservation 
task has nothing to do with the transformation but is simply a misinterpretation of 
what the experimenter wants to hear (i.e. it implies that the first answer was not 
acceptable and should be switched).   
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Many experimental studies seeking to determine children’s magical beliefs 
have also used repetition in one form or another. Some have shown numerous similar 
tasks or trials that involve similar prolonged questioning (e.g., Johnson & Harris, 
1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Rosengren, Kalish, 
Hickling, & Gelman, 1994; Subbotsky, 2004). Studies have also included pre- and 
post-transformation questions (e.g., Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 
1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Subbotsky, 2004, 2007, 2009). For instance, 
children have been asked to make predictions as to whether a transformation can 
occur and then are shown the apparent transformation. Hence some children’s earlier 
views may be compromised. Furthermore, in Rosengren and Hickling’s study children 
were prompted with answers if they did not respond or stated that they did not know 
how an event had occurred. As a result many of the children in these studies may have 
been merely pressured by the experimenter to abandon firmly held causal principles. 
Rosengren and Hickling found that when questioned hypothetically and prior to 
viewing transformations, most 4- and 5-year-old children denied the reality of 
“impossible” transformations (i.e. classic magic tricks, such as two coloured dots 
changing colour by pressing on them). Yet, after seeing the impossible events many 
4-year-olds changed their minds and acknowledged these events to be really magical. 
Subbotsky (2004) argues that if children change their minds during such experiments 
then it shows beliefs are not entrenched. However, this thesis proposes that change in 
children’s responses may reflect compliance towards the experimenter. Ordinarily we 
do not repeat requests when an answer has already been given and this may be linked 
to conflicting reports about what children actually mean by “magic”. Yet despite the 
importance of the issue, sensitivity to the experimenter’s intent in these contexts has 
received little attention to date. 
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Study Aim 
The main aim of Study 2 was to investigate whether repetition alone influences 
children’s causal responses regarding a demonstration of vanishing coins (i.e. a coin 
trick). To this end, it aimed to assess critically Chandler and Lalonde’s (1994) claim 
that most children will initially respond “magic” following an apparent violation of 
object permanence, as the demonstration is inexplicable to the child, but after repeated 
trials or after the child explores the apparatus most will say “trick”. Furthermore, the 
present study aimed to assess Chandler and Lalonde’s claim that children will not 
change responses if initially they respond in terms of trickery.  
Study 2 also sought to examine children’s responses to further questioning 
about the demonstration and, finally, “magic” and “trick” concepts in general in order 
to systematically address which of these more subtle descriptions most accurately 
characterized children’s responses in the coin trick. As was discussed in the opening 
chapter, some investigators point out that the real issue when addressing children’s 
conceptions of apparent violations of physical laws is the extent to which children 
engage in magical thinking. Do they truly believe magic to be a real, supernatural 
force as opposed to only being an explanation referring to tricks as in parlour magic or 
sleight-of-hand (e.g., Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & 
Hickling, 1994)? Likewise, children may view the coin demonstration as a trick even 
if they labelled it as “magic”. Some studies have not given an alternative choice to 
magic as an explanation as opposed to whether an outcome can happen in a certain 
manner (e.g., Johnson & Harris, 1994; Subbotsky, 1997). For instance, Subbotsky 
(1997) only asked children if a postage stamp splitting in half was due to magic or 
not. Children’s explanations of causal events may be subtle and complex. Therefore, 
in order to minimize ambiguity in the interpretation of responses, the interview aimed 
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to ensure those who gave non-permanent answers did indeed mean a genuine magical 
change of the coins and not another term for a trick change involving an explicable 
though hidden mechanical change or sleight of hand. It should be noted that for this 
same purpose of reducing ambiguity in the interpretation of answers that contained 
references to magic, children throughout the studies in the thesis were given a causal 
response choice of “magic” or “trick” for the conjuring demonstrations.  
Four- to 6-year-old children were selected specifically because most theory 
has tended to focus on younger children up to age six. Indeed, Rothbaum and Weisz 
(1988) described a magical stage up to six years of age. There is also evidence that at 
this age children are still prone to magical belief (Subbotsky, 2007), that 4- and 5-
year-olds quite often refer to magic when asked to explain tricks (Rosengren & 
Hickling, 1994) and Rosengren and Hickling (2000) consider that magical thinking 
peaks at six years of age and declines thereafter.   
 
It was hypothesised that: 
If Chandler and Lalonde (1994) are right, the following hypotheses would follow: 
 
1) Children who are repeatedly questioned will be less likely to switch “trick” 
responses than to switch “magic” responses regarding a coin trick.  
 
2) Children who repeatedly view a coin trick will be less likely to retain “magic” 
responses than to retain “trick” responses.  
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3) Finally, children who view a coin trick once will be less likely to give “trick” 
responses than children who repeatedly view it, or repeatedly view it and are then 
given the opportunity to examine the apparatus.   
 
 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty-nine children (70 males and 69 females) participated in the 
study. They ranged in age from four to six years of age (mean 59.27 months). The 
children in the study attended a S.E. London primary school and were predominantly 
from middle class backgrounds although this was not directly assessed. Ethnicity was 
not systematically recorded (although anecdotally the children were predominantly 
white).  
 
Design 
The study used between-samples design with experimental condition as the 
independent variable and various verbal responses to the demonstration as the 
dependent variables. The details of presentation of the coin trick varied between the 
experimental conditions as described below. A correlational design was also 
incorporated that included follow-up questions on children’s concepts of “magic” and 
“tricks”. There were approximately equal numbers of children in the three 
experimental conditions (47 in Condition 1, 47 in Condition 2, 45 in Condition 3).  
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Materials  
The apparatus that was employed was a commercially available “coin trick”, 
consisting of an empty cylindrical metal cap and what appeared to be a genuine stack 
of five coins. In fact there was only one actual ten pence coin resting on an apparent 
stack of four coins which were stuck together (see Figure 2.1). A videotape of the 
trick was shown on a portable television screen, with the screen measuring 32 cm 
wide and 24 cm high.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Coin Trick Apparatus  
 
Procedure 
All 139 children were tested individually in a private room by the same experimenter. 
The children and the experimenter sat at a table next to one another. The television 
was situated in front of them, approximately two feet away. The experimenter ensured 
that all children had a clear view of the television screen. Children were only told that 
they were going to be shown something on the television screen. An edited 
videotaped demonstration of an adult making an apparent stack of coins disappear 
under a gold circular container was shown individually three times via a television 
screen with no sound. Specifically, the children only saw someone’s hand and the 
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apparatus in close up. This was so that the focal point was the action on the apparatus 
itself and not the legitimacy of the person performing the action. Children were shown 
the empty cap first. Then the stack of coins was covered with the cap and pressed 
gently downwards. The cap was then turned over to show that the coins had 
disappeared. In actual fact, the coins were hidden in the cap. Children were randomly 
allocated to one of three conditions:  
 
Condition 1  
Children were shown the videotape of an adult making coins disappear, followed by 
the experimenter putting the videotape on pause and asking them, “Was that magic or 
a trick?” The video was then pressed to play again and the children were shown the 
coins being made to disappear again. The videotape was then put on pause again and 
children asked, “Was that magic or a trick?” Children were then shown the coins 
being made to disappear a final time, followed by the video being paused and being 
asked, “Was that magic or a trick?” In total, the videotape was paused three times and 
the child asked the same question three times.  
  
Condition 2  
Children were shown the videotape of an adult making coins disappear three times, 
without any pauses. They were then asked “Was that magic or a trick?”   
 
Condition 3  
Children were shown a videotaped demonstration of a person making coins disappear 
three times without a pause. They were then given the apparatus as shown at the end 
of the demonstration on the videotape (i.e. with the coins hiding in the container) and 
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told that they could handle the apparatus if they wanted to. After approximately 30 
seconds of handling the apparatus the children were asked, “Was what you saw on the 
videotape magic or a trick?”  
 
For children in all three conditions, the question was counterbalanced (to 
control for order effects) so that half of them were asked, “Was that magic or a trick?” 
and half of them were asked, “Was that a trick or magic?” Responses were noted 
down. All the children were then asked two follow-up questions about the 
demonstration. A post-demonstration interview was then carried out questioning 
children about their concepts of magic and tricks. Responses were once again noted 
down. The extended questions were included as simply asking children whether the 
demonstration was “magic” or a “trick” did not fully address children’s underlying 
concept or understanding of the event. The questions were in the following order: 
 
1) Do you know how the person made the coins disappear? (If the answer is “Yes”, 
children are asked, “Where are the coins?”) 
2) Can anyone make the coins disappear?  
3) Do you know what magic is? (If the answer is “Yes”, children are asked, “What is 
magic?”)  
4) Is magic something real or is it just tricks?  
5) Do you know what a trick is? (If the answer is “Yes”, children are asked, “What is 
a trick?”) 
6) Can you do magic? 
7) Can a friend do magic? 
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8) Can a family member do magic? (Prompt: mummy, daddy, brother, sister, aunt, 
uncle) 
9) Can your teacher do magic? 
10) Can a magician do magic? 
11) Can anyone learn magic or do you need special powers?   
 
 
Results 
The present study assessed verbal responses to a coin trick, followed by consideration 
of children’s concepts of “magic” and “tricks”. Initially the Results section presents 
the descriptive data for the responses specifically related to the coin trick followed by 
differences in responses between the three conditions. Next, descriptive data are 
presented for children’s concepts of “magic” and “tricks” followed by differences 
between the two concepts. Non-parametric statistics were used throughout in the form 
of either chi-square analyses or Fisher’s Exact Test of probability and, where 
applicable, two-tailed tests were used. It should be noted that a small number of 
children failed to give definitive answers regarding some interview questions as 
indicated in tables by “don’t know” or by stating “both” or “neither”. Therefore, they 
were eliminated from further analyses throughout this study. This included four 
children in relation to the coin demonstration, and between one and eleven children in 
relation to magic and trick concepts. 
 
Coin Trick Demonstration 
The responses to the coin trick are presented in Table 2.1. This table shows that in all 
three experimental conditions children were more likely to state that the 
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demonstration was “magic” rather than a “trick” (apart from children’s second 
response in Condition 1). This suggests that more children in all three conditions were 
credulous towards the demonstration (i.e., not sceptical). The differences between the 
three conditions regarding their responses of both “magic” and “trick” appear to be 
minimal and indicates that repeated viewing and being given the opportunity of 
examining apparatus may not have been necessarily linked to children giving a “trick” 
response.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Frequency of 4-6-year-olds’ Causal Responses in the Coin 
Demonstration  
 
Condition Magic Trick 
Condition 1(N=47) 
1
st
 response 
2
nd
 response 
3
rd
 response 
 
25 
20 
30 
 
22 
27 
17 
Condition 2 (N=47) 28 19 
Condition 3 (N=45) 23 22 
 
 
However, on close inspection of Table 2.2, nearly half of the children in 
Condition 1 changed their first response to a different one on their second response. 
This change is also apparent in terms of children’s second and third responses. These 
changes may reflect response expectation rather than actual beliefs, especially as more 
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children appeared to change on their third response from “trick” to “magic”, as 
opposed to changing from “magic” to “trick”.  
 
 
Table 2.2: Frequency of 4-6-year-olds’ Causal Responses in the Coin 
Demonstration for Condition 1  
 
Differences between 
children’s 1st and 2nd 
response 
Differences between 
children’s 2nd and 3rd 
response 
Differences between children’s 
responses throughout all three 
responses 
Changed to Magic = 8 
Changed to Trick = 13 
 
 
 
 
 
Retained Magic = 12 
Retained Trick = 14 
 
Changed to Magic = 16 
Changed to Trick = 6 
 
 
 
 
 
Retained Magic = 14 
Retained Trick = 11 
From Magic to Trick to Magic = 10 
From Trick to Magic to Trick = 4 
From Magic to Magic to Trick = 2 
From Trick to Trick to Magic = 6 
From Trick to Magic to Magic = 4 
From Magic to Trick to Trick = 3 
 
Retained Magic =  10 
Retained trick =  8 
Total Changed = 21 
Total Retained = 26 
Total Changed = 22 
Total Retained = 25 
Total Changed =  29 
Total Retained = 18 
 
 
These data suggest that children’s change in responses may be due to a task 
demand effect in the form of repetitive questioning rather than their true beliefs, 
particularly as 14 out of 21 children’s responses consistently changed throughout, 
with 10 changing from “magic” to “trick” and finally back to “magic”. Conversely, 
only four changed from “trick” to “magic” and finally back to “trick”.  
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Some children appeared to be committed to and credulous of the 
demonstration being an example of magic as they did not switch “magic” responses 
throughout (10 out of 47 children) and some children appeared to be completely 
sceptical of the demonstration as they did not switch “trick” responses throughout 
(eight out of 47). 
 
Condition 1 
In order to assess whether there were any significant changes or not between 
children’s first response of “magic” or “trick” and second response to the coin 
demonstration, a 2 x 2 chi-square analysis was carried out. A non-significant result 
was found (χ² (1) = 0.61, p = 0.43). Children who repeatedly viewed the 
demonstration and who were repeatedly questioned were just as likely to alter or 
retain an initial response, whether it was a “magic” or a “trick” one. Of those children 
who did switch responses, eight changed from a first response of “trick” to a second 
response of “magic” whereas 13 changed from a first response of “magic” to a second 
response of “trick”. Conversely, of those children who did not change responses, 12 
retained a “magic” response whereas 14 retained a “trick” one. These results imply 
that children who changed responses may have been succumbing to experimenter 
demands, particularly the ones who changed from initially stating “trick” to stating 
“magic”. Past research predicts that once children have become aware of trickery as 
indicated in “trick” responses they should not then switch responses in subsequent 
viewings.  
Following on from this, a 2 x 2 Fisher’s Exact Probability test was carried out 
in order to assess whether children who had responded consistently on the first two 
trials would be more likely to change their previous responses on the third trial if their 
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previous responses had been “magic” as compared with “trick”. A non-significant 
result was found (Fisher’s Exact Test, N = 26, p = 0.22, two-tailed). Once again, 
children were just as likely to retain a “magic” response as a “trick” one (i.e., ten 
children retained “magic” responses and eight children retained “trick” responses) and 
they were just as likely to switch responses regardless of whether they stated “magic” 
or “trick” (i.e., six changed from “trick” to “magic” and two changed from “magic” to 
“trick”). Once again, the switching of children’s responses may simply be a 
consequence of the demands of repetitive questioning rather than of being able to 
examine the apparatus (and discover how the demonstration was performed) as past 
research predicts that fewer children should have changed responses if the first two 
responses were “trick” and more children should have changed if the first two 
responses were “magic”.  
 
All Three Experimental Conditions 
A 2 x 3 chi-square analysis was carried out in order to assess whether there were any 
significant differences between the three conditions regarding “magic” or “trick” 
responses to the coin demonstration. The first response was used for Condition 1 in 
order to compare responses following a single viewing, repeated viewing alone, and 
repeated viewing combined with exploring the apparatus. No significant differences 
were found between viewing a demonstration only once (as in Condition 1, first 
response), viewing it repeatedly (as in Condition 2), and viewing it repeatedly and 
viewing the apparatus in reality (as in Condition 3) (χ² (2) = 0.69, p = 0.73). Repeated 
viewing or being given the opportunity to examine the apparatus did not elicit more 
“trick” responses than “magic” responses.  
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In order to further assess any possible influence of experimental condition on 
children’s responses, children in Condition 1 were compared with children in 
Condition 3. As past research predicts that children will be less likely to alter an initial 
response of “trick” over a series of trials, children in Condition 1 who gave a first 
response of “trick” were selected, and their second responses (“magic” or “trick”) 
were compared with children’s responses in Condition 3. A non-significant result was 
found (χ² = 1.29, p = 0.26). Children in Condition 1 were just as likely to state “trick” 
or “magic” (on their second response) as children in Condition 3 (i.e. in Condition 1, 
of the children who had given “trick” as their first response, 14 stated “trick” and 
eight stated “magic” as their second response, and in Condition 3, 22 children stated 
“trick” and 23 children stated “magic”). This implies that “trick” responses were not 
dependent on exploration of the apparatus and so such exploration was not a crucial 
factor.  
 
 
Questions Regarding the Coin Trick Demonstration 
The responses to the extended questions regarding the coin trick are presented in 
Table 2.3. As can be seen from the total count (and each condition), children were 
more inclined not to know how the coins had disappeared and claimed that not anyone 
can make them disappear. Those children who had responded “Yes” to knowing how 
the person had made the coins disappear were asked to give an explanation. 
Responses were coded as: 1= no explanation, 2 = a descriptive explanation of what 
they had literally seen visually (e.g., putting a lid on the coins), 3 = trickery (i.e. 
mentioning the word “trick” or inferring that the coins were still in the container), 4 = 
magical (i.e. explicit mention of the word “magic” or the use of a magical component 
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such as a wand). Forty-six out of 61 children gave an explanation, and the most 
frequent explanations were of a descriptive nature that does not necessarily reflect 
knowledge of the underlying mechanism of the demonstration. Children’s 
explanations or lack of them did not specify either credulity or scepticism of the 
demonstration being an example of magic. Although 15 children were unable to give 
any explanation, this may reflect lack of verbal skills in the young children 
(particularly if they considered the demonstration a magical occurrence that is 
inexplicable by its very nature). Alternatively it may be that some children had not 
really known how the coins had disappeared when they had previously responded 
“yes” to knowing how. Importantly, only nine out of 61 children gave a magical 
explanation (despite more children giving a “magic” response when asked if what 
they had seen regarding the coin demonstration was “magic” or a “trick”). This 
implies that many children’s “magic” causal responses may not represent real magic 
but possibly another term for trickery.  
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Table 2.3: Frequency of 4-6-year-olds’ Responses about the Coin Demonstration 
 
Condition N Do you know 
how the person 
made the coins 
disappear? 
Can anyone 
make the coins 
disappear? 
How did the coins 
disappear? 
(Of those children who claimed 
to know how the person made the 
coins disappear)* 
1 47 Yes = 23 
No = 24 
Yes = 21 
No = 25 
Don’t know = 1 
No explanation = 4  
Descriptive explanation = 7  
Trickery = 9  
Magical = 3  
2 47 Yes = 18 
No = 29 
Yes = 15 
No = 30 
Don’t know = 2 
No explanation = 4 
Descriptive explanation = 12 
Trickery = 1 
Magical = 1 
 3 
 
45 Yes = 20 
No = 25 
Yes = 20 
No = 24 
Don’t know = 1 
No explanation = 7 
Descriptive explanation = 5 
Trickery = 3 
Magical = 5 
Total Count 139 Yes = 61 
No = 78 
Yes = 56 
No = 79 
Don’t know = 4 
No explanation = 15 
Descriptive explanation = 24 
Trickery = 13 
Magical = 9 
 
* Condition 1 (N = 23), Condition 2 (N = 18), Condition 3 (N = 20), Total count (N = 61). 
 
There was a significant association between children claiming to know or not 
to know how the coins had disappeared and stating that anyone can make them 
disappear or that not anyone can make them disappear (χ² = 14.91, N = 135, p = .01). 
Significantly more children who did not know how the coins had disappeared stated 
that not anyone can make them disappear, and conversely, significantly more children 
who claimed to know how the coins had disappeared stated that anyone can make 
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them disappear. This suggests that children who claimed to know how the coins 
disappeared were aware of a physical action being performed somehow on the coins. 
A series of analyses were carried out in order to assess possible differences between 
the three experimental conditions according to children’s responses to further 
questions about the coin demonstration. No significant differences were found 
between the three conditions and children’s responses to the question, “Do you know 
how the coins disappeared?” (χ² (2, N = 139) = 1.09, p = .580), or between the three 
conditions in response to the question, “Can anyone make the coins disappear?” (χ² 
(2, N = 135) = 1.85, p = .40). In all three conditions, children were more likely 
(although not greatly) to claim not to know how the coins had disappeared and that 
not anyone can make them disappear. Therefore, whatever particular condition a child 
was in did not appear to make them more or less likely to understand the mechanism 
behind the coin demonstration (i.e. repeated viewing or being given the opportunity to 
explore the apparatus). 
 
 
“Magic” versus “Trick” Responses 
Further analysis was carried out in order to determine if there was a significant 
association between “magic” versus “trick” responses towards the coin trick and 
children claiming to know or not know how the coins had disappeared. “Magic” 
responses were taken from all three conditions and combined to give a total count. 
The same selection was made with “trick” responses. Data for Condition 1 was taken 
from children’s first responses (because the first question does not imply that a prior 
answer was incorrect or otherwise undesirable). No significant association was found 
(χ² (N = 139) = .65, p = .42). Therefore, lack of understanding does not appear to be 
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implicated in children labelling the demonstration as “magic”. However, on 
examining the experimental conditions separately, although no significant 
associations were found within Condition 2 or Condition 3, a significant association 
was found in Condition 1 (after only one viewing of the demonstration (χ² (N = 47) = 
6.131, p =  .013). As Figure 2.2 shows, significantly more children who responded 
that the demonstration was “magic” claimed not to know how the coins had 
disappeared (i.e. 17 out of 25 children), whereas significantly more children who 
responded that the demonstration was a “trick” claimed to know how the coins had 
disappeared (i.e. 15 out of 22 children). These results imply that repetition of the 
event did not assist children in understanding the actual cause of the event or make 
them more likely to acknowledge trickery. Rather it may potentially obscure or hinder 
the likelihood of this occurring. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Four- to Six-year-olds’ Causal Knowledge of Coins’ Disappearance 
(Condition 1 first response) 
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Interview Regarding Concepts of “Magic” and “Tricks” 
Data relating to children’s concepts about magic and tricks are presented in Table 2.4. 
A majority of the children stated that they knew what “magic” and “tricks” are. 
However, they were less able to give a spontaneous definition for “magic”. Children’s 
definitions were not limited to assigning them to categories of only trickery or magic. 
This was so that any subtle differences between the two concepts would be exposed 
and hence the reason behind invoking “magic” rather than “trick” in the 
demonstration might be revealed. On close inspection of Table 2.4, the most popular 
answer that children gave by way of a definition for “magic” was that it involves 
making something disappear or appear. Children also gave this spontaneous 
explanation most frequently for a “trick” implying that they may interpret magic as 
being the same as tricks. Alternatively, they may have been responding to what they 
had physically seen beforehand in the conjuring demonstration. No children defined 
“magic” specifically in terms of a real supernatural element. However, only five 
children gave definitions that implied stage magic or conjuring (five children stated 
“tricks” and one child stated “a show and magician”). 
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Table 2.4: Frequency and Percentages of 4-6-year-olds’ Definitions for “Magic” 
and “Trick” 
 
 Question Total Count 
(N = 139) 
Do you know what magic is? 
Yes 
No 
 
92 (66%) 
47 (34%) 
Do you know what a trick is? 
Yes 
No 
 
81 (58%) 
58 (42%) 
Definition of Magic (Of those who said “Yes” to knowing what magic is): 
No definition 
Make something appear or disappear 
Tricks 
A show / magician 
*(N = 92) 
59 (64%) 
27 (29%) 
5 (5%) 
1 (1%) 
Definition of Trick (Of those who said “Yes” to knowing what a trick is): 
No definition 
Make something appear / disappear / change 
When trick somebody 
Ambiguous response 
Hide something 
Magic 
Clown/acrobat 
Joking 
*(N = 81) 
25 (31%) 
13 (16%) 
12 (15%) 
9 (11%) 
8 (9%) 
7 (9%) 
5 (6%) 
2 (2%) 
 
* N represents the number of children who were questioned that differ from the total count of 
139 participants in the study.  
 
 
Table 2.5 gives a further breakdown of children’s concepts about magic. 
Children were questioned on the ability of certain people to “do magic”. In terms of a 
family member, responses were categorized as “Yes” if a child claimed (after 
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prompting) that any one of the following people could do magic: mother, father, 
sister, brother, aunt, or uncle. Children appeared to be quite selective in specifying 
who is capable of doing magic. The majority of the children stated that a magician, 
and a family member can do magic, but that they themselves, a teacher, or friend 
cannot. As the majority of the children also stated that magic is “just tricks” as 
opposed to being “something real”, this suggests that magic is considered another 
term for trickery. Contrary to this, the majority of the children also stated that “you 
need special powers” rather than anyone being able to “learn magic”. 
No significant association was found for children stating that “magic is just 
tricks” and can be learnt, or that magic is “real” and requires “special powers” (χ² = 
.47, N = 121, p = .49). Regardless of whether children claimed that magic is “real” or 
“just tricks” they were more inclined to state that it requires “special powers”.  
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Table 2.5: Frequency and Percentages of 4-6-year-olds’ Concepts about “Magic”  
 
Question Total Count 
(N = 139) 
Is magic something real or is it just tricks? 
Real 
Tricks 
Both 
Don’t know 
 
34 (24%) 
93 (67%) 
1 (1%) 
11 (8%) 
Can you do magic? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
 
39 (28%) 
99 (71%) 
1 (1%) 
Can your friends do magic? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
 
52 (37%) 
81 (58%) 
6 (4%) 
Can a family member do magic? (mother, father, brother, sister, aunt, 
uncle) 
Yes 
No 
 
 
94 (68%) 
45 (32%) 
Can your teacher do magic? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
 
37 (27%) 
93 (67%) 
9 (6%) 
Can a magician do magic? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
 
91 (65%) 
46 (33%) 
2 (2%) 
Can anyone learn magic or do you need special powers? 
Learn 
Special Powers 
Both 
Don’t know 
 
31 (22%) 
99 (71%) 
3 (3%) 
6 (4%) 
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“Magic” versus “Trick” Responses 
In order to determine children’s underlying reasoning behind labelling the coin 
demonstration “magic” or “trick”, a series of chi-square analyses were carried out in 
relation to concepts about magic. Total counts were taken from combined “magic” 
causal responses for all three conditions, as were “trick” causal responses. (Please 
note that first responses were used for Condition 1). No significant association was 
found between causal responses and whether magic is considered “real” or “just 
tricks” or between causal responses and whether magic can be learnt or requires 
“special powers”. Table 2.6 shows that regardless of whether children had given a 
“magic” or “trick” response, they were more inclined to state that magic is “just 
tricks” and that it requires “special powers”. This suggests that many of the children’s 
“magic” responses in the coin demonstration may have been another label for trickery. 
However, it is unclear what children’s concepts of “special powers” are.  
 
 
Table 2.6: Four- to Six-year-olds’ Causal Responses for the Coin Demonstration 
and “Magic” Concepts 
 
Magic Concepts Magic Causal Response Trick Causal Response 
Is magic real or just 
tricks? 
Real = 20 
Tricks = 52 
Real = 14 
Tricks =41 
Does magic require 
special powers or can 
anyone learn magic? 
Need Special Powers  = 52 
Anyone Can Learn = 18 
Need Special Powers  = 47 
Anyone Can Learn = 13 
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Discussion 
The main aim of Study 2 was to empirically assess the proposed link between 
repetition of a violation of object permanence in the form of a coin trick and 4-6-year-
old children’s responses in terms of magic or trickery and, in doing so, to critically 
assess previous claims of Chandler and Lalonde (1994). Study 2 proposed that 
repetition influences children so that there is a response expectation quite apart from 
their actual views of trickery versus magic. Therefore, children’s switching of 
responses may be a direct result of experimenter demands through repetitive 
questioning. A series of non-significant results were indeed found in the current study 
that point towards supporting this view. Firstly, when repeatedly questioned, children 
were just as likely to change or retain a “trick” or “magic” response concerning a 
demonstration of coins that appeared to vanish. According to past research on 
violation of expectation, children should not alter their response if it is a “trick” one 
over a series of trials and should be more likely to change if it is a “magic” response 
as the latter may not truly represent real magic but “mundane sleight-of-hand or 
parlour magic” (Chandler & Lalonde, 1994, p. 90). The fact that children did change 
their answers to repeated questions across three trials of the coin trick seems to 
indicate that demand characteristics (i.e. repetitive questioning by the experimenter) 
may indeed be influencing children’s responses. This is especially apparent as more 
children give a “magic” response at the end of three trials than at the beginning, and 
more so than a “trick” one. A second finding that contradicts Chandler and Lalonde is 
that children should have been more inclined to state “trick” than “magic” after a 
series of repeated viewings as a result of the event becoming familiar and no longer 
being unexpected. In fact overall, children in the current study gave more “magic” 
responses. A third finding that contradicts Chandler and Lalonde’s claims is a lack of 
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significant differences between the experimental condition children were in and 
responses to the demonstration. Specifically, children in Condition 3 (who were given 
the opportunity of exploring the apparatus) should have been more likely to say that 
the demonstration was a “trick” than children in the other two conditions if children’s 
responses were dependent solely on examining the apparatus. Therefore, the findings 
imply that exploring the apparatus was not critical in children stating “trick”. 
However, it should be noted that even though children in Condition 3 saw the coin 
apparatus in reality, no children actually explored or touched it. They were happy to 
be spectators and were not interested in playing with the apparatus. As a consequence 
this may have resulted in the lack of significant differences between the three 
conditions. Yet 22 children in Condition 3 did not need to explore the apparatus to 
understand that the event was an example of trickery. This is highlighted in their 
responses of “trick”. In contrast, 23 children in Condition 3 who responded “magic” 
may not have been suspicious of the event being a form of deception. Instead they 
may have regarded the demonstration as real magic. If this was the case, then 
exploring the apparatus would not have been necessary.  
Additional findings point towards the suggestion that physical knowledge 
about the event and understanding the underlying mechanism of the apparatus was not 
critical in predicting children’s responses. Children overall were just as likely to give 
a “magic” or “trick” response regardless of claiming to know or not know how the 
coins had disappeared. Furthermore, regardless of whether children had given 
“magic” or “trick” responses, most children were unable to explain how the coins had 
disappeared (i.e. 54 out of 76 children who had given “magic” responses versus 38 
out of 63 children who had given “trick” responses). Once again, this opposes the idea 
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that children simply say “magic” when they do not understand the mechanism 
involved.  
An interpretive problem created by children’s responses is one of determining 
what children’s underlying meaning was behind labelling the demonstration “magic” 
versus “a trick”. In Condition 1, a number of children appeared to start with a 
credulous viewpoint towards the demonstration as being magic as opposed to a 
sceptical one as implied by their first response (i.e. 25 children gave a “magic” 
response and 22 children gave a “trick” response) and even more children appeared to 
finish with a magic viewpoint after three repeated viewings and questions (i.e. 30 
children gave a “magic” response and 17 gave a “trick” response). However, if they 
truly believed the demonstration to be an instance of a real supernatural force, then 
children who were repeatedly questioned should not have abandoned this by 
responding in terms of trickery. Conversely if children were truly sceptical then they 
should not have abandoned this by responding in terms of magic. Subbotsky (2004) 
suggests that children’s changing of responses may reflect a “not entrenched” belief 
or disbelief in either magic or physical laws of causality. The changing of responses in 
Study 2 of this thesis suggests that children were conforming to the demands of 
repetitive questioning. These children may be considered as vulnerable to the 
“desirability effect”. That is, they are prone to respond in accordance with what they 
believe adults expect from them (Siegal, 1997). Perhaps 4-6-year-olds’ susceptibility 
to changing responses was linked to how confident they are socially. Specifically, 
children may be lacking in social confidence and so judgments that they make are 
undermined or swayed by repetitive questioning. Similarly, social confidence levels 
may be linked to whether children search the apparatus or not. This will be addressed 
further in Study 4.  
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Children’s first responses in Condition 1 may be a true representation of their 
beliefs towards the demonstration, especially as some children, on their third (and 
final) response returned to their original response (i.e. ten children changed back to 
“magic” and four children changed back to “trick”). Indeed, as was discussed 
previously, Piagetian type conservation experiments report that young children’s 
responses are more accurate when they are asked only once versus several times (e.g., 
Gelman, Meck, & Merkin, 1986; Rose & Blank, 1974; Siegal et al., 1988). 
Furthermore, in a study conducted by Moston (1987), children aged six gave 
significantly more correct responses on first questioning about a staged event as 
compared to second questioning. Moston concludes that interviewers should be 
prepared to accept that a child's first answer is probably the best they can give. In 
Study 2 of the current thesis, some children appeared to be fully committed to the 
demonstration being an example of magic as they were not deterred throughout from 
giving a “magic” response when repeatedly questioned (i.e. 10 out of 47 children). 
Similarly, some children appeared to be completely sceptical of the demonstration as 
they were not deterred at all from giving a “trick” response throughout (i.e. eight out 
of 47 children). However, it is unclear from these causal responses alone if those 
children who did not waiver in their responses did so as they had a committed belief 
or disbelief in the demonstration being a real magical occurrence in a supernatural 
sense.  
Extended questions regarding the coin trick were included with the aim of 
giving a clearer understanding of what children meant when they gave “magic” or 
“trick” causal responses for the demonstration. However, the inclusion of repeated 
viewings and questioning appeared to obscure children’s underlying meaning. As 
mentioned earlier, in all three conditions children were more likely to claim not to 
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know how the coins had disappeared and that not anyone can make them disappear. 
Importantly, only when assessing the experimental conditions separately was a 
significant association found: in Condition 1 after one viewing, more children who 
responded that the demonstration was “magic” claimed not to know how the coins 
had disappeared (i.e. 17 out of 25) whereas more children who responded that the 
demonstration was a “trick” claimed to know how the coins had disappeared (i.e. 15 
out of 22). However, no such association was found in Condition 2 or Condition 3. 
Repetition of the event was not necessarily linked to familiarisation and an 
understanding of the mechanism and hence being more likely to acknowledge 
trickery. Another important and key finding was extrapolated from children’s 
responses to specific questions in Condition 1 after only one viewing: only five 
percent who had given “magic” causal responses for the coin demonstration and 
claimed to know how the coins had disappeared, also claimed that magic is “just 
tricks”. It should also be noted that none of these children who had claimed to know 
how the coins had disappeared then gave trick explanations. The significant result 
found in Condition 1 points towards a clear distinction between young children’s use 
of “magic” versus “trick” terms: children use the term “magic” when they are 
unaware of why an event has occurred and the term “trick” when they are aware. 
Therefore, young children appeared to be using “magic” and “trick” terms 
appropriately: if children know that an event is a trick they should know why it has 
happened. If children do not know why an event has happened then it is magic. It 
should be stressed that this only appears to apply when children witness a single 
viewing of an event and results suggest that repeated viewing confuses or obscures an 
understanding of children’s meaning behind “trick” or “magic” causal responses and 
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once again highlight the influence of demand expectation on children’s causal 
responses.  
Further questioning on the coin demonstration revealed a number of findings 
that created ambiguity in definitively knowing what children meant by “magic” or 
“trick”, and whether they do consider the two terms to be distinctive. Firstly, only five 
out of 76 children who had given a “magic” response gave a further magic 
explanation after claiming to know how the coins had disappeared. However, four 
children who had given a “trick” response also gave a magic explanation. Secondly, 
the most frequent explanation given by children (regardless of whether they had given 
a “magic” or “trick” response) was that of a descriptive nature depicting what they 
had literally seen. Children either stated “picking it up”, “put a lid on it”, or else 
copied the physical action itself (i.e. 36 out of 139 children). Thirdly, the majority of 
the children overall (and regardless of whether they gave a “magic” or “trick” 
response) stated that not anyone can make the coins disappear (i.e. 79 out of 139 
children). For the children who gave “magic” causal responses, their lack of further 
magical explanations do not necessarily reflect a lack of belief in the event being 
genuine magic. They may have been unable to give any explanation if they consider 
magic to be inexplicable. Furthermore, they may not have given specific magic 
explanations as the demonstration was not presented in a magical context. Children 
were simply responding to what they were physically seeing: the action of a hand over 
a stack of coins. They may have regarded the demonstration as genuine magic but 
were unable to explain this because they were not given any other information that is 
commonly implicated with magic (e.g. showing someone casting a magic spell over 
the coins or waving a hand over them in a magical way). Perhaps if this had been 
supplied, children would have been able to explain how the coins had disappeared in 
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terms of genuine magic. They may associate magic with saying magic words or 
particular actions but because they didn’t actually see any they were unable to say that 
is how the coins disappeared. 
The other primary goal of the present study was to assess the nature of 
children’s magic and trick concepts in general and, in doing so, to give a clearer 
understanding of what children meant when they gave “magic” or “trick” causal 
responses for the coin demonstration. A higher percentage of children claimed to 
know what “magic” (66%) and “tricks” (58%) are than not to know. However, the 
robustness of children’s responses regarding their understanding of magic is called 
into question as a higher percentage of them were unable to give definitions of what 
magic is than were able to: 64% who stated that they knew what “magic” is were 
unable to give a definition whereas only 31% who had stated that they knew what a 
“trick” is were unable to give a definition for tricks. This may be a consequence of 
magic actually being a supernatural event that is inexplicable and would add further 
support to the proposition for why children who gave “magic” causal responses for 
the coin demonstration were unable to explain how the coins disappeared. 
Alternatively, it may be a consequence of these questions being open-ended. Indeed, 
Waterman, Blades, and Spencer (2000) have found that when children are asked 
questions that require answers other than “yes” or “no”, children are unlikely to 
answer. Therefore, children’s inability to define “magic” may reflect a lack of 
linguistic skills. This may also account for the majority of the children being unable to 
explain how the coins had disappeared. Evidence was found in support of this as 
children who were unable to give an explanation for “magic” were more inclined in a 
subsequent question to claim that it is “just tricks” (i.e. 67 out of 99 children). It is 
important to mention that although no children defined magic specifically in terms of 
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a real supernatural element, only a very few children’s definitions specifically implied 
stage magic or conjuring (i.e. six children). In addition, children were most likely to 
explain that magic is when something appears or disappears which links in with the 
coin demonstration that they witnessed.  
Study 2 provided evidence that 4-6-year-old children understand that magic is 
not truly genuine. Rather they consider magic the same as tricks. This is highlighted 
by the fact that the majority of the children claimed that magic is “just tricks”. These 
findings are in keeping with previous research pointing to the ages between four and 
six being when children change from thinking of magic as real to thinking of it as a 
trick (e.g., Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Woolley, 1997). Study 2 also provided evidence 
that suggests that the majority of the 4-6-year-old children’s “magic” responses in the 
coin trick represented another term for trickery and not genuine magic: 52 out of 76 
children (in total from all three conditions) who had stated that the demonstration was 
“magic” subsequently claimed that magic is “just tricks”. Likewise, 41 out of 63 
children who gave a “trick” response claimed that magic is “just tricks”. Therefore, 
children may have randomly labelled the demonstration as “magic” or “trick” as they 
considered both terms representing or meaning the same thing. It could be argued that 
this viewpoint is supported as children’s definitions of “magic” and “trick” was both 
mainly of making something appear or disappear. In particular, 18 out of 27 children 
who defined magic as making something disappear or appear also claimed that magic 
is “just tricks”. However, it must be stressed that it is understandable these children 
defined magic as making something disappear since they had just watched a 
demonstration that involved making coins disappear. Therefore, children’s definition 
of magic matches their causal response for the coin demonstration.  
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As in other studies investigating children’s understanding of magic and tricks, 
conflict in children’s responses arose. Firstly, half of the children (69 out of 139) who 
stated that “magic is just tricks” appeared to contradict this statement by claiming that 
“special powers" are also needed. Furthermore, regardless of whether children had 
given a “magic” or “trick” response to the coin trick, they were more inclined to state 
that magic requires “special powers” rather than “anyone can learn it” (i.e. 52 out of 
76 children who gave “magic” responses and 47 out of 63 children who had given 
“trick” responses). Secondly, children were selective in asserting who can and cannot 
perform magic: the majority of the children stated that a magician and family 
members can, whereas teachers, friends, and they themselves cannot. Children’s 
inclusion of the capability of family members to perform magic implies that 
magicians are not fantastical entities. Rather they are seen as conjurors who use tricks. 
However, ambiguity in responses was apparent as the majority of the children who 
claimed that a magician and family member can do magic also stated that special 
powers are needed. Unfortunately, the current study did not request that children 
elaborate on the concept of “special powers” and so the true meaning behind this 
response is unclear. These findings are in keeping with Rosengren and Hickling 
(1994) who also found that children aged four years viewed magic as involving 
special powers possible under the control of an agent (magician). Yet, they also found 
5-year-olds viewed magic as tricks that anyone can learn. It is not surprising that 
children claimed that special powers are required, since what children of four years 
and older generally view as magic is deeply embedded in the existing, cultural 
tradition. Typically, in Western cultures, children are acquainted with magic through 
books, films and stories in which characters with special powers are involved (e.g., 
117 
 
Harry Potter, Merlin). These characters are considered to change things in the external 
world through sheer will power or magic spells.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The results of Study 2 showed that 4-6-year-old children will be just as likely to 
change or retain their answers to repeated questions across three trials of a coin trick 
regardless of whether they give a “trick” or “magic” response. Therefore, the 
switching of responses points towards children succumbing to a demand characteristic 
(i.e. repetitive questioning by the experimenter) rather than a genuine change in 
children’s understanding of the situation. Furthermore, repetitive viewing, exploring 
the apparatus, or knowledge of how the coins had disappeared did not yield more 
“trick” responses.  
The majority of the children showed an awareness of magic as just tricks that a 
magician and family members can perform. Therefore, when children responded that 
the coin trick was “magic” it is postulated that many were referring to mere conjuring. 
However, Study 2 created unanswered questions that need to be further investigated. 
Findings imply that young children’s switching of causal responses regarding a 
demonstration of vanishing coins may be based on direct social influence. Yet as a 
consequence of children switching both “magic” and “trick” responses there are 
inherent doubts about giving definitive answers regarding young children’s causal 
explanations to apparent violations of object permanence. Although findings lean 
towards many 4-6-year-olds regarding “magic” as another term for “tricks”, further 
ambiguity was created in interpreting responses as the majority of the children 
claimed magic required “special powers”, were discriminatory in who can do magic, 
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and were less able to define “magic” than “tricks”. Therefore, it remains unclear why 
some children have a preference for labelling the coin trick “magic” while others 
labelled it a “trick”, particularly as there was evidence that some children believed the 
event was an example of genuine magic. This was highlighted by claims that magic is 
“real” and involves magical elements.  
Although Study 2 did not question children’s capacity to explicitly distinguish 
between magic and tricks, children’s responses to a single viewing of the coin trick 
gives an idea of what children may mean by “magic” and “trick”. That evidence 
points to children using the two terms in a distinct and appropriate way: they tended 
to give “trick” causal responses when they claimed to know how the demonstration 
worked and were aware of being deceived, and gave “magic” causal responses when 
they claimed not to know how the demonstration worked and were not aware of being 
deceived. Furthermore, findings suggest that children who gave “magic” causal 
responses regard magic as inexplicable and genuine rather than fake as in tricks. 
According to Subbotsky (2004), young children (i.e. 6-year-olds) revert to 
“magic” responses as they may not have an “entrenched” belief in the universal power 
of physical causality and still hold magical beliefs. Therefore, magical and physical 
beliefs coexist equally and so children may be prepared to give either a magical or a 
physical explanation. Conversely, older children (i.e. 9-year-olds) do have an 
entrenched belief in the universal power of physical causality and, even if they hold 
magical beliefs, physical causality dominates. Perhaps 4-6-year-olds are more 
susceptible to magical explanations as they do not have an established knowledge of 
physical laws of causality. Therefore, children’s tendency to use magic to explain 
events may be linked to age. It may also account for the change in responses 
throughout: young children do not have entrenched beliefs or disbeliefs in magic. 
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Study 3 will attempt to address the possibility of age being a key factor in children’s 
causal responses by testing an older age range.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
STUDY 3 - A second investigation into whether repetition of a question 
regarding a magical demonstration can alter children’s responses 
 
 
“Repetition does not transform a lie into a truth”. (Franklin D. Roosevelt) 
 
 
Both in school education and everyday experience children learn that scientific 
explanations are preferable to non-scientific ones. Children then develop scepticism 
towards magical events as they consider magic is something that cannot occur in 
reality. Past studies have shown that magical explanations decline (and disappear) in 
later childhood (Huang, 1930; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; 
Piaget, 1929; Rosengren et al., 1994; Subbotsky, 2004). As discussed in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis, in their replication of Piaget’s early data, Laurnedeau and Pinard (1962) 
reported that in children between five and eleven years of age, physical explanations 
of natural phenomena gradually replaced pre-causal explanations based on magic. 
Subbotsky (2001) postulated that credulity towards magic is more difficult to elicit in 
older children since Westernized children are immersed in a dominant view of the 
physical world as rational and scientific. They assume that genuine causal violations 
do not really occur, but only appear to do so by virtue of trickery or deception. As a 
result, they adopt a more critical stance towards magic, seeking out the familiar causal 
principles – the trickery that constitutes its real explanation. Based on this premise, 
Study 3 tested the hypothesis that there may be a developmental progression in the 
likelihood of children giving “trick” explanations for an apparent violation of object 
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permanence. Therefore, the main objective was to repeat the coin trick study with an 
older age range than in Study 2 as there may be an age-related effect on children’s 
causal responses. 
Subbotsky (2004) tested 4-, 5-, 6-, and 9-year-old children on the 
entrenchment of their magical beliefs and their beliefs in the universal power of 
physical causality. He found that only 6- and 9-year-old children denied that magic 
could occur in real life (i.e. their ontological judgments). However, when confronted 
with an anomalous causal event (i.e. a transformation of a physical object in an 
apparently empty box), 4-6-year-old children accepted magical explanations of the 
event whereas a large number of 9-year-old children did not. Even if they saw an 
event that looked like magic, the oldest children discredited the anomalous data and 
interpreted them as tricks. Furthermore, the older children did not alter their causal 
explanations (i.e., drop their scepticism toward magic) even after the events that 
looked like instances of magic were repeatedly shown. Subbotsky proposed the reason 
for 4-6-year-olds retreating to magical explanations is that their belief in the universal 
power of physical causality and scepticism toward magic is not entrenched. 
Conversely, 9-year-olds do have an entrenched belief in the universal power of 
physical causality and an entrenched disbelief in magic.  
Phelps and Woolley (1994) specifically examined developmental changes 
regarding children’s beliefs about magical entities and events. Although they only 
interviewed children up to eight years of age, there was a growing awareness of magic 
in the form of tricks and differentiation of real magic from trickery. A majority of 8-
year-olds believed magic could be learned, and be done by the experimenter and 
themselves. All claimed magicians could do magic and existed in the real world. 
However, there was a decrease with age in assertions that a magician does real magic 
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and also a decrease in claims that magic witnessed in physical events was real magic. 
This indicates further children’s growing understanding of the concept of magic as 
trickery. 
 
Study Aim 
The main aim of Study 3 was to repeat the coin trick study to extend the age range to 
include 9-11-year-old children. Nine- to 11-year-old children were specifically 
selected for the following reasons. Firstly, as past research has found an age-related 
increase in scepticism towards magic, it is postulated that 9-11-year-olds would be 
more sceptical in general and so be more inclined to give a “trick” response regarding 
the coin trick. Secondly, if, as Subbotsky proposed, 9-year-olds have an entrenched 
disbelief in magic and an entrenched belief in the universal power of physical 
causality, then the degree of credulity toward the coin trick being “magic” can be 
expected to be smaller than toward it being a “trick”. For this reason, older children 
may be less susceptible to social influence. Hence they will not be influenced by the 
experimenter to change an answer if asked a second time. Indeed, Ceci and Bruck 
(1993) found that when questions are explicitly leading and misleading, preschoolers 
are more often led by such questions compared to older children. Furthermore, Poole 
and Lindsay (2001) assessed the impact of misleading suggestions from parents on 3-
8-year-old children’s eyewitness reports and found that older children are less likely 
to be influenced by suggestive information than younger children. Thirdly, the tasks 
designed to test children’s understanding of magic invariably require a degree of 
language comprehension. It would not be implausible to suppose that 9-11-year-old 
children are linguistically more skilled and developmentally more familiar with the 
terminology of “trick” and “magic”. Therefore, they may be more articulate and 
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forthcoming when questioned and likely to give more detailed responses. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether young children view the violations as real magic 
(i.e. authentic) or magic tricks, as lack of linguistic skills may be influencing their 
responses.   
The second aim of Study 3 was to refine interview questions in relation to the 
coin trick. The question, “Do you know how the coins disappeared?” in Study 2 was 
specifically changed to, “Have the coins really disappeared?” and “Do you know 
where the coins have gone?” It was hoped that these amendments would clarify the 
underlying meaning behind children’s “magic” responses. Specifically, a clearer 
differentiation might be made between real magic whereby the coins have truly 
vanished versus trick magic whereby the coins are hidden. Finally, along with closed 
questions requiring one word responses (e.g., “yes” or “no”, “magic” or “trick”), more 
open-ended questions were incorporated to assess whether children truly understand 
the questions being asked or are simply guessing due to a simple willingness to give 
an answer. In particular, a more detailed distinction between children’s “magic” and 
“trick” concepts might be gained.  
 
It was hypothesised that: 
Nine- to 11-year-old children have a firm understanding of physical laws of causality 
and so will be tend to be sceptical with respect to the coin trick being genuine magic, 
and will not succumb to experimenter pressure through repeated questioning. 
Therefore,  
 
1) In all three experimental conditions the older children will be unlikely to accept the 
demonstration of vanishing coins as being genuine “magic”. 
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2) Older children who are repeatedly questioned will be unlikely to change responses. 
 
3) There will be developmental differences in the likelihood of children labelling the 
coin trick “magic” or a “trick”. Specifically, the younger children in Study 2 (i.e. 4-6-
year-olds) will be less likely to give “trick” causal responses and more likely to give 
“magic” causal responses compared to the older children in Study 3 (i.e. 9-11-year-
olds). Furthermore, 9-11-year-olds will be less likely to change causal responses when 
repeatedly questioned than 4-6-year-olds. 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-four children (47 males and 47 females) took part in the study. They ranged in 
age from nine to eleven years of age (mean = 10.7 years). The children in the study 
attended a S.E. London primary school and were predominantly from middle class 
backgrounds although this was not directly assessed. Their ethnicity was 
predominantly white (46 white, 25 black, 23 Asian) with an equal mixture of female 
and males.   
 
Design 
The study used a between-samples design with experimental condition of the coin 
trick as the independent variable and various verbal responses to the demonstration as 
the dependent variables. A correlational design was also incorporated that included 
follow-up questions on children’s concepts of “magic” and “tricks”. There were 
approximately equal numbers of children in the three experimental conditions (31 in 
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Condition 1, 32 in Condition 2, 31 in Condition 3). All statistical tests were two-tailed 
unless otherwise indicated. 
 
Materials  
The apparatus that was employed was the same commercially available coin trick as 
was used in Study 2 (Figure 2.1).  
 
Procedure 
All 94 children were tested individually in a separate room by the same experimenter. 
The procedure was the same as in Study 2. After the coin demonstration all the 
children were then asked thirteen follow-up questions: three questions about the coin 
demonstration and then ten questions about their concepts and understanding of 
“magic” and “tricks”. Responses were noted down for later analysis. The extended 
questions regarding the coin demonstration were designed to assess more detailed 
aspects of children’s tendency to invoke “magic” or “trick” responses than in Study 2. 
It was also hoped that the interview questions would clarify similarities and 
dissimilarities between the two terms. The questions were in the following order: 
 
1) Have the coins really disappeared? 
2) Do you know where the coins are? (If the answer is “Yes”, children are asked, 
“Where are the coins?”) 
3) Can anyone make the coins disappear? 
4) Do you know what magic is? (If the answer is “Yes”, children are asked, “What is 
magic?”) 
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5) Have you seen/witnessed magic before? (If the answer is “Yes”, children are 
asked, “When have you seen magic?”) 
6) Do you know what tricks are? (If the answer is “Yes”, children are asked, “What is 
a trick?”) 
7) Have you seen or witnessed tricks before? (If the answer is “Yes”, children are 
asked, “When have you seen tricks?”) 
8) Is magic something real or is it just tricks? 
9) Who or what can do magic? 
10) Who or what can do tricks? 
11) Can magic occur anytime? (If the answer is “No”, children are asked, “When can 
magic occur?”) 
12) Can tricks occur anytime? (If the answer is “No”, children are asked, “When can 
tricks occur?”) 
13) What is the difference between magic and tricks? 
 
 
Results 
The present study assessed verbal responses to a coin trick, followed by consideration 
of children’s concepts of “magic” and “tricks”. Initially the Results section presents 
the descriptive data for the responses specifically related to the coin trick followed by 
differences in responses between the three conditions. Next, descriptive data are 
presented for children’s concepts of magic and tricks followed by a consideration of 
differences between the two concepts. Non-parametric statistics are used throughout 
in the form of either chi-square analyses or Fisher’s Exact Test of probability, and 
where applicable two-tailed tests were used. It should be noted that a small number of 
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children failed to give definitive answers regarding some interview questions as 
indicated in tables by “don’t know”, or by stating “both”, or “neither”. Therefore, they 
were eliminated from further analyses throughout this study. This included two 
children in relation to the coin demonstration, and between one and three children in 
relation to magic and trick concepts. 
 
Coin Trick Demonstration 
The responses to the coin trick are presented in Table 3.1. As can be seen from this 
table, children in all three conditions were more likely to state that the coin 
demonstration was a “trick” rather than “magic”. This suggests that the majority of 
the children were sceptical toward the demonstration being genuine magic. 
Furthermore, the differences between the three conditions, in terms of their responses 
was minimal and indicates that no particular condition evoked a “trick” response more 
than any other condition.  
 
 
Table 3.1: Frequency of 9--11-year-olds’ Causal Responses in the Coin 
Demonstration  
 
Condition Magic Trick 
Condition 1 (N=31) 
1
st
 Response 
2
nd
 Response 
3
rd
 Response 
 
7 
7 
8 
 
24 
24 
23 
Condition 2 (N=32) 7 25 
Condition 3 (N=31) 5 26 
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On close inspection of Table 3.2, one can see that a higher number of children 
in Condition 1 retained “trick” causal responses. Very few children changed 
responses. Therefore, 9-11-year-old children were less likely to alter “trick” 
responses. These findings also suggest that children were not responding to fit with 
possible expectations of the experimenter. In fact, 18 out of 31 children did not change 
their response throughout (16 gave a “trick” response and two gave a “magic” 
response). These data suggest that the children’s change in responses was mainly in 
the direction of trickery. Only a very few changed in the direction of “magic” and 
these may be due to a task demand effect in the form of repetitive questioning rather 
than their true beliefs. Specifically, six out of 31 children changed their responses 
consistently throughout the three repeated questions. (Two had changed from “magic” 
to “trick” and finally back to “magic” whereas four had changed from “trick” to 
“magic” and finally back to “trick”). 
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Table 3.2: Frequency of 9-11-year-olds’ Causal Responses in Condition 1    
 
Differences between 
children’s 1st and 2nd 
response 
Differences between 
children’s 2nd and 3rd 
response 
Differences between children’s 
responses throughout all three 
responses 
Changed to Magic = 5 
Changed to Trick = 5 
 
Retained Magic = 2 
Retained Trick = 19 
Changed to Magic = 5 
Changed to Trick = 4 
 
Retained Magic = 3 
Retained Trick = 19 
From Magic to Trick to Magic = 2 
From Trick to Magic to Trick = 4 
From Magic to Trick to Trick = 3 
From Trick to Magic to Magic = 1 
From Magic to Magic to Trick =  0 
From Trick to Trick to Magic =  3 
 
Retained Magic = 2 
Retained trick = 16 
Total Changed = 10 
Total Retained = 21 
Total Changed = 9 
Total Retained = 22 
Total Changed = 13 
Total Retained = 18 
 
 
Condition 1 
There was a significant difference in the degree to which children changed or did not 
change their responses depending on whether they said “magic” or “trick” first (2 x 2 
Fisher’s Exact Test, N = 31, p = 0.022, two-tailed). Five out of seven children 
changed their first response of “magic” to a “trick” second response. In contrast, only 
five out of 24 children changed their first response of “trick” to a “magic” second 
response. Hence, children who were repeatedly questioned were more likely to retain 
their initial response of “trick” (i.e. 19 children) than retain their initial response of 
“magic” (i.e. 2 children). These results suggest that most children who were 
repeatedly questioned were not succumbing to experimenter pressure. Instead they 
may be more suspicious and aware of trickery. 
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Following on from this, a 2 x 2 Fisher’s Exact Probability test was carried out 
in order to assess whether children would be more likely on a third attempt to alter 
their responses as opposed to retain them. Therefore, children whose first and second 
responses were “magic” or whose first and second responses were “trick” were 
compared with respect to their third response (whether they changed versus did not 
change responses on the third trial). A non-significant result was found (Fisher’s 
Exact Test, N = 21, p = 1, two-tailed). Only three out of 19 children who stated 
“trick” in the first two responses changed on their third response whereas neither of 
the two children who stated “magic” for their first two responses changed on the third 
response. This further implies that children were not being influenced by the demands 
of repetitive questioning by the experimenter. 
 
All Three Experimental Conditions 
A 2 x 3 chi-square analysis was carried out to assess whether there were any 
significant differences between the three conditions regarding responses to the coin 
demonstration. As in Study 2, the first response was used for Condition 1 in order to 
compare responses following a single viewing, repeated viewing alone, and repeated 
viewing plus exploring the apparatus. No significant differences were found (χ² (2) = 
0.48,  p = 0.79), indicating that the condition the child was in did not affect whether 
the child responded “magic” or “trick” and that being given the opportunity to 
examine the apparatus did not elicit more “trick” responses than “magic” responses. 
In order to further assess whether children in Condition 1 would be just as 
likely to state “trick” (rather than “magic”) as those in Condition 3, children in 
Condition 1 who gave a first response of “trick” were selected and their second 
response (of either “magic” or “trick”) was compared with children in Condition 3 
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using a 2 x 2 Fisher Exact Probability test. A non-significant result was found 
(Fisher’s Exact Test, N = 55; p = .76, two-tailed). Children in Condition 3 were not 
more likely to state “trick” as opposed to “magic” than children in Condition 1, 
implying that responses were not dependent on exploring the apparatus. Specifically, 
in Condition 1, 19 children stated “trick” and five children stated “magic”, and in 
Condition 3, 23 children stated “trick” and eight children stated “magic”.  
 
 
Comparison of Age Groups between Children in Study 2 and Study 3 regarding the 
Coin Demonstration  
Following on from this, a 2 x 2 Fisher’s Exact Probability test was carried out in order 
to assess whether there were developmental differences in children’s causal 
interpretation of the coin demonstration. Therefore, the 4-6-year-old children’s first 
responses in Condition 1 were compared with 9-11-year-old children’s first responses 
(i.e. whether it was “magic” or “trick”). A significant result was found (Fisher’s Exact 
Test, N = 78, p = 0.01, two-tailed). Nine-11-year-olds were more sceptical of the 
demonstration being “magic” than 4-6-year-olds. Specifically, older children were 
less likely to claim that the demonstration was “magic” and more likely to claim that 
it was a “trick” than younger children. Seven 9-11-year-olds stated “magic” and 24 
stated “trick”. In comparison, twenty-five 4-6-year-olds stated “magic” and 22 stated 
“trick”. This further implies a developmental trend in scepticism towards magic 
causality.  
Following on from this, a 2 x 2 Fisher’s Exact Test was carried out to assess 
whether there were any significant age differences between children in Study 2 and 
children in Study 3 not changing “magic” versus “trick” responses. Using first and 
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second responses of “magic” and first and second responses of “trick” in Condition 1, 
4-6-year-old’s were compared with 9-11-year-old’s. A significant result was found 
(Fisher’s Exact Test, N = 47, p = 0.0095, two-tailed). Nine-11-year-olds were more 
likely to retain “trick” responses as opposed to “magic” responses than 4-6-year-olds 
(i.e. 9-11-year-olds: 19 retained “trick” responses and two retained “magic” 
responses; 4-6-year-olds: 14 retained “trick” responses and 12 retained “magic” 
responses). This implies that older children have a firmer understanding of what they 
are witnessing as trickery. 
 
 
Questions Regarding the Coin Trick Demonstration 
The responses to the extended questions about the coin demonstration are presented in 
Table 3.3. As can be seen from the total count (and inspection of data from the three 
conditions), the majority of the children stated that the coins had not really 
disappeared and the majority of the children stated that they knew where the coins had 
gone. However, they were unable to give an explanation for how the coins 
disappeared. As most children acknowledged that the coins had not really 
disappeared, this suggests that children were aware that the coins were hidden in some 
way although not necessarily of the actual mechanism involved. This viewpoint is 
supported by the fact that 13 out of 14 children who gave an explanation stated that 
the coins were “hidden”. Although the majority of the children stated that not anyone 
could make the coins disappear, their responses do not necessarily reflect a belief that 
this is due to lack of magical powers. It may simply be that some people are not able 
to do it because they have not learnt how to, particularly as most children claimed that 
the coins had not really disappeared.  
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Table 3.3: Frequency of 9-11-year-olds’ Responses about the Coin 
Demonstration  
  
Condition  N Searched 
apparatus 
and found 
coins?* 
Have the 
coins really 
disappeared? 
Do you 
know where 
the coins 
have gone? 
Explanation for 
where the coins 
have gone? 
Can anyone 
make the coins 
disappear? 
1 31 N/A Yes = 4 
No = 27 
Yes = 19 
No = 12 
No explanation = 25 
Hidden = 6 
Magic = 0 
Yes = 13 
No = 16 
Don’t know = 2 
2 32 N/A Yes = 4 
No = 28 
Yes = 20 
No = 12 
No explanation = 29 
Hidden = 2 
Magic = 1 
Yes = 14 
No = 18 
 
3 
 
31 Yes = 5 
No = 26 
Yes = 5 
No = 26 
Yes = 17 
No = 14 
No explanation = 26 
Hidden = 5 
Magic = 0 
Yes = 12 
No = 19 
 
Total 
Count 
94  Yes = 13 
No = 81 
Yes = 56 
No = 38 
No explanation = 80 
Hidden = 13 
Magic = 1 
Yes = 39 
No = 53 
Don’t know = 2 
 
*Observed reaction to the demonstration 
 
 
Importantly, although children in Condition 3 were given the opportunity of 
examining the coin trick apparatus, the majority of them did not do so and as a 
consequence did not find the coins. All five children who did search the apparatus 
found the coins, and stated they knew where the coins were (but were unable to give 
an explanation) and responded that the demonstration was a “trick”. However, 
regardless of whether children searched the apparatus, most children stated “trick” 
anyway. Therefore, examining the apparatus was not crucial in detecting trickery. 
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Combined “magic” responses and combined “trick” responses were totalled in 
order to determine if there were any significant differences regarding total “magic” 
versus “trick” responses and children stating whether the coins had really disappeared 
or not, and whether they knew where the coins had gone. As in Study 2, data for 
Condition 1 was taken from children’s first responses on the assumption that they 
should be more accurate than their responses to repeated questions because the first 
question does not imply that a prior answer was incorrect or otherwise undesirable. 
Most children who had given a “magic” or a “trick” response claimed that the coins 
had not really disappeared (i.e. 12 out of 19 children who gave a “magic” response 
versus 69 out of 75 children who gave a “trick” response). However, significantly 
more children who gave a “trick” response claimed that the coins had not really 
disappeared than had disappeared compared to children who gave a “magic” response 
(χ² (1, N = 94) = 10.58, p = .001). Figure 3.1 illustrates these findings.  
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NB: Total responses were taken from Condition 1 (1
st
 response), Condition 2, Condition 3. 
 
Figure 3.1: Frequency of “Magic” and “Trick” Responses in 9-11-year-old 
Children  
 
 
A significant relationship was also found between children’s total “magic” 
versus “trick” responses and claims of knowing where the coins had gone (χ² (1, N = 
94) = 7.75, p = .005). As Figure 3.2 illustrates, children who responded “magic” were 
significantly more likely to claim not to know where the coins had gone whereas 
children who responded “trick” were significantly more likely to claim to know where 
the coins had gone. 
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NB: Total responses were taken from Condition 1 (1
st
 response), Condition 2, Condition 3. 
 
Figure 3.2: Frequency of Coin Location Knowledge in 9-11-year-olds who 
responded “Magic” or “Trick” 
 
 
Taken together, the results revealed that most children who gave “trick” 
responses believed that the coins had not really disappeared but did claim to know 
where they had gone. Most children who gave “magic” responses also believed that 
the coins had not really disappeared even though they stated they did not know where 
they had gone. Therefore, it would seem that most children’s “magic” responses 
represented fake magic and that the factor that determined whether children responded 
“magic” rather than “trick” was mainly their lack of knowledge regarding where the 
coins were actually hidden and not lack of knowing that they had not really 
disappeared.  
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Interview Regarding Concepts of “Magic” and “Tricks” 
As can be seen in Table 3.4, the interview questions revealed considerable familiarity 
with magic and tricks. The majority of the children stated that they knew what 
“magic” was and also what a “trick” was and were able to give definitions of both. 
Magic and trick definitions were categorized as “tricks” accordingly if children 
mentioned the word “trick”, “illusion”, “pretending”, or “lying”. On close inspection 
of children’s definitions of magic and a trick, there was a trend toward more often 
claiming that both involve either making something appear or disappear, or are tricks 
in the form of an illusion, fooling, lying or pretending. This suggests that they regard 
magic being the same as tricks and is supported by the fact that the majority of 
children claimed that magic is “just tricks” as opposed to “something real”. Only four 
children’s definitions of magic might be construed as involving supernatural 
elements: they claimed that magic is what wizards or witches do. However, these 
same children also stated that magic is “just tricks”. Furthermore, although eight 
children claimed that magic is “extraordinary happenings” and two children claimed 
that it is “unexpected occurrences”, all 10 of them also claimed that magic is “just 
tricks”. Taken together, these responses indicate that the children in the present study 
did not consider magic to be truly magical in a supernatural sense. 
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Table 3.4: Total Frequency and Percentages of 9-11-year-olds’ Concepts of 
“Magic” and “Tricks”   
 
Question Total Count 
(N = 94) 
Do you know what magic is? 
Yes 
No 
 
81 (86%) 
13 (14%) 
Do you know what a trick is? 
Yes 
No 
 
85 (90%) 
9 (10%) 
Definition of Magic (Of those who responded “Yes” to knowing what magic is): 
 
No explanation 
Make something appear or disappear 
Tricks / illusion/ pretending 
Extraordinary happenings 
What wizards/witches do 
Obscure response (unintelligible) 
Unexpected occurrences 
Real things 
Fantasy 
*(N = 81) 
 
9 (11%) 
28 (35%) 
24 (30%) 
8 (10%) 
4 (5%) 
3 (4%) 
2 (2%) 
2 (2%) 
1 (1%) 
Definition of Trick (Of those who responded “Yes” to knowing what a trick is):: 
 
No explanation 
Tricks (fooling/pretending/lying/illusion) 
Make something appear / disappear / change 
Like / Same as Magic 
Hide something 
Looks like magic but not 
Inexplicable occurrence 
Opposite of Magic 
*(N = 85) 
 
7 (8%) 
48 (56%) 
10 (12%) 
8 (9%) 
7 (8%) 
2 (2%) 
2 (2%) 
1 (1%) 
Is magic something real or is it just tricks? 
Real 
Tricks 
Both 
 
12 (13%) 
79 (84%) 
3 (3%) 
Can anyone learn magic or do you need special powers? 
Learn 
Special Powers 
Neither 
 
78 (83%) 
15 (16%) 
1 (1%) 
 
* N represents the number of children who were questioned that differ from the total count of 
94 participants in the study.  
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Children revealed further an awareness of magic as being a form of trickery. 
The majority of children stated that “anyone can learn magic” rather than it requiring 
“special powers”. Regardless of whether children claimed that magic is “real” or “just 
tricks”, they were more inclined to state that “anyone can learn it” as opposed to 
requiring “special powers” and no significant difference was found between these 
claims  (2 x 2 Fisher’s Exact Test, N = 90, p = .205, two-tailed). Specifically, 67 out 
of 78 children who stated magic is “just tricks” claimed it can be learnt. Eight out of 
12 children who stated that magic is “real” also claimed it can be learnt. This suggests 
that most children may have used the term “real” to reference a demonstration that is 
witnessed (i.e. performed) rather than a genuine supernatural process. 
 
 
“Magic” versus “Trick” Responses 
In order to determine children’s underlying meaning behind labelling the coin 
demonstration “magic” versus “trick” a series of chi-square analyses were carried out 
in relation to concepts about magic. Total counts were taken from combined “magic” 
responses for all three conditions, as were “trick” responses. (Please note that first 
responses were used for Condition 1). No significant association was found between 
causal responses and whether magic can be learnt or requires special powers. 
Irrespective of “magic” or “trick” causal responses, children were more likely to claim 
that “anyone can learn magic”. However, a significant association was found between 
causal responses and whether magic is considered “real” or “just tricks” (Fisher’s 
Exact Test, N = 91, p = .001, two-tailed). Children who gave a “trick” causal response 
were significantly more likely to claim that it is “just tricks” than “real”, compared to 
children who gave a “magic” causal response. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3.  
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NB: Total responses were taken from Condition 1 (1
st
 response), Condition 2, Condition 3. 
 
Figure 3.3: Frequency of stated Belief in “Magic” versus “Trick” Responses in  
9-11-year-old Children 
 
 
Further presentation of children’s concepts regarding “magic” is shown in 
Table 3.5 and shows that the majority of the children stated that they have seen magic 
before. The most frequent response children gave to having witnessed it before was, 
“on television”. No reference was made to a supernatural event.  
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Table 3.5: Total Frequency and Percentages of 9-11-year-olds’ Concepts of 
“Magic”    
 
Question Total Count 
(N = 94) 
Have you seen magic before? 
Yes 
No 
 
70 (74%) 
24 (26%) 
When have you seen magic? 
No explanation 
Television 
Party with a magician 
Friend / relative 
Circus 
Can do myself 
*(N = 70) 
10 (14%) 
31 (44%) 
12 (17%) 
11 (16%) 
5 (7%) 
1 (1%) 
Who / What can do magic? 
Magician  
Anyone 
No one 
Don’t know 
Wizard / Witch 
God 
Special people 
 
38 (41%) 
23 (24%) 
17 (18%) 
10 (11%) 
3 (3%) 
2 (2%) 
1 (1%) 
Can magic happen anytime? 
Yes  
No 
Don’t know 
 
40 (43%) 
53 (56%) 
1 (1%) 
When can magic happen? 
Don’t know 
At a party / show 
It can’t happen 
Anytime / when want it to 
Special occasion/time/magic words 
When someone does it 
When know how to / learn / practice 
When someone thinks / believes 
Sometimes 
When you have apparatus 
*(N = 53) 
13 (24%) 
11 (21%) 
7 (13%) 
5 (9%) 
4 (7%) 
4 (7%) 
3 (6%) 
3 (6%) 
2 (4%) 
1 (2%) 
 
* N represents the number of children who were questioned that differ from the total count of 
94 participants in the study.  
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Further statements also point towards a disbelief in magic being truly magical. 
The person or entity that most children claimed can do “magic” was a magician, 
followed by anyone. Only six children actually mentioned a fantastical entity (i.e. 
“special people”, “God” and “wizard or witch”). Most children said that magic cannot 
happen anytime but this response does not necessarily reflect belief in it being a 
supernatural process or event. Particularly as most children on explaining when magic 
can happen did not attach specific or genuine magic to it. Nineteen out of 53 children 
implied trickery of some sort by claiming it can occur at a party, when the correct 
apparatus is in place, when someone does it, or when it is learnt. Seven children 
actually asserted disbelief in the reality aspect of it by claiming, “It can’t happen”. 
Only seven children’s explanations could be considered qualifying as truly magical: 
“when magic words are spoken”, “when someone thinks or believes it”. In fact, most 
children who stated that magic cannot happen anytime also claimed that magic is “just 
tricks” and that “anyone can learn magic” (41 out of 53 children).  
Table 3.6 presents children’s concepts regarding “tricks” in depth. The most 
frequent response that children gave for where they had seen tricks before was, “on 
television” or when a friend or relative had performed them. The majority of the 
children claimed that anyone can do tricks, with a magician being the second most 
frequent response. These responses appear to converge with children’s responses 
towards the magic questions with the notable exception of most children claiming that 
a trick “can happen anytime”. Conversely, most children claimed that magic cannot 
happen anytime. However, many children’s explanations for when magic can occur 
were the same for when tricks can occur: at a show, when someone does it, if it is 
practiced or learnt. 
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Table 3.6: Total Frequency and Percentages of 9-11-year-olds’ Concepts of 
“Tricks” 
 
Question Total Count 
(N = 94) 
Have you seen tricks before? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t know 
 
80 (85%) 
13 (14%) 
1 (1%) 
When have you seen tricks? 
Television 
Friend / relative 
A show / party with a magician 
Can’t explain 
Circus 
*(N = 80) 
30 (38%) 
29 (36%) 
13 (16%) 
5 (6%) 
3 (4%) 
Who/what can do tricks? 
Anyone 
Magician 
Don’t know 
Trained people 
Special people 
No one 
 
56 (60%) 
19 (20%) 
16 (17%) 
1 (1%) 
1 (1%) 
1 (1%) 
Can tricks happen anytime? 
Yes 
No 
Don’t Know 
 
75 (80%) 
18 (19%) 
1 (1%) 
When can tricks happen? 
Don’t know 
A show 
When someone does it/makes it 
If practice / learn 
Sometimes 
Need certain stuff 
When want them to 
When use brains enough 
*(N = 18) 
4 (22%) 
3 (17%) 
3 (17%) 
3 (17%) 
2 (11%) 
1 (6%) 
1 (6%) 
1 (6%) 
 
* N represents the number of children who were questioned that differ from the total count of 
94 participants in the study.  
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Finally, children were directly asked to differentiate between magic and tricks. 
A breakdown of responses is presented in Table 3.7. The most popular response given 
by children was that magic is real in the sense that it really happens whereas tricks are 
not real and involve hiding something or fooling someone. In fact only five children 
specifically acknowledged that magic is the same as tricks. Other children implied 
that tricks may be deception and when someone is aware of being deceived whereas 
with magic you are not aware of deception and so believe that it has actually occurred. 
Several children made reference to magic having supernatural properties in 
comparison to tricks. For example, “magic is automatic”, or “magic needs a spell”, or 
“magic special things”. Overall though, although children distinguished between “real 
magic” and “tricks”, and despite the majority of the children earlier responding that 
magic is “just tricks” as opposed to “real”, it was not possible to ascertain whether 
children actually believe that “real magic” exists and are credulous of magic being 
possible in the real world.  
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Table 3.7: Frequency and Percentages of 9-11-year-olds’ Differentiation between 
“Magic” and “Tricks” 
 
What is the difference between magic and tricks? 
 
Total Count 
(N = 94) 
 
Magic is real (really happens) / Tricks are not real (involve hiding, fooling) 
No explanation 
Magic is not real (not true) / Tricks are real (trying to make happen) 
They are the same 
Magic not shown or do not know how it is done /Tricks show or know how 
done 
Magic is automatic / Tricks can practice, learn 
Magic needs a spell, wand, click fingers / Trick use apparatus 
Magic only special people can do or a special time / Tricks anyone can do 
Use different equipment 
Magic think happening / Trick looks like 
Magic looks like happening / Trick fooling 
Magic small, big things / Trick with mirrors 
Magic do by self, hide / Trick amazing 
Magic big /Trick little 
Magic still there but magician did something 
Magic believe / Trick not worked out 
Magic special things / Trick an illusion 
Magic disappear / Trick do something 
 
41 (44%) 
13 (14%) 
7 (7%) 
5 (5%) 
5 (5%) 
4 (4%) 
4 (4%) 
3 (3%) 
2 (2%) 
2 (2%) 
1 (1%) 
1 (1%) 
1 (1%) 
1 (1%) 
1 (1%) 
1 (1%) 
1 (1%) 
1 (1%) 
 
 
 
Discussion  
Study 3 aimed to investigate possible effects of repetition of a coin trick on 9-11-year-
old children’s causal interpretation (i.e., whether they responded “magic” or “trick”). 
It was hypothesised that this age range would be more sceptical than credulous 
towards a coin demonstration being genuine magic (and more so than the younger age 
range in Study 2), as they have a firm understanding of physical laws of causality and 
so would be less susceptible to the presumed demand characteristics of repetitive 
questioning. As predicted, the majority of the children responded “trick” as opposed 
to “magic” when shown a demonstration of coins that appeared to vanish. 
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Consequently, no significant differences were found between the three experimental 
conditions (i.e. single viewing, repeated viewing, and repeated viewing with the 
opportunity of examining the apparatus). Therefore, in line with what was expected, 
viewing the same demonstration over a series of trials or being given the opportunity 
of exploring the apparatus were not necessary requirements in dismissing magic 
causality and accepting trickery. Importantly, most 9-11-year-old children did not 
appear to succumb to the demands of repeated questioning by the experimenter. This 
is evident in the children’s responses in Condition 1: the majority of the children 
retained their original responses throughout. These findings support Subbotsky (2004) 
who found that 9-year-old children stuck to physical causal explanations after 
repetition of an event. In keeping with Subbotsky, this implies that children’s disbelief 
in magic causation was deeply entrenched. In fact, the only significant change found 
was that more children altered their initial “magic” response to a “trick” one when 
questioned a second time. From these findings it is suggested that a substantial 
proportion of the children were aware of the demonstration being a form of deception 
from the outset. If not, then they were convinced of it after being questioned a second 
time. Although searching the apparatus was not crucial in children’s rejection of 
magic causality it may have assisted children to a certain extent. This is evident in the 
fact that all five children (in Condition 3) who examined the apparatus actually found 
the coins and stated “trick”. Yet none of these children were able to give a further 
explanation of where the coins were.  
As few children responded “magic”, the ability to draw any conclusions about 
factors that contributed to their labelling the demonstration “magic” versus “trick” is 
limited. The only characteristic that children who responded “trick” generally shared 
was that they were significantly more likely to claim to know where the coins had 
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gone (i.e. 50 out of 75 children). Conversely, children who responded “magic” were 
significantly more likely to claim not to know where they had gone (i.e. 13 out of 19 
children). Furthermore, although most children believed that the coins had not really 
disappeared, they were significantly more inclined to state this if they had given a 
“trick” response (i.e. 69 out of 75 children who gave a “trick” response versus 12 out 
of 19 children who gave a “magic” response). In this respect, “trick” appears to refer 
to awareness of deception in the form of the coins being hidden in a specified 
location. “Magic” may also refer to the possibility of deception but children are 
unaware of the specific location of the hidden coins. However, irrespective of giving 
“magic” or “trick” responses, the majority of the children were unable to offer 
explanations for where the coins had gone. Therefore, it would appear that children 
did not revert to “magic” responses only when they were unable to explain any 
physical working of the demonstration. This somewhat opposes Chandler and 
Lalonde (1994) and Phelps and Woolley (1994) who claim that children quite often 
use the word simply to mark phenomena for which they lack immediate physical 
explanations.  
The other primary goal of the present study was to assess the nature of 
children’s magical beliefs in general and in so doing to gain a clearer understanding of 
children’s labelling the coin demonstration “magic” versus “trick”. The interview 
questions revealed that the majority of children believed that magic is “just tricks” 
that anyone can learn and that anyone (including a magician) can do. Therefore, this 
implies that children considered magic to involve conjuring rather than supernatural 
processes and indicates further, older children’s understanding of the concept of 
magic as trickery. These findings are in keeping with Phelps and Woolley (1994). 
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In relation to the coin demonstration, irrespective of whether children had 
given “magic” or “trick” causal responses, they were more likely to claim that anyone 
can learn magic. However, children who had given a “trick” response were 
significantly more inclined to believe that magic is “just tricks” (i.e. 69 out of 75) 
compared to children who had given a “magic” response (i.e. 10 out of 19). It should 
be noted that children’s magic concepts may have been related to and influenced by 
the coin trick itself rather than representing beliefs in magic events per se. This was 
evident as a substantial proportion of the children claimed to have witnessed magic in 
the past on the television and said that it involves making something disappear. 
Only when children were asked to specifically differentiate between the two 
were clear distinctions made between real magic and trick magic. Children most 
frequently explained that magic really happens whereas tricks are not real and involve 
fooling or illusion (i.e. 44%). Some children also ascribed magical properties to 
magic. For example, a few children asserted that “it is when you click your fingers” or 
“it is automatic”. These clear distinctions imply that some children consider magic as 
genuine. However, they appear to conflict with earlier claims that magic is “just 
tricks”. In fact only five children specifically stated that magic is the “same as tricks”. 
Perhaps 9-11-year-old children believe genuine magic is only possible in the non-real 
world, such as in fiction or dreams.  
On comparing children’s causal responses to the coin trick in Study 3 with 
those of Study 2, important differences were found that need to be addressed. In Study 
2, most 4-6-year-olds labelled the event as “magic” whereas, in Study 3, most 9-11-
year-olds labelled it as a “trick”. Furthermore, 4-6-year-olds were just as likely to 
change as to retain a response regardless of whether it was “magic” or “trick” over a 
series of viewings. Conversely, 9-11-year-old children were more likely to retain a 
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“trick” response. While repetitive viewing and exploring the apparatus were not 
conducive to children’s tendency to respond “trick” rather than “magic”, age does 
appear to be a key factor in predicting responses. There appears to be an age-related 
decline in children succumbing to experimenter pressure and an age-related decrease 
in “magic” responses. This trend of older children to view a perceived physical object 
as increasingly permanent confirms previous research showing a decrease in verbal 
magical beliefs with children older than six years of age (Subbotsky, 2001, 2005; 
Woolley, 1997; Woolley et al., 1999). The findings also lend support to a study that 
has found that younger children (6-year-olds) were more likely to change their 
responses in the face of repeated questioning than older (10-years old) children 
(Moston, 1987) and a study which showed that, compared to adults and older 
children, 4-year-olds were more likely to shift answers to repeated specific yes/no 
questions (Poole & White, 1991). However, it is worth noting that there was quite a 
large age gap between children in Study 2 and Study 3 of the thesis. As a result, 
although age comparisons revealed significant age differences in causal responses, 
caution is needed.  
Although both Study 2 and Study 3 were attempting to investigate and 
interpret children’s causal explanations of a violation of object permanence, various 
methodological limitations may have affected results. Firstly, one limitation was the 
exclusive use of verbal measures and reliance on verbal responses regarding the coin 
trick. Research has shown that when children’s behaviour is examined in addition to 
their verbal judgments, they show a considerably stronger credulity towards magic 
(Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittal, & Harmer, 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994; 
Subbotsky, 1985, 2001, 2007; Woolley, 1997). Therefore, future studies could employ 
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measures such as observing children during the demonstration and their reactions 
(e.g., levels of surprise) could be observed upon uncovering the outcome.  
A second limitation was that the coin demonstration was not a great example 
of a magical event; it was a commercially bought trick that children may have been 
familiar with or seen before. In fact, in Study 3 one child declared that he had “done 
the trick himself”. It should be noted that the coin trick was selected on the premise 
that it did not create a context whereby real and authentic magic was suggested, as 
one of the main objectives was to clarify whether children’s labelling and meaning of 
“magic” was the same as that of “trick”. For this same purpose, the studies were 
designed so that children only viewed on a television screen a close-up of a hand 
touching the apparatus and putting a lid on top of the coins. However, Subbotsky 
(2004) argues that a trick should be presented that does not come from a traditional set 
of tricks available in magic shops. Instead it should look more convincingly like an 
instance of real magic so that it would present a serious challenge to children’s belief 
in physical causality in order to clearly assess children’s magical thinking. 
Thirdly, the lack of significant differences between the experimental 
conditions in the demonstration may be due to children in Condition 3 being shown a 
non-working copy of the apparatus. Although children were permitted and encouraged 
to explore the apparatus, nevertheless, it was still a non-working copy of a magic trick 
apparatus and children would not have necessarily been able to find the true causal 
mechanism for it anyway. It is important to note that it was possible to discover the 
coins as they were actually hidden within the apparatus. Furthermore, the apparatus 
was shown after having viewed the coin trick on television. Had they been allowed to 
explore beforehand, fewer children may have subscribed to a “magic” response. 
Therefore, in future studies the experimenter should perform the action in front of the 
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child with the apparatus before viewing it on the television and then ask the child, 
“So, what you saw, was it magic or a trick?” 
Based on Study 2 and Study 3, it is still not definitively clear what children 
mean by “magic” and “trick”. Children were too vague with their explanations in the 
interview tasks, particularly in Study 2. In addition, children in Study 2 were not 
explicitly required to make a distinction between magic and tricks. Yet the findings 
give an idea of what children mean and this appears to be linked to what they 
physically see: a concrete demonstration in the real world. Younger children (i.e. 4-6-
year-olds) tend to use “trick” when they know how an object has disappeared and use 
“magic” when they do not know how. Although older children (9-11-year-olds) 
understand that an object is hidden regardless of giving a “magic” or “trick” causal 
response, they tend to use “trick” when they know where an object is hidden and use 
“magic” when they do not know where. They also regard magic as fake. Despite these 
findings, there is still ambiguity in children’s responses as they viewed an event on 
television. As discussed in Chapter 1, research shows that children do not treat an 
event in the same way when witnessing it live in front of them. For control reasons, it 
was appropriate to have children witness the demonstration on the television, but this 
muddied the waters. Therefore, further studies in this thesis focus on live conjuring 
demonstrations.  
As the majority of children aged 9-11-years of age in Study 3 provided 
evidence of scepticism toward genuine magic, this age range will no longer be 
investigated in the thesis. Most differences in causal thinking were found in 4-6-year-
olds and a differentiation between magic and tricks on a single viewing of a conjuring 
demonstration. Study 2 ascertained that young children (four to six years of age) do 
differentiate between magic and trick causation appropriately and regard magic as 
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genuine rather than fake as in tricks. As such, it is important to concentrate on this age 
range in the remainder of this thesis. In addition, Study 2 found evidence that 4-6-
year-olds are susceptible to direct social influence in the form of repeated questioning 
by an adult. Therefore, Study 4 will investigate whether indirect social influence is 
linked to young children’s interpretation of a conjuring event. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Study 3 confirmed, as predicted, that 9-11-year-old children are more likely to give a 
“trick” response than a “magic” one regarding a coin trick and highlights scepticism 
toward magical causation in older children. Furthermore, they were more likely to 
retain an initial “trick” response and more likely to change a “magic” one following 
repeated questions across three trials. Nine- to 11-year-olds did not conform to 
experimenter pressure as they did not show a tendency to drop their scepticism toward 
magic. Furthermore, although most children were aware that the coins had not truly 
vanished, children appeared to respond “magic” when they did not know specifically 
where an object was hidden whereas children who responded “trick” did claim to 
know where the coins were hidden. The interview showed that the majority of the 9-
11-year-olds consider magic to be “just tricks” that “anyone can learn”. However, 
evidence also revealed that 9-11-year-olds have an understanding that genuine magic 
is different from stage magic and actually claimed that it “can really” or “truly” 
happen. This may be interpreted as children just saying what magic is and does not 
necessarily signify their belief in its existence. Therefore, doubt is cast on whether 
older children are believers in genuine magic being possible in the real world or 
confined to the non-real world such as fiction. 
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Overall, Study 3 provided evidence of the majority of 9-11-year-old children’s 
disbelief (or scepticism) toward genuine magic (as indicated by a significant 
understanding of the conjuring demonstration being an instance of trickery, that magic 
is just tricks, and a belief that anyone can learn magic). Therefore, this implies that 
children considered magic to involve conjuring rather than supernatural processes and 
indicates older children’s clearer understanding of the concept of magic as trickery.  
As in other studies investigating children’s understanding of magic and tricks, 
Studies 2 and 3 did not yield an entirely clear pattern of results. Cumulatively, the 
data lean towards most 4-6-year-old and 9-11-year-old children regarding magic as 
simply tricks and highlight that many children do view an apparent violation of object 
permanence as being caused by trickery rather than real magic. Although age appears 
to be a valid factor that needs to be taken into account, it remains unclear why some 
children prefer to label an event “magic” while others label the same event a “trick”. 
The existence of a small group of believers in magic among the more sceptical in 
Study 3, as indicated by “magic” responses to the coin trick and references to magical 
concepts in general suggests that there is not a simple developmental influence that 
characterizes children’s responses to information about magical events during early 
childhood. Rather, what children believe, and how consistently they believe it, and 
their reasons for labelling an event “magic” or “trick”, may be linked to individual 
differences among children of the same and varying age. Therefore, a central question 
that is relevant and requires further exploration is: “What individual differences are 
associated with children’s acknowledgement of an event being a trick as opposed to it 
being magic?” Studies 2 and 3 have focused on possible external factors. The next 
three studies will focus mainly on internal factors.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
STUDY 4 – Exploration of a possible association between social confidence and 
verbal versus behavioural responses to a conjuring demonstration 
 
 
 “The universe is full of magical things, patiently waiting for our wits to grow 
sharper”. (Eden Phillpotts) 
 
 
People contradict themselves in different ways. For instance, someone may not 
necessarily mean what they say or may say one thing and yet do another. The same 
might be said about children’s causal judgments regarding events that appear to 
violate known physical laws. Although some children verbally ascribe magic 
causality, it may signify fake magic rather than genuine supernatural magic. Likewise, 
if a child verbally assigns trick causality to the event, he or she is not necessarily 
implying scepticism. It may be that he or she is unwilling to reveal verbally credulity 
towards magic or may be unaware of in fact being credulous. Yet in his or her actions 
a child might show credulity (Subbotsky, 2001). Hence, verbal judgments are not 
always accompanied by the appropriate behaviours. According to Argyle (1996), non-
verbal behaviour may amplify or disambiguate words. Indeed, when children’s 
behaviour is examined in addition to their verbal judgments they show considerably 
stronger credulity towards magic (Harris, Brown, Mariott, Whittall, & Harmer, 1991; 
Johnson & Harris, 1994; Subbotsky, 1984, 1985, 1991, 1994, 2001; Woolley, 1997). 
Even adults show behaviours compatible with magical thinking (Rozin, Markwith, & 
Ross, 1990; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986; Subbotsky, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2010; 
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Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002). Furthermore, Subbotsky has shown that under certain 
conditions children manifest a belief in magical causality in their actions while 
proclaiming disbelief in their verbal judgments (Subbotsky, 1985, 1993, 2001, 2004). 
Therefore, Study 4 of the current thesis explores children’s behavioural reactions as 
well as verbal responses to a conjuring trick in order to uncover possible discrepancies 
between the two. In addition, a possible association between children’s responses and 
reactions and level of social confidence is explored.  
Studies that have examined non-verbal responses to events that violate known 
physical laws have focused on preferential and prolonged looking, or exploratory 
actions. The violation-of-expectation paradigm is frequently used by researchers for 
studying the permanence of perceived objects in infants, with displays involving 
obstruction of objects by other objects, invisible displacement, or replacement of one 
object by another one behind a screen (e.g., Baillargeon, 1987, 1991; Bower, 1971; 
Piaget, 1986). According to Hood, Cole-Davies, and Dias (2003), the paradigm was 
based on the principle of the conjurer’s trick: namely that a trick increased the 
observer’s attention because it contravened an expectancy or belief about the physical 
world. However, there have been conflicting reports regarding behavioural reactions. 
Some researchers claim that infants and preschool-aged children look reliably longer 
at events that appear to violate their beliefs about the world than at events consistent 
with their beliefs (Baillargeon, 1991; Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Hood et al., 2003). 
Contrastingly, a few situations have emerged in which infants have not looked 
preferentially at events that appear to violate their beliefs about objects (Baillargeon, 
1994). It has been argued that failure to look preferentially transpired as infants had 
arrived at some understanding for the event, such as speculating about hidden objects. 
In other examples, infants’ preferential looking appeared to depend on additional 
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clues provided by the experimental situation. For example, Baillargeon, Graber, 
DeVos, and Black (1990) suggested that the same type of object can appear first in 
one location and then in another without any visible movement between the two if, in 
fact, there are two identical objects involved rather than one. Infants may take 
advantage of these available hints to make sense of what has happened and the event 
is treated as being less unexpected and less surprising. Likewise, older children often 
rely on clues to come to conclusions about the way the world works. However, 
showing two identical objects at the same time would not seriously challenge beliefs 
in object permanence as the hint of deception is too strong. Instead providing children 
with a difference in the appearance of an object before and after a violation has 
occurred might alert children subtly to the possibility of there being two objects and 
hence trickery. Indeed, Michotte (1962) found that, in judgments about object 
identity, adults were inclined to view the object as being the same (i.e. identical to the 
one seen previously) if only one of the four features (form, dimension, colour and 
spatial location) was changed. If, however, two or more characteristics were changed, 
adults tended to think that one object had been replaced by another one thus revealing 
the dependence of identity judgments on the degree of transformation. Therefore, if a 
child sees an object in a new location and a change in appearance, then he or she 
might be aware of deception having taken place.  
Research has shown that children who successfully search apparatus commit 
to principles of physical causality (e.g., Chandler & Lalonde, 1994, Hood et al., 
2003). Subbotsky (2010) found that in order to elicit exploratory behaviour in 
children aged four years and older, an event must be incompatible with the 
fundamental laws of nature (such as object permanence or physical causality). He 
argued that such exploration is due to the fact that the violation of physical laws is 
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both novel and interesting. Subbotsky has carried out a substantial body of research 
into conditions that evoke magical forces to explain violations of object permanence 
using a version of Bower’s (1971) invisible replacement task. The task uses a 
specially constructed trick box that creates the impression of a physical object’s 
disappearance or appearance from thin air or transformation into another object in a 
way that the object’s non-permanence seems genuine. Subbotsky argues that using 
such a device is needed for children to view a display as a serious challenge to their 
belief in object permanence rather than a trick, as it is difficult to explain in a rational 
way (i.e. according to the laws of physics). Indeed, children aged four years and older 
verbally ascribe magical causality when they witness an event that uses such a device 
(e.g., Subbotsky, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2010).  
Past researchers have analysed children’s interpretations of anomalous events 
with an all-or-nothing approach. That is, whether the child gives a non-scientific 
judgment (i.e. magical causality) or a scientific judgment (i.e. physical causality) 
based on a specific question. As was outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis, children have 
been categorised as either credulous or sceptical; believers or disbelievers; having 
belief systems that are consistent or inconsistent, or co-exist. For instance, Subbotsky 
(1984) has hypothesised that children possess two distinct and inconsistent belief 
systems that are reflected in their verbalisations and behaviour: they verbally deny the 
possibility of transforming pictures into objects by magic words but try to use magic 
words when left alone. Yet children’s cumulative responses to an anomalous event, 
both verbally and behaviourally, might be better understood by assessing levels of 
scepticism in the case of verbal responses, and levels of active monitoring in the case 
of behavioural responses. (In Study 4, active monitoring refers to looking back and 
forth and tactile exploration of apparatus during aspects of a conjuring demonstration. 
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These levels of measurement are explained further in the Procedure section). Past 
research (including Study 2 and Study 3 of the current thesis) has shown that most 
children older than four years of age are not entirely credulous of magic or entirely 
sceptical when asked a variety of questions. Furthermore, the level of children’s 
scepticism that is revealed towards an event being magical may be related to how 
confident they are in social situations.  
Some people are reserved during social contacts with strangers or casual 
acquaintances. They can exhibit awkward behaviour and are tense when in the 
presence of others. In magic causality studies and other developmental research, 
children are often put in a situation where they are in contact with an experimenter 
they are not familiar with. This may explain reported discrepancies between 4- and 6-
year-old children’s behaviours and their judgments about the existence of magical 
objects and events. That is, many children when in the presence of an experimenter 
deny the existence of magical objects and events, yet when left alone they search 
boxes or attempt to cast magic spells (e.g., Harris et al., 1991; Subbotsky, 1984, 
1985). However, no studies have specifically assessed a possible link between 
children’s social confidence and reactions towards unusual phenomena. In fact, there 
does not appear to be any research on social confidence per se as related to magical 
belief. Confidence research has mainly explored children’s accuracy in eyewitness 
recall settings, and consisted of verbal self-assessments on performance (see Allwood, 
Granhag, & Jonsson, 2006, for a review). As a consequence, research has typically 
found that individuals of all ages have an inflated belief in their performance and they 
are over-confident with regard to what they know and/or remember (see Roebers, Von 
der Linden, & Howie, 2007). In studying social behaviour, Cheek and Buss (1981) 
state that it is important to know whether children are shy and also whether they are 
159 
 
sociable as they are distinct personality dispositions. They define shyness in terms of 
one’s reaction to being with strangers or casual acquaintances: tension, concern, 
feelings of awkwardness and discomfort, and both gaze aversion and inhibition of 
normally expected social behaviour (Buss, 1980). They define sociability as a 
tendency to affiliate with others and to prefer being with others to remaining alone. 
Factors such as shyness, sociability, social anxiety and social competence may be 
considered distinct traits related to social behaviour. Yet one relevant feature that they 
all appear to share is confidence in social situations, and behavioural traits are 
typically judged in terms of smiling, assuming a relaxed posture, and making good 
eye contact. Therefore, for the purposes of Study 4, a social confidence measure was 
constructed that encompassed these properties as well as freedom of speech and ease 
of movement. It is proposed that social confidence may be linked to performance in 
an actual testing session and influence children’s responses and/or reactions. A child 
low in social confidence may feel self-conscious and inhibited when being tested and 
as a result be less likely to openly deny or contest an apparent violation of object 
permanence. Furthermore, they may be less likely to search apparatus. Conversely, a 
child high in social confidence may be more likely to verbally challenge a violation of 
object permanence. They may also be more inclined to search apparatus.  
 
Study Aim  
The main aim of Study 4 was to provide a thorough, controlled investigation of 
children’s responses to a violation of object permanence in the context of a conjuring 
event. In order to do this the present study included an assessment of behavioural 
reactions in addition to verbal responses to a conjuring event whereby the 
manipulation of the transference of an object was difficult to explain in a rational way. 
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As tasks designed to test children’s understanding of magic and tricks almost 
invariably require a degree of language comprehension, a behavioural measure 
potentially bypasses the problems of children’s limited verbal ability and 
responsiveness to demand characteristics that can be a problem, as found in Study 2 
of this thesis. It is important to establish whether or not children’s verbal responses 
reflect belief in the authenticity of the conjuring demonstration being genuine magic. 
Bunce and Harris (2008) found that children aged four to seven years use the words 
“real”, “really” and “pretend” predominantly to express the notions of authenticity of 
things around them (i.e. whether or not something was the real or genuine version as 
opposed to substandard, imitation, or fake). Therefore, Study 4 will include a “real 
magic” versus “trick” causal choice instead of “magic” versus “trick” as used in 
Studies 2 and 3. Study 4 was also concerned with providing an examination of a 
possible association between young children’s level of social confidence and level of 
scepticism towards the event being genuine magic. Hence, analysis of behavioural and 
verbal responses during a pre-test “hiding game” were included to provide a measure 
of children’s social confidence that may be linked to responses to the conjuring 
demonstration that in turn may lead to a clearer understanding of children’s level of 
scepticism towards an anomalous event being genuine magic. It should be noted that 
children’s behavioural reactions were taken as being a measure of level of active 
monitoring that might be related to or contribute to their level of scepticism, but not 
necessarily a direct measure of it as in the case of verbal responses. This is further 
discussed in the Procedure section. A pre-test hiding game was included for two 
purposes. Firstly, it was hoped that a less formal approach would be less intrusive and 
provide a more naturalistic context in which to assess social confidence. Secondly, it 
aimed to help children feel at ease to a certain extent, so that they may be more freely 
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expressive and respond spontaneously in the conjuring event. Related to this, it was 
important to ensure that the pre-test was not an extension of the actual task 
demonstration. Past researchers have incorporated familiarization tasks, pre-tests, or 
interviews before actual demonstration trials. Yet they appear to be part of the testing 
situation and may influence children’s responses (Johnson & Harris, 1994; Phelps & 
Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling, & 
Gelman, 1994; Subbotsky, 1994, 2004, 2005). For instance, Rosengren and Hickling 
(1994) presented children with hypothetical transformations, gave proposed causal 
mechanisms that were the same ones to be used in the actual transformations and even 
corrected children in the pre-test sessions.  
Finally, Study 4 investigated whether the availability of a visual clue hinting at 
deception would have an effect on children’s verbal judgments or behavioural 
reactions. Specifically, two soft toys were included that were not identical in 
appearance (one teddy-bear sported a bow while the other didn’t). The discrepant 
appearance of the test stimuli was designed to add to the information already gained 
in the last two studies of the thesis (and previous research) concerning a possible link 
between external factors and interpretation of an anomalous event.  
 
It was hypothesised that: 
1) There will be an association between children’s level of verbal scepticism 
regarding a conjuring demonstration and level of social confidence. Thus, children 
scoring lower in social confidence will be inconsistent in verbal judgments and so less 
likely to respond in terms of trickery (i.e. score lower in verbal scepticism) whereas 
children scoring higher in social confidence will be more likely to express scepticism 
(i.e. score higher in verbal scepticism). 
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2) There will be an association between children’s level of active monitoring during a 
conjuring demonstration and level of social confidence. Children scoring lower in 
social confidence will be less likely to search the apparatus or look in a direction that 
may imply awareness of trickery (i.e. where a teddy was hidden) whereas children 
scoring higher in social confidence will be more likely to search the apparatus and 
look in a direction that implies awareness of trickery. 
 
3) There will be a difference between children in Condition 1 (teddy without a bow-
tie) and children in Condition 2 (teddy with a bow-tie) in terms of level of verbal 
scepticism or level of active monitoring. Children in Condition 2 will exhibit higher 
levels of verbal scepticism and/or levels of active monitoring than children in 
Condition 1. A visual difference between the two teddies will encourage children to 
spontaneously query or challenge what they have witnessed and also may lead them to 
more actively explore the scenario both visually and physically.  
  
 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-six children (20 males and 36 females) took part in the study. They ranged in 
age from four to six years of age (mean age 64 months). The participants attended a 
S.E. London primary school and were predominantly from middle class backgrounds 
although this was not directly assessed. Ethnicity was not systematically recorded 
(although anecdotally the children were a mixture of Asian, black, and white). Forty-
three out of 56 children were videotaped in order to rate behavioural responses to the 
conjuring demonstration and social confidence in a testing session. Parental 
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permission for videotaping was withheld for 13 children and so they could not be 
included in the behavioural and social confidence analyses. 
 
Design 
The study included the independent variable of social confidence and the dependent 
variables of verbal scepticism and active monitoring. There were also two 
independent experimental conditions (teddy with a bow and teddy without a bow) in 
the conjuring demonstration each with 28 children. All statistical tests were two-tailed 
unless otherwise indicated. 
 
Materials 
The pre-test game required two chairs and one chocolate wrapped in coloured foil per 
participant. The pre-test game and conjuring demonstration were videotaped using a 
JVC 700x digital zoom, high resolution camcorder mounted on a tripod that stood in 
full view of the participant. The conjuring demonstration involved a light blue square 
box measuring 19 cm wide and 8.5 cm deep, decorated with a large lilac star on its lid 
(Figure 4.1). There was also a red velvet bag with a rigid rim and a lever attached to a 
wooden handle (Figure 4.1). The box was placed on a table within touching distance 
of the child and the experimenter who sat on separate chairs. There were also two 
small teddy bears measuring 10 cm high with a 6 cm arm span (Figure 4.1). Both 
bears were identical apart from one teddy-bear had no bow-tie, while the second had a 
relatively large for its size blue bow-tie around its neck (Figure. 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1: Materials for the Conjuring Demonstration  
 
 
Procedure 
The study consisted of one testing session lasting approximately 10 minutes per child. 
All the children were tested individually in a quiet place (i.e. in a separate room away 
from the other classrooms). First, a pre-test game was conducted before the conjuring 
demonstration so that children became familiarized with the experimenter and the 
testing environment and to observe how socially confident he or she appeared.  
 
Pre-Test Hiding Game 
In the pre-test game the experimenter and child sat facing opposite each other on 
separate chairs. The experimenter explained to the child, “We are going to play a 
hiding game. I have a chocolate [she held up the chocolate wrapped in coloured foil 
for the child to see]. I am going to hide it in one of my hands and you have to guess 
which hand it is in.” The experimenter then put her hands behind her back and hid the 
chocolate in one hand. She then closed both hands into fists, held them out in front of 
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the child, and instructed the child to point to which hand he or she thought the 
chocolate was hidden. The hand the child chose was opened immediately. Lots of 
praise and encouragement was given. The chocolate was hidden and revealed a total 
of three times. At the end of the pre-test game the children did not receive the 
chocolate. All children in each class received sweets from the experimenter at the end 
of the total completed testing sessions, regardless of whether or not they took part in 
the experiment. The word “hiding” was deliberately included to reinforce the fact that 
the chocolate had not actually vanished but that deception was being implemented. 
This may have later assisted children’s responses in the conjuring demonstration.  
 
 
Conjuring Demonstration 
The 56 children were semi-randomly allocated to the two testing conditions 
(counterbalancing for age). In both conditions the experimenter showed the child a 
box and said that this was where she could make things appear that she really liked. 
The box was then placed on a table in touching distance of both the child and the 
experimenter and in the child’s sight. The experimenter then showed the child a small 
teddy and said that she liked it and would make it disappear in her bag and reappear in 
the box. She then put it in the bag in front of the child and said “abracadabra” and 
waved her hand over the bag. The bag had a wooden handle with a lever attached that 
enabled an object to be hidden within the cloth pocket of the bag when the lever was 
moved across. The experimenter held the handle and inconspicuously moved the lever 
across after the teddy had been placed in the bag and whilst saying “abracadabra”. She 
then asked the child if he or she thought that the teddy had disappeared. Regardless of 
the response, the child was shown the apparently empty inside of the bag and then 
166 
 
asked, “Where is the teddy?” If the child did not give a spontaneous response a 
prompt was given of, “Is it in the box or the bag?” If the child responded that it was in 
the box, the experimenter lifted the lid off and revealed the teddy inside the box (one 
that had been in the box all the time, but the child had not been shown beforehand). If 
the child responded that the teddy was in the bag the experimenter stated, “Let’s look 
in the box” and the child was then shown the teddy in the box. In Condition 1, the box 
was opened to reveal an identical teddy to the one that was in the bag. In Condition 2, 
the box was opened to reveal an identical teddy to the one that was in the bag with the 
exception that it had a bow around its neck. The child was then asked, “Is this the 
same teddy that I made disappear in the bag or does it just look like the teddy I made 
disappear?” and, “Do you think that what I did was real magic or a trick?” Following 
this, the experimenter put the lid back on the box and then told the child that she 
would make the teddy disappear from the box and reappear in the bag again. The 
experimenter then waved her hand over the bag (but did not say “abracadabra”) and 
the child was then shown the teddy (without a bow around its neck) in the bag. The 
child was asked, “Is this the same teddy that was in the box or does it just look like 
it?” and whether it was “real magic” or a “trick”. Verbal responses were noted down. 
Children were not prevented from touching, searching or exploring the conjuring 
materials throughout the duration of the demonstration. The order of the structure of 
the question asking if the teddy was in the “box” or the “bag” was counterbalanced to 
control for order effects, as was the questions if it was “real magic” or a “trick”.  
 
Scoring and Classification Criteria 
Children’s verbal responses to specific questions were categorised according to: 1) 
“yes” or “no” (“Do you think that the teddy has disappeared?”, 2) “box” or “bag” 
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(“Where is the teddy? Is it in the box or the bag?”, 3) “same” or “looks like” (“Is this 
the same teddy that I made disappear or does it just look like it?”, 4) “real magic” or 
“trick” (“Do you think I did real magic or a trick?”). Children’s behavioural reactions 
throughout the conjuring demonstration were categorized according to : “yes” or “no” 
(“When the teddy disappeared from the bag, did the child search the bag?”, “Before 
the word “box” was mentioned, did the child look at the box when the teddy was 
shown to have disappeared?”, “When the box was opened, did the child search the 
bag? “, “As soon as the box was opened, did the child look at the bag? “, “When the 
teddy re-appeared in the bag, did the child search the box?”). Along with categorising 
children’s responses to individual questions and behavioural reactions, a separate 
verbal scepticism score and an active monitoring score was calculated for each 
participant. In addition, a social confidence score was calculated. 
 
 
Verbal Scepticism 
All 56 children’s verbal responses were rated individually. For each question, a score 
of 1 was assigned to participants who gave a sceptical answer and a score of 0 if they 
gave a credulous answer. Each score was combined to give a total verbal scepticism 
score that ranged from 0 to 6, with 6 indicating the highest level of scepticism and 0 
indicating the lowest level of scepticism. A breakdown of the scoring according to the 
questions was as follows: 
 
1) “Has the teddy disappeared from the bag?” 
If the answer is “yes” = score of 0  
If the answer is “no” = score of 1  
168 
 
2) “Where is the teddy now, in the box or the bag?” 
If the answer is “box” = score of 0  
If the answer is “bag” = score of 1  
 
3) (When the teddy had disappeared in the bag and was seen in the box) “Is this teddy 
the same one that I made disappear from the bag or does it just look like it?” 
If the answer is “same” = score of 0  
If the answer is “looks like it" = score of 1  
 
4) “Was it real magic or a trick?” 
If the answer is “real magic” = score of 0 
If the answer is “trick” = score of 1  
 
5) (When the teddy had re-appeared in the bag) “Is this teddy the same one that I 
made appear in the box or does it just look like it?” 
If the answer is “same” = score of 0 
If the answer is "looks like it” = score of 1  
 
6) “Was it real magic or a trick?” 
If the answer is “real magic” = score of 0 
If the answer is “trick” = score of 1  
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Active Monitoring 
As 13 parents refused permission for videotaping, only 43 out of 56 children were 
analysed behaviourally. (This applied to active monitoring and to social confidence.) 
The experimenter reviewed the video-tape and rated behavioural responses based on 
direction of looking, and searching. Children were observed at the point that they saw 
the teddy had disappeared from the bag. Children were given a score of 0 indicating 
no active monitoring or 1 indicating active monitoring according to various 
observations. A total active monitoring score was then calculated. Each score was 
combined to give a total monitoring score that ranged from 0 to 5, with 5 indicating 
the highest level of active monitoring and 0 indicating the lowest level of active 
monitoring. Twelve children were scored for their reactions by a second rater for the 
purposes of inter-observer reliability. Excellent inter-observer reliability was achieved 
with 100% agreement attained for all reactions. A breakdown of the scoring according 
to reactions was as follows:  
 
1) When the teddy disappeared from the bag, did the child search the bag?  
If the answer is “yes” = score of 1  
If the answer is “no” = score of 0 
 
2) Before the word “box” was mentioned, did the child look at the box when the teddy 
was shown to have disappeared?  
If the answer is “no” = score of 1  
If the answer is “yes” = score of 0 
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3) When the box was opened, did the child search the bag?  
If the answer is “yes” = score of 1  
If the answer is “no” = score of 0 
 
4) As soon as the box was opened, did the child look at the bag?  
If the answer is “yes” = score of 1  
If the answer is “no” = score of 0 
 
 5) When the teddy re-appeared in the bag, did the child search the box?  
If the answer is “yes” = score of 1  
If the answer is “no” = score of 0 
 
 
 Searching the bag after the teddy has disappeared from it shows active 
curiosity and possibly suspicion or scepticism, as does searching the box after the 
teddy has reappeared in the bag. For the looking behaviour, curiosity and possibly 
suspicion or scepticism is less clearly defined. If one takes question 2, “Before the 
word ‘box’ was mentioned, did the child look at the box when the teddy was shown to 
have disappeared?”, I am taking this to refer to when the teddy appears to have 
disappeared from the bag. Why might looking at the box suggest scepticism? It 
indicates that the child is not just passively watching the procedure, but anticipating 
each stage. It indicates that the child is actively curious, which is possibly related to 
suspicion or scepticism, but not necessarily a direct measure of it. As such, children’s 
behavioural reactions were taken as being a measure of level of active monitoring that 
might be related to or contribute to their level of scepticism. 
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Social Confidence 
Social confidence was rated in relation to the pre-test game. The experimenter 
reviewed the video-tape and rated each child in the following categories: 1) How 
talkative/chatty the child was, 2) If the child made eye contact, 3) If the child 
smiled/laughed, 4) How relaxed the child appeared in posture (e.g., leaning back, 
arms unfolded), 5) How tense the child appeared (e.g., arms folded or still by sides of 
body, hunched shoulders, covering face with hands), 6) How engaged the child 
appeared (e.g., looking and listening, no prompting needed). Each category was given 
a rating on a scale between 0 and 3: 0 = not at all confident, 1 = a little confident, 2 = 
somewhat confident, 3 = very confident. It was possible that different components that 
were taken as indicators of social confidence would not when considered separately 
from one another indicate how confident the children appeared to be. Thus a more 
subjective global score was also awarded by the observers in terms of the children’s 
level of social confidence on a 0-3 rating scale. 
Twelve children were scored for their social confidence in each category from 
the pre-test game by a second rater. Excellent inter-observer reliability was achieved 
with 100% agreement attained for five out of six categories. The category for whether 
the child made eye contact had 75% observed agreement and a highly significant 
positive correlation (Pearson’s r = .84, p = .001).  
For the purposes of the current study, children’s overall social confidence 
rating was used for further analysis. Excellent inter-observer reliability was achieved 
for these ratings with 83.3% observed agreement and a Cohen’s kappa of .750; p = 
.001. The confidence scores of the two raters were highly significantly correlated 
(Pearson’s r = .894, p = .001). 
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Results 
The present study employed measures in the area of assessing links between levels of 
verbal scepticism, active monitoring, and social confidence. In addition, two 
experimental conditions were assessed in relation to levels of verbal scepticism and 
levels of active monitoring: a visual clue (i.e. teddy with a bow) versus no visual clue 
(i.e. teddy without a bow). Initially the results section addresses and presents the 
descriptive data for the verbal responses in the conjuring demonstration followed by 
differences in age between “trick” versus “real magic” causal responses. Next, 
descriptive data are presented for children’s behavioural reactions. Non-parametric 
statistics are used throughout and tests are two-tailed unless otherwise mentioned.  
 
 
Verbal Responses 
A summary of children’s verbal responses can be found in Table 4.1. When looking at 
the total counts and percentages for individual questions asked in the conjuring 
demonstration, most children stated that the teddy had disappeared from the bag 
(73%) and that the teddy was “in the box” (77%). At this point, responses suggest that 
children believed that the object (i.e. the teddy) had in fact spontaneously vanished 
and transferred from its original location (the bag) to a new location (the box). Hence, 
children may have been credulous of the event being genuine magic. However, a 
number of subsequent responses point towards a higher percentage of children 
showing scepticism than credulity towards the transference spontaneously occurring: 
55% stated that the transferred teddy that was in the box only looked like the original 
teddy, 54% stated that the movement of the teddy into the box was a “trick”, and 59% 
stated that the transferred teddy that re-appeared in the bag only looked like the teddy 
173 
 
that had been in the box. An equal percentage of children gave “magic” and “trick” 
causal responses regarding the movement of the teddy from the box back into the bag 
that may be indicative of an equal proportion of children being sceptical and 
credulous. The variation in responses to certain questions being indicative of 
children’s scepticism and to other questions being indicative of children’s credulity 
highlights the need for the assessment of levels of scepticism. This is evident in the 
fact that 43 children were inconsistent throughout regarding responses to different 
questions. Only nine children gave consistently credulous responses pointing towards 
magic, and four children gave consistently sceptical responses. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Four- to Six-year-olds’ Verbal Responses and Percentages during the 
Conjuring Demonstration (N = 56) 
 
Has the 
teddy 
disappeared 
from the 
bag? 
Where is 
the 
teddy? 
Is it the same 
teddy that was 
in the bag? 
 
Was the 
movement 
(into the 
box) real 
magic or a 
trick? 
Is it the same 
teddy that was 
in the box? 
Was the 
movement (into 
the bag) real 
magic or a 
trick? 
Yes = 41 
(73%) 
 
No = 15 
(26.8%) 
 
Box = 43 
(77%) 
 
Bag = 13 
(23.2%) 
Same = 25 
(45%) 
 
Looks like = 31 
(55.4%) 
Magic = 26 
(46%) 
 
Trick = 30 
(53.6%) 
Same = 23 
(41%) 
 
Looks like = 33 
(58.9%) 
Magic = 28 
(50%) 
 
Trick = 28 
(50%) 
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A major indicator of children’s belief in the causal effect of the manipulation 
was their answers in response to whether the movement of the teddy was “real magic” 
or a “trick”. However, a Mann Whitney U test revealed no significant differences 
between the age of children giving a specific “real magic” versus “trick” response for 
the cause of the movement of the teddy from the bag into the box (Mann-Whitney 
U(26, 30) = 371; p = .760) and for the teddy moving from the box back into the bag 
(Mann-Whitney U(28, 28) = 331; p = .320). Regardless of age, children were just as 
likely to give a “real magic” or “trick” causal response. Therefore, there does not 
appear to be a developmental pattern in children ascribing “trick” causality to the 
event. 
 
 
Behavioural Responses 
A summary of the children’s behavioural responses can be found in Table 4.2. When 
looking at the total counts and percentages, the majority of the children did not search 
the bag or the box at any stage during the procedure. This could be construed as 
children not being suspicious of the demonstration as trickery. However, children 
appeared to show more active monitoring behaviour in terms of looking than 
searching: children were equally likely to display looking behaviour as not to. Once 
again, this highlights the need for levels of assessment regarding children’s reactions 
to anomalous events rather than categorising children’s responses according to simple 
dichotomous categories.  
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Table 4.2: Frequency and Percentages of 4-6-year-olds’ Behavioural Reactions 
during the Conjuring Demonstration (N = 43) 
 
Did the child 
search the bag? 
 
(When the teddy 
disappeared from 
the bag) 
 
Did the child 
look at the 
box? 
(Before the 
word “box” was 
mentioned) 
Did the child 
look back at 
the bag? 
(As soon as the 
box was 
opened)  
Did the child 
search the bag? 
 
(When the box 
was opened)  
 
Did the child 
search the box? 
 
(When the teddy 
re-appeared in the 
bag) 
 
Yes = 11 
(26%) 
 
No = 32 
(74%) 
Yes = 21 
(49%) 
 
No = 22 
(51%) 
Yes = 22 
(51%) 
 
No = 21  
(49%) 
Yes = 5 
(12%) 
 
No = 38 
(88%) 
Yes = 8 
(19%) 
 
No = 35 
(81%) 
 
 
A Mann Whitney U test revealed no significant differences between children 
searching versus not searching any of the apparatus (searching the bag when the teddy 
disappeared from the bag: Mann-Whitney U(11, 32) = 169; p = .855; searching the 
bag when the box was opened: Mann-Whitney U(5, 38) = 80; p = .580; searching the 
box when the teddy re-appeared in the bag: Mann-Whitney U(8, 35) = 135; p = .888). 
Furthermore, in terms of looking behaviour, no significant difference was found 
between children glancing back at the bag or not when the teddy had appeared in the 
box (glancing at the bag: Mann-Whitney U(22,21) = 230; p = .980). Therefore, there 
does not appear to be a developmental pattern in children’s behavioural reactions to 
the event. 
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Level of Verbal Scepticism and Level of Active Monitoring Behaviour 
As the majority of children appeared to sway between scepticism and credulity of a 
genuine violation of object permanence throughout the conjuring trick, a total verbal 
scepticism score was calculated in order to analyse and determine children’s level of 
verbal scepticism. A total active monitoring score was also calculated for analysis. It 
should be noted that all further analyses for the remainder of the study were 
conducted on 43 children, as 13 children were omitted due to lack of parental 
permission to videotape them. 
Figure 4.2 shows that there was a positive linear relationship between levels of 
verbal and active monitoring scores, indicating that as children’s verbal scepticism 
increased so too did their behavioural reactions.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Linear Regression between 4-6-year-olds’ Verbal Scepticism and 
Active Monitoring Behaviour  
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A spearman’s correlation was carried out in order to assess whether children’s 
level of verbal scepticism and level of active monitoring were related. A significant 
positive correlation was found (r = .438, N = 43; p = .003). Hence, there did not 
appear to be a discrepancy between levels of verbal judgments and behavioural 
reactions. Even when the possible effects of age, social confidence, and experimental 
condition were controlled for, a significant positive correlation still remained: age (r = 
.463, df = 40; p = .002); social confidence (r = .440, df = 40; p = .004); experimental 
condition (r = .488, df = 40; p = .001). Therefore, irrespective of the child’s age, their 
level of social confidence, and whether they were exposed to a visual clue of 
deception or not, levels of non-verbal and verbal responses were associated.  
 
 
Social Confidence 
Although level of verbal scepticism and level of active monitoring behaviour were 
significantly correlated, a combined score was not calculated. Combining scores may 
have obscured a possible association between level of active monitoring (especially 
exploratory behaviour) towards the conjuring demonstration and social confidence 
that was independent of level of verbal scepticism. Therefore, a separate analysis was 
carried out. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, a step-wise increase was observed in social 
confidence and active monitoring: the more socially confident children were, the more 
inclined they were to explore apparatus and look in the direction of where the teddy 
was hidden.  
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Figure 4.3: Four- to Six-year-olds’ Active Monitoring Behaviour and Social 
Confidence  
 
 
A significant positive correlation was found between children’s level of social 
confidence and their level of active monitoring in the conjuring demonstration (r = 
.364, N = 43; p = .016). Furthermore, when a possible effect of age and condition was 
controlled for, a significant positive correlation still remained: age (r = .440, df = 40; 
p = .004); condition (r = .449, df = 40; p = .003). Therefore, the more socially 
confident a child was the more active they were in their behaviour. 
Regarding level of verbal scepticism, those scoring highest in social 
confidence appeared to be the most sceptical. However, children who were the least 
socially confident appeared to be more sceptical than children who were somewhat 
socially confident (see Figure 4.4). Children’s level of social confidence and level of 
verbal scepticism were not significantly correlated (r = .133, N = 43: p = .393).  
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Figure 4.4: Four- to Six-year-olds’ Verbal Scepticism and Social Confidence  
 
 
Taking the results together, social confidence was not linked generally to 
verbal scepticism in the testing session and cannot be taken as reflecting children’s 
scepticism towards what they have witnessed per se. Instead it appears that 
behavioural reactions to the conjuring demonstration reflected social confidence in the 
testing session, especially as children were being videotaped. A summary of these 
correlations are shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Matrix of Spearman Correlation Results for 4-6-year-old Children  
(N = 43) 
 
Verbal 
scepticism 
.438** 
p = .003 
  
Social 
confidence 
.364* 
p =.016 
.133 
p = .393 
 
Age .072 
p =.648 
.153 
p = .327 
.184 
p = .238 
 Active 
monitoring 
Verbal 
scepticism 
Social 
confidence 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Experimental Condition (bow versus no bow) 
When comparing children who were in the bow condition (i.e. 26 children whereby 
the teddy that was found in the box had a bow around its neck) with those who were 
in the no bow condition (i.e. 17 children whereby the teddy that was found in the box 
had no bow around its neck) there appeared to be a difference in levels of verbal 
scepticism. That is, there was a tendency for children in the bow condition to be more 
verbally sceptical than those in the no bow condition (Figure 4.5).   
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Figure 4.5: Four- to Six-year-olds’ Level of Verbal Scepticism according to 
Experimental Condition 
 
 
A statistically significant difference was found between the two conditions in 
terms of level of verbal scepticism (Mann-Whitney U (17,26) = 135; p =.031). 
However, no significant difference was found between the two conditions in terms of 
level of active monitoring behaviour (Mann Whitney U (17,26) = 207; p = .722). 
Therefore, being exposed to a visual clue of deception appeared to only influence 
children’s verbal judgments.  
Further analysis was carried out between the two conditions and children’s 
responses as to whether the movement of the teddy was “real magic” or a “trick”. As 
was mentioned earlier, responses to this question were a major indicator of children’s 
belief in the causal effect of the conjuring demonstration. No significant difference 
was found between the two conditions with respect to the number of children stating 
that the movement of the teddy from the bag into the box was “real magic” versus a 
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“trick” (Chi-square: ²(1, N = 43) = .874, p = .350). A near significant difference was 
found regarding the condition children were in and responses of whether the 
movement from the box back into the bag was “real magic” or a “trick” (Chi-square 
²(1, N = 43) = 3.741, p = .053). Children in the bow condition appeared to be more 
likely to state “trick” whereas children in the no bow condition appeared to be more 
likely to state “real magic” (Figure 4.6). However, this near-significant result may be 
related to repetition of the causal question. Hence, children’s belief in the causal effect 
of this part of the manipulation was not necessarily related to the condition that the 
child was in.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Four- to Six-year-olds’ Causal Responses for the Movement of the 
Teddy from the Box back into the Bag 
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Discussion 
The main aim of Study 4 was to examine 4-6-year-old children’s behavioural and 
verbal responses to a conjuring trick. In doing so, possible discrepancies between the 
two in terms of children’s judgments towards the event being genuine magic might be 
uncovered. Irrespective of age, an association was found between children’s level of 
verbal scepticism and level of active monitoring behaviour: as children’s verbal 
scepticism increased, so too did their behavioural reactions towards the “spontaneous” 
transference of an inanimate object (i.e. a teddy). This implies that children’s verbal 
judgments were accompanied by appropriate non-verbal behaviour. As such it 
opposes research that has only found children’s belief in magic causality in their 
actions and disbelief in their verbal judgments (e.g., Subbotsky, 1985, 1993, 2001, 
2004). However, a crucial difference in methodology might account for these 
contrasting findings. Other research has examined verbal beliefs prior to witnessing a 
demonstration and according to ontological beliefs. That is, whether a child states 
before witnessing a violation that it can occur in reality or not. Children are then 
tested on whether verbal responses correspond with non-verbal behaviour. For 
instance, according to whether a child looks inside a box after they have stated that an 
item cannot spontaneously appear by magic (e.g., Harris et al., 1991; Subbotsky, 
1984, 1995). In contrast, Study 4 observed children’s behaviour at the same time as 
questioning children on their interpretation of the event. 
It is important to note many previous studies that have found conflict between 
children’s verbal and behavioural reactions about magical causality have exploited the 
possibility of cost to the participant. As discussed in Chapter 1, in their verbal 
judgments school children usually show scepticism towards magic. Yet children show 
behaviours compatible with magical thinking if they are put in a context where 
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disregarding the possibility of magic involves a potentially high cost (e.g., Harris, et 
al., 1991; Johnson & Harris, 1994; Subbotsky, 1985, 1994, 2001), for instance, 
refusing to place a personal  item in a box for fear of damaging it (Subbotsky, 2001).  
Findings support the proposal that children’s explanations for anomalous 
events might be better understood in terms of levels of verbal scepticism spanning a 
continuum as opposed to only categorising children as credulous or sceptical. In their 
verbal judgments, only nine children gave consistent responses throughout 
questioning that could be deemed as entirely credulous towards the demonstration 
being real magic. Six of these children also appeared to be genuinely surprised by the 
spontaneous transference of the teddy from one location to another. They exhibited 
surprise by having gaping mouths, putting their hands to their face, or to use Chandler 
and Lalonde’s (1994) phrase, having “bugged” eyes (p. 89). Likewise, only four 
children gave consistent responses throughout questioning that could be construed as 
complete scepticism towards the demonstration. In fact, the majority of children gave 
a mixture of the two types of responses. Hence they conveyed different levels of 
scepticism towards the event. In their non-verbal behaviour, children were more 
inclined to look than to search. That is, equal numbers of children actively looked as 
did not in the direction that the teddy was hidden when the teddy was shown in an 
apparently different location. In contrast, the majority of children did not search the 
apparatus and so this might be construed as children showing credulity towards the 
spontaneous transference of the teddy without physical intervention. These results 
indicate that the children are not passively accepting of what they see, but are more 
curious and willing to explore. Such attitudes and consequent behaviour are likely to 
contribute to scepticism as it increases the possibility that the children will find 
alternative non-magic explanations of the events they witness.  
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In terms of children’s verbal judgments, there was no developmental pattern in 
children ascribing trick causality to the event. Regardless of age, children were just as 
likely to give “real magic” as “trick” as an explanation for the movements of the 
teddy. Therefore, age was not a crucial factor in children suspending beliefs in the 
permanence of perceived objects. The majority of the children did not appear to be 
reliant on searching the apparatus in order to give a “trick” causal response. Nineteen 
out of 24 children gave a “trick” causal response for the transference of the teddy 
from the bag into the box, despite not searching the bag. In addition 17 out of 23 
children gave a “trick” causal response regarding the transference of the teddy back 
into the bag, despite not searching the box. This implies that exploring the apparatus 
was not crucial in the detection of trickery and thus supports the findings of Study 2 
and Study 3. A few children, who had felt the bag or opened the box after the 
transferences of the teddy, and gave “trick” causal responses, were able to 
independently work out and explain how the conjuring trick had actually been 
performed. For instance, after having opened the box and finding another teddy in it, 
one child correctly explained that one teddy was hiding in the bag and that there was 
just another teddy in the box. Another child clearly stated that she would have opened 
the box when the teddy was in the bag to “see if it’s a trick” before she actually 
searched the box. However, other children appeared to be confused by the 
demonstration after having explored the apparatus. For instance, one child retrieved 
the teddy from the bag at the end of the demonstration, then opened the box, held both 
teddies in her hands, and commented that the two teddies looked different because 
one had a ribbon around its neck. Yet she stated that the demonstration was real 
magic, “’Cos magic it appeared. When I blinked you put ribbon in, did it really fast 
and when I blinked again you put it in there”. Another child felt the bag when the 
186 
 
teddy had disappeared (and consequently felt the hidden teddy). Yet when the box 
was opened and a teddy was revealed, the child hunched his shoulders and gave a 
“real magic” causal response. These findings somewhat oppose research that has 
shown that children who successfully search apparatus commit to principles of 
physical causality (e.g., Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Hood et al., 2003). However, in 
Study 4, some children (i.e. six out of fourteen children) exhibited what might be 
interpreted as an element of scepticism towards the transference being genuine magic 
by searching the apparatus even though they gave “real magic” causal responses. It 
should be noted that there was an element of repetition in questioning children on the 
causality of the demonstration (i.e. asking whether the movement of the teddy into the 
box was “real magic” or a “trick”, and whether the movement of the teddy back into 
the bag was “real magic” or a “trick”). Despite this repetition, the majority of the 
children maintained a “trick” causal response (i.e. 23 out of 30 children) or a “real 
magic” causal response (i.e. 21 out of 26). Therefore, as only a few children changed 
their original causal statements, it was unlikely that children were conforming to a 
task demand (as in Study 2) and so the effect of repetitive questioning on results 
seems minimal. Instead, by providing a slightly more sensitive measure in the form of 
asking a second time if the demonstration was “real magic” versus “trick” reinforced 
children’s commitment to their causal responses. 
Another aim of Study 4 was to introduce the possibility of a link between a 
psychological factor and responses towards a violation of object permanence. 
Therefore, in addition to including levels of verbal scepticism and levels of active 
monitoring, the current study also included ratings of children’s social confidence 
during a pre-test game. Although no significant association was found with levels of 
verbal scepticism, social confidence was associated with levels of active monitoring. 
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Indeed, the higher children’s level of social confidence, the higher children’s level of 
behavioural reaction was (and irrespective of the age of the child and the experimental 
condition they were in). Specifically, children were more likely to search the 
apparatus or look in the appropriate location where the teddy was hidden. Therefore, 
contrary to Subbotsky (2010), in order to elicit exploratory behaviour in children aged 
four years and older, an event does not need to be necessarily incompatible with the 
fundamental laws of nature (such as object permanence or physical causality). Instead, 
exploratory behaviour may be indicative of children’s social confidence levels. 
Hence, a child lacking in social confidence seems less likely to explore.  
The association found in Study 4 between level of active monitoring and 
social confidence was not unexpected. Both factors were assessed using similar 
criteria: direction of eye gaze and physical movements. Hence, social confidence was 
rated according to physical behaviour, apart from taking into account how talkative 
the child was, and if he or she smiled or laughed. Active monitoring assessed 
children’s spontaneous reactions whereas verbal scepticism was assessed using 
judgments based on forced questions that only required one-word responses. Hence 
this might account for the lack of association found between verbal scepticism and 
social confidence, and the association found between active monitoring and social 
confidence. However, only two children spontaneously queried what had happened 
when the teddy had disappeared and re-appeared in a different location. Therefore, 
additional spontaneous verbal data could not be utilised.  
Study 4 was also designed to add to the information already gained in the last 
two studies (and previous research), concerning a possible link between external 
factors and interpretation of an anomalous event. Therefore, it included two 
conditions in the conjuring demonstration (i.e. bow versus no bow around a teddy’s 
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neck) in order to assess the effect of a visual clue on detection of trickery. Hence, 
children were provided with a hint of there being two teddies used in a conjuring 
demonstration rather than one. A non-significant trend was found regarding causal 
responses and the experimental condition the child was in. It would appear that an 
available clue was not necessary to make sense of there being a different teddy and 
hence trickery. The lack of a visual clue did not seriously challenge children’s belief 
in physical causality (i.e. that an object cannot spontaneously move without physical 
intervention). With more power or a slightly different methodology, this aspect of 
their responding could and perhaps should be studied in the future. 
Evidence was found of a link between children’s interpretation of the 
conjuring demonstration and the experimental condition children were in. A 
significant association was found between level of verbal scepticism and the 
experimental condition: children in the bow condition were more sceptical in their 
verbal judgments than in the no bow condition. However, no association was found 
between children’s level of active monitoring and experimental condition. This 
suggests that children’s preferential looking and searching behaviour was not linked 
to additional clues provided by the experimental situation. It somewhat lends support 
to Hood et al. (2003) who found that preschoolers did not discriminate in searching 
performance between impossible and possible events: they search successfully both 
types of events. Instead, as stated previously, looking and searching behaviour is 
linked to social confidence. Therefore, social confidence appears to be a stronger 
influence on behavioural reactions than what may be deemed an explicit clue of 
trickery.  
Children’s level of verbal scepticism should be accepted with some caution 
since the inclusion of a visual clue may have biased results. Had children in the bow 
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condition given equal or more “real magic” causal responses than children in the no 
bow condition, this would have been an indication of children’s low level of 
scepticism instead of a response to a visual clue. Specifically, an explicit hint was 
provided of there being two different teddies used in the demonstration rather than 
one and hence a hint of deception. Although two out of six questions were asked 
before children were exposed to the teddy with the bow around its neck in the box, 
children may have been responding directly to what they saw rather than what they 
believed and so does not truly reflect children’s levels of scepticism towards the 
demonstration per se. Instead it reflects scepticism in response to a visual clue of 
trickery. This renders the results open to the possibility that it merely points to 
children’s sensitivity to contextual clues in interpreting events and not actual 
scepticism towards a violation of object permanence being genuine magic per se. 
With hindsight, it would have been appropriate not to include an explicit visual clue.  
Irrespective of the experimental condition that the child was in, all participants 
were exposed to the suggestion of a magic context. The experimenter’s suggestion of 
magic by waving her hand over the bag and saying, “Abracadabra” may have 
influenced some children’s verbal convictions and cannot be dismissed. Indeed, 
Subbotsky (2004) explicitly talked about magic as well as using magic words in 
conjunction with an event and found that 4- and 6-year-old children accepted a 
magical explanation for a transformation of a physical object in an apparently empty 
box. In Study 4 of the current thesis, this magic suggestion was only spoken during 
the first transference of the teddy (i.e. when the teddy was put in the bag and was 
being transferred to the box) and not during the second transference (i.e. when the bag 
was empty and the teddy was being transferred back into it). Even so, there did not 
appear to be any differences between children’s first and second causal verbal 
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judgments and stating “abracadabra” or not. These findings contrast with Subbotsky 
(1994) who suggests that the experimenter’s credulity towards unusual phenomena 
may play a crucial role in changing children’s beliefs. As with Subbotsky (2004), 
magic words and action were specifically used in conjunction with the event in order 
to present an event that looked like authentic magic that is difficult to explain. By 
doing so, children’s physical causal beliefs were challenged and so, the extent to 
which children adhere to scepticism of magic tested. Conversely, the extent to which 
children subscribe to magical causality could also be explored.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Study 4 found a significant association between 4-6-year-old children’s level of verbal 
scepticism and level of active monitoring behaviour towards a conjuring 
demonstration being genuine magic. This suggests that verbal judgments are a true 
reflection of their beliefs. Furthermore, although no significant association was found 
between children’s level of active monitoring when exposed to a visual clue of 
deception, children were significantly more likely to express verbal scepticism. 
However, a visual clue was not a crucial factor in the likelihood of children giving 
“trick” causal responses for an event that appeared to violate object permanence. 
Therefore, children’s verbal responses were somewhat dependent on whether they 
witnessed a teddy with a bow around its neck or not. No developmental trend was 
found in children ascribing “trick” causality or suspension of beliefs in the 
permanence of perceived objects. This implies that age may not be the crucial factor 
in children’s ability to acknowledge deception. Study 4 introduced a psychologically 
relevant factor to the thesis in the form of social confidence. No significant 
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association was found between level of verbal scepticism and level of social 
confidence. However, a significant association was found between level of active 
monitoring behaviour and social confidence: the more confident children were 
socially, the more likely they were to physically explore the apparatus or look in a 
relevant direction. This latter association points towards the possibility of there being 
individual differences between children’s level of scepticism towards an event being 
real magic related to psychological factors. Therefore the final two studies in this 
thesis will explore other possible internal factors that may be associated with 
children’s causal explanations and scepticism towards a conjuring demonstration 
being genuine magic. So far in the thesis the studies have looked mainly at contextual 
influences on children’s interpretation of a violation of object permanence. The next 
two studies will focus on children’s interpretations from a social-cognitive 
perspective. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
STUDY 5 – Detection of trickery and levels of sophistication of theory of mind,   
                   machiavellian intelligence, verbal ability, and spatial monitoring 
 
 
“The power of thought, the magic of the mind”. (Lord Byron) 
 
 
There are several cognitive abilities that might be related to the development of 
magical belief or scepticism. Study 5 of the present thesis was conducted principally 
to investigate the hypothesis that scepticism with respect to conjuring tricks would be 
related to Theory of Mind ability. However, Study 5 also investigated the effect of 
levels of Machiavellian intelligence, spatial cognitive intelligence, and verbal 
intelligence upon magical belief. 
 
Theory of Mind and Advanced Theory of Mind 
In everyday life we form ideas about other people and about social situations. We 
interpret other people’s actions and we predict what they will do under certain 
circumstances. This requires a Theory of Mind (ToM) and is one of the most 
important skills to develop in early childhood with implications for the development 
of social interaction, emotional understanding and communication (Coull, Leekam, & 
Bennett, 2006). From the earliest research, a central focus has been on children’s 
understanding of false belief – that a person’s belief can contradict reality (e.g., 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). An understanding of false beliefs is essential to an 
appreciation of the possibility of deception and trickery. More specifically, one must 
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have a fairly sophisticated ToM in order to appreciate that people may sometimes 
deliberately mislead others into drawing false conclusions (e.g., an object has 
disappeared when in reality it hasn’t). Indeed, Sullivan, Zaitchik, and Tager-Flusberg 
(1994) postulated that advanced forms of reasoning underlie much of our social 
reasoning and are necessary for any sophisticated understanding of human action. 
These include understanding subtle forms of social deception such as bluffs and white 
lies (e.g., Happé, 1994). Study 5 of the current thesis explores a possible link between 
young children’s detection of trickery in a conjuring demonstration and an advanced 
theory of mind (AToM). The conjuring demonstrations used in this thesis involve 
deception whereby an apparent violation of object permanence is shown. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that advanced understanding of knowledge and belief might 
assist children in identifying a “trick” as the underlying causal effect for the violation. 
So, it is likely that the more advanced one’s theory of mind, the more likely one is to 
think, “It’s a trick”, and the less likely one is to think, “It’s real magic”. There does 
not appear to be any research as yet that has attempted to assess children’s 
understanding of conjuring (which is a form of deception) from a theory of mind 
perspective. Study 5 also investigated different intelligence factors that might be 
related to children’s level of verbal scepticism towards the conjuring demonstration 
being genuine magic: namely Machiavellian intelligence, spatial cognitive 
intelligence, and verbal intelligence. Once again there has been no previous research 
that has addressed these internal factors in relation to children’s magical thinking.  
ToM has been the topic of considerable research effort in the last twenty years 
(for thorough reviews, see Astington, 2003; Harris, 2006; Hughes & Leekam, 2004; 
Miller, 2009). A detailed examination of ToM development and its consequences is 
beyond the scope of the current thesis (as are the controversies surrounding this vast 
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topic).  Instead, the current thesis contains a selective literature survey focusing on 
ToM’s relevance to magical beliefs. 
Studies on ToM have investigated various conceptions within the child’s 
developing understanding and used a variety of tasks (e.g., Astington, 1993; Flavell & 
Miller, 1998; Wellman, 1990). As was mentioned earlier, much ToM research has 
focused on children’s understanding of belief, especially false belief in others. The 
most popular topic has been first-order false belief: the realization that it is possible to 
hold false beliefs about events in the world. False belief tasks require children to 
distinguish between a mental representation (e.g., a belief that a cookie is in a jar) and 
the actual state of the world (e.g., the cookie really is in the cupboard). Appearance-
reality tasks also require the understanding that mental representations of stimuli and 
the stimuli themselves may not always correspond (Flavell, 1988). The task requires 
the child to appreciate that an object’s appearance may differ from its real status (e.g., 
an object can look like a rock, but in fact can be made of sponge; Flavell, Flavell, & 
Green, 1987). Therefore, the child needs to understand that appearance is separate 
from reality, in the same way that they need to understand that belief is separate from 
reality to complete the false belief measures. Research has established that nearly all 
children achieve success on standard false-belief tasks at approximately the same age 
(between four and five years of age). However, there are individual differences in that 
achievement, with some researchers (e.g., Chandler & Sokol, 1999; Coull et al., 2006) 
arguing that children’s understanding of others’ minds is a skill that develops for 
several years after children are successful on a typical false-belief task. 
 Selman (1980) theorised that progressive levels of social understanding are 
conceptualised in terms of increasingly advanced forms of perspective taking. Many 
researchers (e.g., Miller, 2009; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990) have noted that 
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advanced ToM understanding (AToM) involves not only that a person has their 
thoughts and beliefs about social situations and the world and that they can be false 
(first-order reasoning) (e.g., “he thinks that...”). It also involves thoughts about 
another person’s thoughts (e.g., he thinks that she thinks that...”) and it can even 
involve thoughts about another person’s thoughts about their thoughts, involving 
intentions and emotions as well as beliefs. These beliefs too can be false or wrong. 
Miller (2009) labels them as “higher order” reasoning. AToM tasks such as Happé’s 
(1994) “strange stories” are considered more complex than first-order ToM tasks as 
the scenarios through which the task is conveyed are longer, they contain more 
informational units, they put more demand on working memory, and they include a 
more complexly worded test question. Furthermore, the AToM task is a powerful 
measure of children’s ToM development as not only are children required to infer 
mental states that are embedded in the context of a story, they must also provide 
causal reasons why a character has given a particular false statement. This ensures 
judgments reflect genuine understanding.  
 The consequences of ToM development have long been of interest in the 
literature on first-order mentalising and have been shown to relate to a wide range of 
social outcomes (Astington, 2003). Yet the development and consequences of more 
advanced aspects of social reasoning are under-investigated. Miller (2009), reporting 
on research that has been carried out to date, groups advanced social reasoning into 
three general and overlapping categories: lying and other forms of false statement, 
social behaviour (e.g., moral reasoning), and cognitive consequences. Lying is a 
relevant topic in relation to this thesis since, just as with magical trickery, it is a form 
of deception. As such, it will be addressed separately in Study 6.  
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Few studies have investigated the earliest age at which AToM emerges. There 
is also no clear consensus on when children become capable of attributing advanced 
order mental states, although it is widely assumed that this ability develops later than 
first-order ToM (Coull et al., 2006). Like the understanding of first-order ToM, there 
are different aspects of AToM understanding that may appear at different points of 
development and Miller (2009) reports that age of mastery varies across methods and 
samples. Therefore, irrespective of age, individual differences in children’s level of 
ToM ability may account for individual differences in children’s interpretation of an 
anomalous event.  
 
Spatial Monitoring 
Another area of cognitive skill that may relate to children’s understanding and 
acknowledgment of trickery in a conjuring demonstration is spatial monitoring ability. 
A basic function of spatial cognition is to keep track of the positions of objects in 
space. Sophian (1986) claimed this task is challenging because events are constantly 
occurring that change the positions of objects. At the same time, some objects remain 
stationary despite changes in the positions of objects around them. To function 
effectively, children must take account of both the changing (moving) and the stable 
aspects of their environment as movements occur. Sophian calls this “spat ial 
monitoring”. While much spatial monitoring can be done perceptually, by noting 
where various objects are at successive points in time, efficient spatial monitoring 
may also depend importantly on the child’s ability to infer where objects will be after 
a movement, without perceiving them in their new positions. This is because objects 
are not always visible in their new positions, since they may be occluded by other 
objects or concealed within a container.  
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 According to Sophian (1986), in order to evaluate children’s understanding of 
object movements, and correspondingly their ability to monitor the positions of 
objects without immediate perceptual input, it is essential to look at their ability to 
locate objects that are not only concealed from view at the end of a movement but that 
also are not directly visible while a movement is taking place. Otherwise the child 
could locate the object simply by looking where he or she last saw it, which would not 
necessarily imply that he or she understood the movement. For example, on spatial 
transposition problems an object is hidden in one of several containers and then two 
of those containers are moved. Here, the object’s movements are invisible as it is 
concealed inside the container. So the child can only infer what happens to the object 
from the movements of the containers. These movements may either include the 
container in which the object was hidden or just surrounding, empty, containers. 
Therefore, advances in children’s understanding of what happens to an object when its 
container is moved enables them to infer what happens to objects that are concealed 
from view during a movement. It may follow that children require the same advance 
in spatial understanding in order to judge that a conjuring demonstration is a “trick”. 
That is, the ability to keep track of and monitor a concealed object. The conjuring 
demonstration used in Study 5 (and Study 4) presents a “spontaneous” transference of 
an object (i.e. teddy) from one location (a bag) to another (a box). In order for 
children to understand that the teddy has not actually moved to a new location but is 
merely hidden within a bag, they need to be able to keep track of and monitor the 
concealed teddy. As children have not witnessed the teddy moving they may correctly 
infer that it is hidden in the bag by acknowledging trickery. Therefore, children may 
require a certain level of spatial monitoring ability in order to arrive at a “trick” 
conclusion to the operation of the event.  
198 
 
Machiavellian Intelligence 
A social intelligence factor that might be related to children’s interpretation of a 
conjuring demonstration is Machiavellianism. Our beliefs about others are of 
fundamental importance in social interaction. We quickly form impressions and make 
judgments or attributions concerning people we meet, and this process can guide our 
behaviour towards them. Some may view people in general as untrustworthy in 
interpersonal situations, whereas others may have a high degree of faith in human 
nature, seeing people as fundamentally kind and to be treated with honesty and 
respect. This variation in attitudes has been described as degrees of 
“Machiavellianism” (Christie & Geis, 1970). Machiavellianism refers to the 
predisposition to cynically view others as fundamentally dishonest and gullible 
(Christie & Geis, 1970; Harrell & Hartnagel, 1976; Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996). In 
the psychological literature, Christie and colleagues have found that Machiavellians 
also appear to be resistant to social influence, better able to ignore social concerns 
when they interfere with task performance and better able to initiate and control the 
structure of social interactions. It may follow in Study 5 that Machiavellian children 
will search apparatus in the conjuring demonstration and suspect trickery.  
There has been some interest into Machiavellianism as a personality trait; 
however, there has been little empirical research using child samples. The majority of 
research on Machiavellianism in children has addressed children aged nine years and 
above. For example, Nachamie (1969) studied the behaviour of 11-year-old children 
and found that those scoring high in Machiavellianism (“high Machs”) were more 
successful in bluffing and challenging in an experimental setting involving a dice 
game than those scoring low (“low Machs”). Furthermore, they were more able to 
distinguish lying from truth-telling in their opponents and were also more adept at 
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deceiving others. According to Damon (1988), the key Machiavellian view of other 
people as fundamentally untrustworthy, manipulable and gullible may not emerge 
before age eight or nine. Furthermore, according to Wellman (1990), the conceptual 
prerequisites of a Machiavellian orientation, namely an understanding of and capacity 
for deception, develop over the course of early to middle childhood. However, 
research suggests that Machiavellianism does exist in children as young as preschool 
age, with children becoming capable of deception (such as lying and misleading 
others in experimental settings) as young as age three or four (e.g., Russell, Mauthner, 
Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991).  
 
The Identity of the Magic Performer 
Although the current thesis has specifically used a conjuring demonstration in order to 
differentiate between children who give a “trick” or “magic” causal response, it may 
not have been sufficient to convince children that genuine magic had occurred and 
thereby challenge children’s adherence and commitment to natural physical laws of 
object permanence. Therefore, in Study 5 the conjuring demonstration included a 
variety of “magical” elements. Firstly, children were exposed to the appearance of 
someone who had the attribute of being a magician (i.e. wearing a cape and pointed 
hat, claiming to have special powers, and casting a magic spell). In doing so, the 
credibility of the agent might increase the potential for being able to somehow 
summon up magical powers and cause the transference of an object by magic. 
Previous research has established that children’s causal reasoning about events in the 
natural world appears predominantly rational, not magical. Yet when there is 
inclusion of a magician young children accept the power of magic to violate laws of 
physicality (e.g., Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & 
200 
 
Hickling, 1994; Rosengren, Kalish, Hickling, & Gelman, 1994). Indeed, Study 2 of 
this thesis found that the majority of 4-6-year-olds subscribed to magicians being able 
to “do magic” and having “special powers”. However, they also said magic was “just 
tricks”. In Study 5 it was hoped that by providing the agent (i.e. a magician) and a 
specific causal mechanism (i.e. “real magic” or a “trick”) in the conjuring 
demonstration instead of questioning children hypothetically about the abilities of 
magicians after having watched a conjuring event, children’s conflicting thoughts 
about magic in Study 2 would be clarified. Therefore, by having the experimenter 
appear as a magician, if children gave “real magic” causal responses instead of “trick” 
causal responses for the conjuring demonstration in Study 5, then responses  can be 
considered as reflecting belief in genuine magic (as children claimed that magicians 
have special powers and can perform magic) and not that magic is “just tricks”.  
 
 Study Aim 
Study 5 aimed to find a possible link between AToM and responses to a conjuring 
demonstration. It is proposed that children with a higher level of ToM skills will be 
less likely to reason magically as they are more socio-cognitively developed. 
Therefore, children scoring higher on an AToM test will be more likely to think in 
terms of deception and trickery and actually suspect deception in a conjuring 
demonstration. Conversely, those with a lower AToM score will be less likely to think 
in terms of deception and trickery and be credulous of a conjuring demonstration 
being genuine magic. However, children may show limited AToM ability related to 
first-order ToM ability. Therefore, a series of standardised first-order ToM tasks were 
included alongside an AToM test in order to provide a fuller picture of children’s 
level of ToM ability.  
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Study 5 also tested children’s Machiavellian beliefs in order to examine 
whether there is a link between level of Machiavellian intelligence and interpretation 
of a conjuring demonstration. As mentioned earlier, research has found that 
Machiavellians are more adept at detecting deception, able to distinguish lying from 
truth-telling and view people in general as untrustworthy. Furthermore, they have 
been found to be resistant to social influence, better able to ignore social concerns 
when they interfere with task performance and better able to initiate and control the 
structure of social interactions. Therefore, it is proposed that children with a higher 
level of Machiavellianism may be more likely to explore the apparatus and challenge 
the demonstration by judging in terms of trickery (and thereby adopt a high level of 
scepticism). 
 Spatial monitoring ability was also investigated in order to find a possible link 
with level of verbal scepticism towards a conjuring demonstration. It is proposed that 
a child with a higher level of spatial monitoring ability is better able to understand 
that objects move with their containers and to keep track of concealed objects that are 
both moving and stationary despite other objects moving around them. Furthermore, 
they are better at allocating their attention to key parts of the spatial field, and can 
monitor multiple as well as single objects at the same time. Therefore, they may be 
more capable of keeping track of the teddy in the conjuring demonstration and 
understand that it was concealed within the bag. Hence, they may be more sceptical of 
the conjuring demonstration being an instance of genuine magic. Conversely, a child 
with a lower level of spatial monitoring ability may be less sceptical of the 
demonstration.  
Finally, an assessment of verbal ability was included in the present study due 
to the large verbal requirements of the measures of first-order ToM and AToM and as 
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a measure of verbal intelligence in relation to level of verbal scepticism. Vocabulary 
has been found to be the best single index of school success (Dale & Reichert, 1957) 
and to be one of the most important contributors to measures of intelligence (Elliot, 
1982). Furthermore, correlations between language ability and ToM performance 
have now been established. Happé (1995) showed that verbal ability, as measured by 
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS), was clearly linked to children’s ability 
to pass false-belief tasks.  
A 4-6-year-old age range was selected, as research reviewed in this thesis has 
shown that it is within this age range that children are most likely to subscribe to 
magic causality. It was also hoped that the inclusion of this age range would make 
more transparent any developmental influences and variations in theory of mind 
ability. In particular, individual variations in rates of developing false belief 
understanding are most apparent in four-year-olds (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001).  
 
It was hypothesised that: 
1) There will be an association between an AToM and children’s verbal responses to a 
conjuring demonstration. Children with a higher AToM score will be more likely to 
suspect deception and state that the demonstration is a “trick”. Children with a lower 
AToM score will be less likely to suspect deception and so be more likely to state the 
demonstration is “real magic”. Therefore we might expect that children who give 
consistent “trick” responses will have higher AToM scores than those who give 
consistent “magic” responses, with those giving inconsistent responses having 
intermediate AToM scores. 
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2) There may be a correlation between children’s level of verbal scepticism towards a 
conjuring demonstration being genuine magic and level of Machiavellian intelligence. 
Specifically, children’s level of scepticism may increase along with level of 
Machiavellian belief.  
 
3) There may be a correlation between children’s level of verbal scepticism towards a 
conjuring demonstration and level of spatial monitoring ability. Children with higher 
scepticism scores may be more likely to score higher in spatial monitoring ability as 
they are more capable of tracking movements of concealed objects. 
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty children (22 males and 18 females) participated in the study. They ranged in age 
from four to six years of age (mean 64.6 months). The children in the study attended a 
S.E. London primary school and were predominantly from middle class backgrounds 
although this was not directly assessed. The ethnicity was predominantly white (31 
white, eight black, one Asian).  
 
Design 
The study used an independent samples design that included the independent 
grouping variable of response category group (“trick”, “mixed”, or “magic”) and 
dependent variables of AToM ability and first-order ToM ability. A correlational 
design was also incorporated that included spatial monitoring ability, Machiavellian 
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intelligence, verbal ability, and level of verbal scepticism. All statistical tests were 
two-tailed unless otherwise indicated. 
 
Materials 
The conjuring demonstration involved the same apparatus as used previously in Study 
4 (i.e. a light blue square box, a red velvet bag with a rigid rim and a lever attached to 
a wooden handle that enabled an object to be hidden within a cloth pocket when the 
lever was moved across; see Figure 5.1). There were also two identical small teddy 
bears (the same as in Study 4 with the exception of no bow-tie on either teddy; see 
Figure 5.1). The “magic box” was placed on a shelf approximately ten feet away from 
the experimenter and the child who sat on separate chairs. The experimenter wore a 
pointed black hat and cloak so as to look like a magician/wizard.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Materials for the Conjuring Demonstration 
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 The first-order ToM test for unexpected location used the following materials: 
one task used two small dolls each measuring 40 cm high with a 34 cm arm span with 
contrasting coloured hair and contrasting clothes (Figure 5.2), a basket measuring 22 
cm in diameter with a cloth cover (Figure 5.2), a gold box measuring 5 cm wide and 5 
cm deep (Figure 5.2) and a toy orange ball measuring 3 cm in diameter (Figure 5.2).  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5.2: Materials for one Unexpected Locations Task 
 
 
 A second task used two small dolls each measuring 19 cm high and with a 14 
cm arm span with contrasting coloured and length hair and contrasting clothes (Figure 
5.3), a silver box with a lid measuring 12.5 cm wide and 6.5 cm deep (Figure 5.3), a 
red box measuring 5 cm wide and 5 cm deep (Figure 5.3) and a wrapped sweet 
measuring 5 cm long and 1.5 cm wide (Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3: Materials for a second Unexpected Locations Task 
  
 
A third task used a red teddy bear measuring 26 cm high with a 27 cm arm 
span (Figure 5.4), a brown teddy bear measuring 25 cm high with a 24 cm arm span 
(Figure 5.4), a green paper bag with handles measuring 19.5 cm long and 16 cm wide 
(Figure 5.4), a woven basket with a lid measuring 7 cm wide and 7 cm deep (Figure 
5.4), and a deflated yellow balloon (Figure 5.4).  
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Figure 5.4: Materials for a third Unexpected Locations Task 
 
 
The first-order ToM test for unexpected contents used a “Smarties” tube 
containing a red pencil, a green pencil and a blue pencil (Figure 5.5); a plasters box 
containing four 20 pence pieces (Figure 5.5); and a toothpaste tube box containing a 
necklace (Figure 5.5).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Materials for the Unexpected Contents Tasks 
208 
 
 The first-order ToM test for appearance-reality used a candle that looked like a 
flower (Figure 5.6), and a sharpener that looked like a toy car (Figure 5.6). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Materials for the Appearance-Reality Task 
 
 
 The AToM Test consisted of a set of Happé’s (1994) “strange stories”: 12 
short stories each accompanied with an A4-sized picture. (Details of the story types 
including pictures can be found in the appendices.) Verbal ability was tested using the 
short-form British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & 
Pinitilie, 1982). This consists of a standardised series of line drawings displayed in a 
booklet. The booklet contains 32 test item plates preceded by six training plates. A 
separate Individual Test Record was used that lists the stimulus words to be used with 
both the training and test plates and gives the answer key to the correct choices. 
Machiavellian intelligence was tested using a modified and condensed version of the 
“Kiddie-Mach” Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970). The spatial monitoring task consisted 
of three red boxes each measuring 5 cm wide and 5 cm deep (Figure 5.7), a ring, a 
deflated balloon, and a tea light (Figure 5.7). 
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Figure 5.7: Materials for the Spatial Monitoring Task 
 
NB: A single-object condition used only two red boxes and a ring. A three-object 
condition used all three red boxes and the three objects shown in Figure 5.7. 
 
 
Procedure 
The study consisted of two testing sessions, each lasting approximately 25 minutes. 
The first testing session included first-order ToM measures, the “Kiddie-Mach” Scale, 
and the spatial monitoring tasks. The second testing session included the AToM test, 
the short-form BPVS test, and the conjuring demonstration. All children were tested 
individually in a separate room. The same experimenter tested all 40 children. 
 
First-order ToM Measures 
Three measures of first-order ToM were used in the present study, two assessing 
aspects of false belief understanding and the third examined appearance-reality 
understanding.  
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1) The Unexpected Locations Task 
The unexpected locations task was carried out three times, involving different 
scenarios to provide a more stringent measure of ability and to reduce the possibility 
that the results gained could be due to chance responding.  
The first scenario was based on the “Sally-Ann” task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1985). The child was shown two dolls that were labelled as “Sally” and “Ann”; 
the dolls were distinguishable in terms of both hair colour and clothing colour. The 
child was shown two containers: a basket with a cloth cover and a box with a lid. The 
child was then told that Sally has a toy ball and that she has to go out for a while and 
wants to put the ball somewhere to keep it safe. They were shown Sally putting the 
ball into the basket and putting the cloth cover over it. Sally then left the scene. While 
Sally was out the child was shown that Ann had moved the ball to the box and put the 
lid on it (an unseen transfer). Sally then returned and the child was asked the test 
question, “Where will Sally look first for her ball?” Two control questions were also 
asked: “Where did Sally leave her ball?” (memory question) and “Where is the ball 
really?” (reality question). The questions were based on those used by Eisnemajer and 
Prior (1991), as these included the element of asking where Sally will look first, 
which is believed to be a clearer pragmatic wording of the question.  
The next scenario was based on the “Maxi” task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), 
whereby the child was shown two different dolls to those of the first task. These 
included a small boy doll called “Maxi” and a small girl doll called “Mary”. The child 
was shown two boxes: one red and the other silver. The child was then told that Maxi 
likes chocolate, so he has got some chocolate. Maxi needs to go to the toilet so he puts 
the chocolate in the red box and then leaves the scene. While Maxi was out, the child 
was shown that Mary had moved the chocolate to the silver box and closed the lid. 
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Maxi then returned and the child was asked the test question, “Where will Maxi look 
first for his chocolate?” Two control questions were also asked: “Where did Maxi 
leave the chocolate?” and, “Where is the chocolate really?”  
The final scenario involved showing the child a red teddy and a brown teddy. 
The child was also shown a bag and a basket with a lid on. The child was then told 
that it was the red teddy’s birthday so he has a balloon. But red teddy needs to make 
his birthday cake so he puts his balloon in the basket, puts the lid on and leaves the 
scene. While red teddy is out the child was shown that brown teddy had moved the 
balloon to the bag. Red teddy then returned and the child was asked the test question, 
“Where will red teddy look first for his balloon?” Two control questions were also 
asked: “Where did red teddy leave his balloon?” and, “Where is the balloon really?” 
 
Scoring Criteria 
Scores were only given for the task if the child correctly answered the control 
questions. Had any child failed a control question, they would have been excluded 
from the sample on the grounds that responses to false belief test questions are 
meaningless if critical information is misunderstood. For each of the scenarios, a 
score of 1 point was given if the child correctly answered the test question and the two 
control questions, with a possible maximum total score (for all three scenarios 
combined) of 3 points. 
 
 
2) The Unexpected Contents Task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987) 
The child was shown a container (e.g., a Smarties tube) and was asked what they 
thought was inside the container, “What do you think is inside this tube?” Once the 
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child had guessed the contents, the container was opened and the actual, unexpected 
contents were revealed (e.g., coloured pencils). The contents were then replaced, the 
container resealed and the child was asked two questions. Firstly, they were asked, “If 
your teacher came in now and we showed her this Smarties tube all closed up like this 
and we didn’t let her look in it, what would she guess was in the Smarties tube, 
Smarties or coloured pencils?” This assessed whether they could predict the false 
belief of another person. Secondly, they were asked, “What did you think was inside 
the Smarties tube before you had a look inside, Smarties or coloured pencils?” This 
question assessed whether they were aware of their own earlier false belief regarding 
the contents of the container. A control question about the actual contents of the 
container was also asked to assess the child’s memory, “What is really in the Smarties 
tube, Smarties or coloured pencils?” The order of the alternative possible contents 
mentioned in the questions, for example coloured pencils or Smarties was switched 
for each question. 
The unexpected contents task was carried out three times, using a Smarties 
tube containing coloured pencils, a plasters box containing coins and a toothpaste tube 
box containing a necklace.  
 
Scoring Criteria 
Scores were only given for the task if the child correctly answered the control 
question. Had any child failed a control question, they would have been excluded 
from the sample for the same reason as stated for the unexpected locations task. A 
score of 1 point was given if the child correctly answered the test question relating to 
another’s false belief. A score of 1 point was given if they correctly answered the test 
question related to their own previous false belief. Therefore, two separate measures 
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of false belief understanding were ascertained: a measure of the child’s understanding 
of his or her own false beliefs and a measure of the child’s understanding of another’s 
false beliefs. On each of these separate measures each child could accrue a maximum 
total score (for all three contents combined) of 3 points. So a maximum score of 3 
points was possible for questions concerning the child’s own previous false belief, 
and a maximum score of 3 points was possible concerning their understanding of the 
false belief of another.  
 
 
3) The Appearance-Reality Task (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1987) 
The child was shown two objects with a misleading appearance; a flower-shaped 
candle, and a car-shaped sharpener. The child was asked two questions to assess their 
understanding of the object’s appearance, e.g., “When you look at this with your eyes 
right now, does it look like a candle or does it look like a flower?” and its real form, 
“What is this really and truly, a candle or a flower?” Therefore, the two questions 
assessed children’s ability to appreciate that an object’s appearance may differ from 
its real form. The questions were counterbalanced for the objects, so for one of the 
objects the child was asked about appearance first and for the other one about reality 
first.  
 
Scoring Criteria 
A score of 1 point was given if the child correctly answered both the reality and 
appearance questions for each object, thereby yielding a maximum total score (for 
both objects combined) of 2 points. 
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Measure of Machiavellian Intelligence 
To date, there has been no verbal measure of Machiavellianism for children under age 
nine. Therefore, a modified and condensed version of the “Kiddie-Mach” Scale 
(Christie & Geis, 1970) was used to assess children who might be high or low 
Machiavellians. The scale was condensed from 20 items to 14 items that were age-
appropriate for the children being tested so that hopefully they would all understand 
the items. Due to the young ages in the study, instead of using a Likert scale, 
agreement with statements was indicated according to the response, “True” and 
disagreement with the statements was indicated according to the response, “False”. 
The experimenter read out 14 items to the children individually and responses were 
noted down. The items were as follows: 
 
1) Never tell anyone why you did something unless it will help you. 
2) Most people are good and kind. 
3) The best way to get along with people is to tell them things that make them happy. 
4) You should do something only when you are sure it is right. 
5) It is smartest to believe that all people will be mean if they have a chance. 
6) You should always be honest, no matter what. 
7) Sometimes you have to hurt other people to get what you want. 
8) Most people won’t work hard unless you make them do it. 
9) It is better to be ordinary and honest than famous and dishonest (tell lies). 
10) It is better to tell someone why you want him to help you than to make up a good 
story to get him to do it. 
11) Successful people are mostly honest and good. 
12) Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
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13) A criminal is just like other people except that he is stupid enough to get caught. 
14) Most people are brave. 
 
Scoring Criteria 
Machiavellian items (1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, and 13) were awarded 1 point each for a “true” 
response and 0 points each for a “false” response. Non-Machiavellian items (2, 4, 6, 9, 
10, 11, and 14) were reverse scored for consistency with the Machiavellianism 
construct, so that high scores on these items indicated disagreement and therefore, 
Machiavellianism. So, “true” responses were awarded 0 points and “false” responses 
were awarded 1 point. An overall Machiavellian score was calculated for each child 
by totalling how many items they achieved 1 point for, with a total possible range of 
scores of 0-14. 
 
 
Spatial Monitoring Task (Sophian, 1986) 
Spatial monitoring becomes more complex when there is more than one object to keep 
track of, so that the child must determine which objects are affected and which are not 
by a given movement. Therefore, level of spatial monitoring ability was assessed by 
children’s ability to track both single and multiple movements. The child participated 
in a single-object condition, in which the experimenter hid one object (i.e. a ring) in a 
red box (in full view of the child), and a three-object condition in which the 
experimenter hid three different objects, one in each of three red boxes (in full view of 
the child). The objects were a ring, a deflated balloon and a tea light. In the single-
object condition, the experimenter selected in advance of testing a positioned box in 
which a ring was to be hidden. In the three-object condition, the experimenter chose 
216 
 
randomly which object to put in each box. The boxes were arrayed in a line so that all 
were approximately equidistant from the child.  
In both conditions a mixture of transposition and control problems were 
presented. For the transposition problems, after hiding the object(s) in full view of the 
child, the experimenter picked up two of the boxes, one in each hand, and moved 
them to each other’s places, passing one above the other so that both remained in view 
throughout. (Please note that in the single-object condition for irrelevant transposition 
problems, only one box out of two was moved. This is explained and illustrated in 
detail under the heading of Single-object Condition). For the control problems, the 
experimenter simply paused after hiding the object(s) in the box(es) for a period of 
time equivalent to that needed to carry out the transpositions (about two seconds) but 
did not move any  box. The experimenter then asked the child to point to the box 
where a named object was. In the single-object condition, the object they requested 
was the only one they had hidden. In the three-object condition, it was a pre-
designated object from the three hidden objects. If the child made an error, the 
experimenter encouraged them to try again until they found the object. In the three-
object condition, if the child’s first attempt was correct, the experimenter asked the 
child to find a second object as well, in one of the two remaining boxes.  
The final location of the box containing the object the experimenter requested 
and the position of the box in which it had been hidden at the outset of the problem 
were counterbalanced across the set of problems each child received. The particular 
problems used varied across participants in such a way that all possible combinations 
of which boxes (if any) were interchanged and which box was correct occurred 
equally often. On three-object problems, which of the two remaining objects was 
tested second when the child pointed correctly for the first object was also varied 
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systematically across participants. All of the problems within each condition were 
intermixed and their order randomised independently for each child and each 
condition.  
 
Scoring Criteria 
Each child was scored on their transposition performance in the single-object 
condition and the three-object condition, according to whether they made a correct 
search (by pointing and finding) or whether they made an error. 
 
 
Single-object Condition 
Each child received seven problems in the single-object condition: two control 
problems (where no movement of two boxes occurred), three transposition problems 
in which the object the experimenter asked for was in one of two moved boxes 
(relevant transpositions), and two transposition problems in which the object the 
experimenter asked for was in one box out of two that had not been moved (irrelevant 
transpositions). Figure 5.8 shows an example of each problem. (All transposition 
problems can be found in the appendices.)  
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NB: X represents the object hidden in a box that the child had to locate. The arrows represent 
the movement of specific box(es). 
 
Figure 5.8: Single-object Transposition Problems 
 
 
A score of 1 point was given for each correct response for the position of the 
object and a score of 0 points for each incorrect response. Therefore, the maximum 
correct score possible was 7 points.  
 
 
Three-object Condition 
Each child received ten problems in the three-object condition: two control problems, 
three transposition problems in which the object the experimenter asked for first was 
in one of two moved boxes (relevant transpositions), three further transposition 
problems in which the second object the experimenter asked for was in one of the 
other two boxes (relevant transpositions), and two transposition problems in which the 
object the experimenter asked for first was in the box that had not been moved 
(irrelevant transpositions). Figure 5.9 shows an example of each problem. (All 
transposition problems can be found in the appendices).  
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NB: “X” represents the object hidden in the box that the child had to locate. “y” and “z” 
represent objects in separate boxes. The arrows represent the movement of specific boxes. 
 
Figure 5.9: Three-object Transposition Problems 
 
 
A score of 1 point was given for each correct response for the position of an 
object and a score of 0 points for each incorrect response. Therefore, the maximum 
correct score possible was 10 points.  
 The total score for the single-object condition was combined with the total 
score for the three-object condition to give an overall spatial monitoring score for 
each child. 
 
 
Measure of Verbal Ability (The Short-form BPVS; Dunn et al., 1982) 
This task required children to view a series of plates each showing four pictures. The 
experimenter stated a word and the child responded by pointing to the picture (from 
four options) that best illustrated the word’s meaning. The questions broadly sample 
words that represent a range of content areas such as actions, animals, toys and 
emotions and parts of speech such as nouns, verbs or attributes, across all levels of 
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difficulty. The task consisted of a training phase whereby as many training series 
items were administered as necessary to secure four consecutive correct responses. 
Following on from this, a testing phase was carried out. A series of plates were 
administered as necessary until four consecutive correct responses were not given. 
The scoring procedure was exactly the same as that outlined in the scoring manual by 
Dunn et al. (1982) so that a standardised score was calculated for each child.  
 
 
AToM Test – The Strange Stories (Happé, 1994) 
The “strange stories” task was selected as O’Hare, Nash, Happé, and Pettigrew (2009) 
found it is possible to test children using this AToM measure across the age range of 
five to twelve years. Twelve stories were administered randomly to children about 
everyday situations where characters say things they do not mean literally. They were 
simple accounts of events, which concern the different motivations that can lie behind 
everyday utterances that are not literally true (i.e. subtle forms of social deception). 
According to Happé (1994), they present a somewhat more naturalistic challenge to 
children than acted out ToM battery tasks. Children were required to infer mental 
state concepts when the ToM elements were embedded in the context of the stories. 
The stories consisted of Lie, White Lie, Joke, Pretence, Misunderstanding, 
Persuasion, Appearance/Reality, Figure of Speech, Sarcasm, Forgetting, Double 
Bluff, and Contrary Emotions. The child was read a story out loud by the 
experimenter and shown a picture that remained in front of the child (together with 
the story) whilst the experimenter read it out. This was to minimise memory 
requirements. At the end of the story the child was asked two test questions. The first 
question was, “Was it true what X said?” Although the first response was recorded, 
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the datum was not used for analysis as it was purely a test of comprehension. The 
second question, “Why did X say that?” was then asked. Figure 5.10 shows an 
example of an illustrated ‘Lie’ story type. Repetition of the question was only given 
once if the child did not respond the first time. This was in contrast to the 
methodology described by Happé, in that the story was re-read until it was either 
answered correctly or the child justified their answer. This adjustment was made in 
order to keep the time for administration manageable in the experimental setting and 
to not impose pressure on the child. The child’s answers were recorded in full on 
scoring sheets for later analysis. Positive encouragement was given but there was no 
direct feedback on the correctness of the answers.  
 
   
One day, while she is playing in the 
house, Anna accidentally knocks 
over and breaks her mother’s 
favourite crystal vase. Oh dear, when 
mother finds out she will be very 
cross! So when Anna’s mother 
comes home and sees the broken 
vase and asks Anna what happened, 
Anna says, “The dog knocked it 
over, it wasn’t my fault!” 
Question: Was it true what Anna told her mother? 
Question: Why did she say this? 
 
Figure 5.10: Illustrated Story-type for Lie 
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Scoring Criteria 
In accordance with Happé (1994), the justifications and scoring given in response to 
the “Why” questions were: either correct involving mental states (2 points) or correct 
involving physical states (1 point) or incorrect involving neither (0 points). For 
example, in the lie story, in which Anna breaks a vase but tells her mother that the 
dog did it, this can be correctly explained by the physical justification “so she won’t 
get told off” or the mental justification “She’s lying”. Mental state answers included 
all those that refer to thoughts, feelings, desires, traits, and dispositions (i.e. like, 
want, happy, cross, afraid, know, think, joke, pretend, lie, to fool someone, 
expecting). Justifications were scored as physical state when they referred to non-
mental events – physical appearance, action of objects, physical events, and outcomes 
(i.e., big, looks like, is shaped like, to get rid of them, to sell them, because of the 
object, to not get physical outcome). A justification could be incorrect because it 
involved errors about the facts given in the story or because it involved an inference 
that was inappropriate as a reason for the story character’s utterance. For example, in 
the lie story, the justification “Anna did not break the vase,” would be scored as 
incorrect because it includes a factual error. A justification that “Anna was just 
joking” would also be scored as incorrect, because in the context of the story it is not 
appropriate to interpret her utterance as a joke. If the child’s answer appealed to both 
physical and mental states, the justification was scored as mental state.  
In each case a maximum score of 2 points was given per story with a total 
possible score of 24 points for the twelve pictures. The subjective judgment of 
justification made co-validation of the scoring necessary to establish validity. The 
justifications given to each story by every child was given to a second independent 
rater, who was blind to the identity of the children. The degree of concordance 
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between the two raters was calculated for each story-type separately, and inter-rater 
reliability was 100% for all answers. 
 
 
Conjuring Demonstration 
The experimenter put on a hat and cloak in front of the child and stated that she had 
special powers and could make an object disappear and reappear where she wanted it 
to. The experimenter showed the child a “magic box” and said that this was where she 
could make things appear that she really liked. The box was then placed at the 
opposite end of the room on a shelf but still in the child’s sight. The experimenter 
then showed the child a small teddy and said that she liked it and would make it 
disappear from her bag and reappear in her magic box. She then put it in the bag in 
front of the child, waved her hand over the bag and said “abracadabra”. She then 
asked the child if he or she thought that the teddy had disappeared. Regardless of the 
response, he or she was shown the apparently empty inside of the bag and then asked, 
“Where is the teddy?” If the child did not give a spontaneous response a prompt was 
given of, “Is it in the box or the bag?” If the child responded that it was in the box, the 
experimenter lifted the lid off and the child was then shown the teddy in the magic 
box (one that had been in the box all the time, but the child had not been shown). If 
the child responded that the teddy was in the bag the experimenter showed the child 
the apparently empty inside of the bag again and stated, “Let’s look in the box” and 
the child was then shown the teddy in the magic box. The child was then asked, “Is 
this teddy the same teddy that I made disappear in the bag or does it just look like the 
teddy I made disappear?” and, “Do you think that what I did was real magic or a 
trick?”  The structure of the question asking if the teddy was in the “box” or the “bag” 
224 
 
was counterbalanced to control for order effects, as was that for the question whether 
it was “real magic” or a “trick”. Verbal responses were noted down. Children were 
not prevented from touching, searching or exploring the conjuring materials 
throughout the duration of the demonstration.  
 
Scoring and Classification Criteria 
Children’s verbal responses to specific questions were categorised according to: 1) 
“yes” or “no” (“Do you think that the teddy has disappeared?”, 2) “box” or “bag” 
(“Where is the teddy? Is it in the box or the bag?”, 3) “same” or “looks like” (“Is this 
the same teddy that I made disappear or does it just look like it?”, 4) “real magic” or 
“trick” (“Do you think I did real magic or a trick?”). Along with categorising 
children’s responses to individual questions, a separate verbal scepticism score was 
calculated for each participant. For each question, a score of 1 was assigned to 
participants who gave a sceptical answer and a score of 0 if they gave a credulous 
answer. Each score was combined to give a total verbal scepticism score that ranged 
from 0 to 4, with 4 indicating the highest level of scepticism and 0 indicating the 
lowest level of scepticism. A breakdown of the scoring according to the questions was 
as follows: 
 
1) “Has the teddy disappeared from the bag”? 
If the answer is “yes” = score of 0 
If the answer is “no” = score of 1  
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2) “Where is the teddy now, in the box or the bag”? 
If the answer is “box” = score of 0 
If the answer is “bag” = score of 1  
 
3) (When the teddy has disappeared in the bag and appeared in the box) “Is this teddy 
the same one that I made disappear from the bag or does it just look like it”? 
If the answer is “same” = score of 0 
If the answer is “looks like it” = score of 1  
 
4) “Was it real magic or a trick”? 
If the answer is “real magic” = score of 0 
If the answer is “trick” = score of 1  
 
 
Results 
The present study employed measures in the areas of AToM, first-order ToM, spatial 
monitoring ability, Machiavellian intelligence, verbal ability, verbal responses to a 
conjuring demonstration, and level of verbal scepticism towards a conjuring 
demonstration. Initially the results section presents the descriptive data for these 
measures, followed by presentation of the inter-relations and connections among 
AToM, first-order ToM and verbal responses to a conjuring demonstration and then 
inter-relations and connections among level of verbal scepticism to the conjuring 
demonstration, verbal ability, spatial monitoring ability and Machiavellian 
intelligence. Non-parametric statistics are used throughout in the form of Kruskal-
Wallis tests, Mann-Whitney U tests or Spearman correlations unless otherwise stated. 
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Examination of Table 5.1 shows that the mean score is well within the normal 
range for the short-form BPVS task (mean score 100.60) indicating that the children 
were capable of comprehending instructions given to them and that their verbal 
intelligence was in line with their age. Children’s total scores on the Kiddie-Mach 
task varied widely between 3 and 11 points. No child scored a maximum possible 
score of 14 points and the mean score (6.28) indicates that children did not have high 
levels of Machiavellian intelligence. The maximum score possible for total spatial 
monitoring ability was 17 and the mean score (13.80) indicates that children were 
capable of monitoring a hidden object. These observations indicate a competence in 
spatial monitoring ability for majority of the children tested. 
Although the range of children’s AToM scores varied widely between 0 and 
11 out of a maximum possible score of 24, the mean score was extremely low (4.52). 
These low scores imply a lack of sophistication in children’s social intelligence. This 
may be related to the age range selected and will be addressed. As expected and in 
line with past ToM research, children were more proficient at passing first-order ToM 
tasks as indicated by the mean scores. In particular, children were adept in the 
appearance-reality task whereby a ceiling effect was found, with all children attaining 
the maximum score possible of 2 points. This indicates that all children were able to 
differentiate between appearance and reality. As there was no variation in scores, this 
task was omitted from analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
227 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for 4-6-year-olds’ Scores obtained for Tasks   
(N = 40)  
 
Task 
 
 
Range 
 
 
Minimum 
 
 
Maximum 
 
 
Median Mean 
 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Short –form BPVS 
68 69 137 97.50 100.60 15.850 
 
Kiddie-Mach 8 3 11 6.00 6.28 1.948 
ToM – Unexpected 
location 3 0 3 3.00 2.52 .987 
ToM - Unexpected 
contents (own false 
belief) 
3 0 3 3.00 1.95 1.300 
ToM - Unexpected 
contents (another's 
false belief) 
3 0 3 3.00 2.30 1.114 
ToM – Appearance-
reality  0 2 2 2.00 2.00 0 
AToM  
11 0 11 4.00 4.52 3.202 
Spatial monitoring  
13 4 17 14.00 13.80 2.534 
 
 
 
Conjuring Demonstration 
Table 5.2 gives a detailed breakdown of verbal responses obtained in the conjuring 
demonstration.  
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Table 5.2: Frequency and Percentages of 4-6-year-olds’  Responses in the 
Conjuring Demonstration (N = 40) 
 
Has the 
teddy 
disappeared 
from the 
bag? 
 
Where is 
the teddy? 
Did the 
child feel 
the bag?* 
Is this the same 
teddy? 
Was the 
movement 
real magic 
or a trick? 
Pattern of 
responses 
throughout 
Yes = 24 
(60%) 
 
No = 16 
(40%) 
Box = 32 
(80%) 
 
Bag = 8 
(20%) 
No = 31 
(77.5%) 
 
Yes = 9 
(22.5%) 
Same = 17 
(42.5%) 
 
Looks like = 23 
(57.5%) 
Magic = 16 
(40%) 
 
Trick = 24 
(60%) 
Magic = 8 
(20%) 
 
Trick = 5 
(12.5%) 
 
Mix =27 
(67.5%) 
  
* Observed reaction 
 
 
 
 When examining responses, the majority of the children stated that the teddy 
had disappeared from the bag (60%) and was in the box (80%). This suggests that the 
majority of the children believed that the object (i.e. the teddy) was no longer in the 
bag and had transferred from its original location to a new location and may be 
interpreted as children being credulous of a spontaneous transference (i.e. without 
physical intervention). Hence it may represent children having a magical (i.e. non-
sceptical) stance rather than a “trick” (i.e. sceptical) stance. However, although only a 
slight majority of the children stated that the teddy only “looks like” the original teddy 
(57.5%), a higher percentage gave a “trick” causal response for the movement of the 
teddy from the bag into the box (60%) than a “magic” one (40%) which is more 
indicative of a “trick” viewpoint. This implies that the children were sceptical of the 
demonstration being genuine magic and so appeared to be aware of the demonstration 
involving deception in some way. Children’s responses throughout the demonstration 
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(as indicated by “pattern of responses throughout”) were mainly a mixture of 
scepticism (trickery) and credulity (magic) (67.5%), rather than consistent scepticism 
(12.5%) or consistent credulity (20%). This variation in responses once again 
highlights the need for an assessment of levels of scepticism that was first proposed in 
Study 4. 
 
 
AToM and the Conjuring Demonstration 
In order to explore a possible relationship between AToM ability and the likelihood of 
children interpreting the conjuring demonstration in terms of trickery, children were 
assigned to different categories based upon their pattern of overall responses to 
selected questions about the demonstration. Children were assigned to a “magic” 
category if they stated that the teddy in the box was the same teddy as the one in the 
bag, and that the transference was real magic. Children were assigned to a “trick” 
category if they stated that the teddy just looked like the original teddy, and that the 
transference was a trick. Lastly, children were assigned to a “mixed” category if they 
gave a combination of responses throughout.  
This set of criteria was used as it might be considered more indicative of a true 
“magic” or “trick” viewpoint (i.e. whether the teddy in the box was the same teddy 
that was in the bag or just looked like it, and whether the movement of the teddy from 
the bag to the box was “real magic” or a “trick”). Responses to the question, “Has the 
teddy disappeared?” and, “Is the teddy in the bag or the box?” were omitted as, on 
reflection, it was realised that children who stated “yes” may simply have responded 
literally to the fact that they could not see the teddy in the bag. Likewise, responses  to 
the question, “Is the teddy in the bag or the box?” were also omitted as children who 
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stated “box” may have known that it was trickery and as such were expecting 
something in the box. Using these criteria, 11 children gave consistently “magic” 
responses, 18 children gave consistently “trick” responses, and 11 children gave 
“mixed” and therefore ambiguous responses. Figure 5.11 illustrates a step-wise 
increase in AToM scores across the three response categories. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Four- to Six-year-olds’ AToM Score in relation to Overall Verbal 
Response for the Conjuring Demonstration 
 
 
In order to investigate whether a significant difference in AToM scores would 
be found between the overall response category groups, AToM scores were analysed 
using a Kruskal-Wallis test.  A significant result was found (χ² = 8.433, df = 2; p = 
.015) indicating that children in the “trick” category had higher AToM scores than 
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those in the “mixed” category who in turn had higher AToM scores than those in the 
“magic” category. A Mann Whitney U test revealed a significant difference between 
AToM scores of children giving overall “magic” versus “trick” responses (Mann-
Whitney U(11, 18) = 34; p = .003). Children giving “trick” responses had higher 
AToM scores than those giving “magic” responses. This was the only significant 
difference found between the three groups. 
Responses as to whether the transference of the teddy into the box was “real 
magic” or a “trick” was considered indicative of children’s belief in the causal effect 
of the manipulation. Twenty-four children gave a “trick” causal response compared to 
16 children who gave a “real magic” causal response. Comparing children’s total 
AToM scores with respect to their response to this question, there appeared to be a 
clear difference (Figure 5.12). Children who gave a “trick” response had higher 
AToM scores than those who gave a “real magic” response.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Four- to Six-year-olds’ AToM Score in relation to Causal Response 
about Teddy’s Movement.  
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A statistically significant difference was found between AToM scores of 
children giving “magic” versus “trick” causal responses (Mann-Whitney U(16, 24) = 
84; p = .002, one-tailed). Children giving “trick” responses had higher AToM scores 
than those giving “magic” responses.  
 
 
First-order ToM and the Conjuring Demonstration  
Exactly the same tests were carried out on the first-order ToM task scores with respect 
to responses to the conjuring demonstration as were carried out on the AToM task 
scores in order to ascertain whether there would be an association between standard 
false belief understanding and interpretation of a conjuring demonstration as either 
being a form of trickery or genuine magic. No significant results were found. Table 
5.3 gives a summary of the results found for responses to the conjuring demonstration 
in relation to the first-order ToM and AToM tasks. 
 
Table 5.3: Summary of 4-6-year-olds’ Results for the Conjuring Demonstration, 
First-order ToM and AToM Tasks 
 
Conjuring 
Demonstration 
ToM 
Unexpected 
location 
(Sally-Ann, 
Maxi, Teddy) 
ToM 
Unexpected 
contents 
(Own False 
Belief) 
ToM 
Unexpected 
contents 
(Another’s 
False Belief) 
AToM 
Was the 
movement of the 
teddy a trick or 
real magic? 
 
Mann-Whitney  
U = 155 
Sig = .148 
 
Mann-Whitney  
U = 140 
Sig = .112 
 
Mann-Whitney  
U = 140 
Sig = .090 
 
Mann-Whitney  
U = 84 
Sig = .002 (one-
tailed) 
Overall response  
(magic, trick, 
mixture) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis   
χ² = 2.399 
df = 2 
Sig = .301 
 
Kruskal-Wallis  
χ² = 3.710 
df = 2 
Sig = .156 
Kruskal-Wallis  
χ² = 2.577 
df = 2 
Sig = .276 
Kruskal-Wallis  
χ² = 8.433 
df = 2 
Sig = .015 
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Other Variables and the Conjuring Demonstration  
Following on from these results, a Kruskal-Wallis test was then carried out comparing 
other variables with respect to overall verbal response type as described above. No 
significant differences were found between the groups for verbal intelligence (χ² = 
5.155, df = 2; p = .076), for Machiavellian intelligence (χ² = 2.714, df = 2; p = .257) 
or for spatial monitoring ability (χ² = 348, df = 2; p = .840). Therefore, children’s 
interpretation of the conjuring demonstration was not dependent on these factors. 
However, a significant result was found with respect to age (χ² = 9.675, df = 2; p = 
.008). Figure 5.13 suggests that children who gave “trick” responses were older than 
those who gave “mixed” responses and those who gave “magic” responses.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Four- to Six-year-olds’ Overall Response to the Conjuring 
Demonstration  
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A Mann Whitney U test revealed a significant difference between age of 
children giving overall “mixed” versus “trick” responses (Mann-Whitney U(11, 18) = 
26; p = .001).  Children who gave a “trick” causal response were older than those who 
gave “mixed” responses. Likewise, a Mann Whitney U test revealed a significant age 
difference between those children who gave “magic” versus those who gave “trick” as 
the causal response for the transference of the teddy (U(16, 24) = 115, p = .034). 
Children who gave a “trick” causal response were older than those who gave “real 
magic” responses (Figure 5.14). Therefore, age was considered an influencing factor 
in children’s causal interpretation of the conjuring demonstration. More importantly, 
age may be an important factor that needs to be taken into consideration when 
ascertaining a link between AToM ability and detection of trickery in a conjuring 
demonstration. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Four- to Six-year-olds’ Causal Response to the Conjuring 
Demonstration  
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Relations Among the Tasks 
Spearman correlations were carried out in order to assess the relations among all the 
tasks. Importantly, links between levels of verbal scepticism and levels of theories of 
mind, Machiavellian intelligence, and spatial monitoring ability were explored. Total 
levels of verbal scepticism scores were used for the conjuring demonstration (as the 
majority of the children gave a mixture of responses throughout that could be deemed 
as both magic and trick responses). The verbal scepticism scores incorporate 
responses to the entire set of questions asked in the conjuring demonstration. This 
follows the same response criteria and justification for assessing levels of verbal 
scepticism as in Study 4. A matrix of results can be found in Table 5.4.  
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Table 5.4: Matrix of Spearman Correlation Results for 4-6-year-old Children 
 (N = 40) 
 
AToM .455** 
p = .003 
       
ToM 1 
 
.181 
p = .263 
.404* 
p = .010 
      
ToM 2 
 
.203 
p = .208 
.440** 
p = .004 
.117 
p = .474 
     
ToM 3 
 
.245 
p = .128 
.547** 
p < .001 
.481** 
 p = .002 
.398* 
p = .011 
    
SM -.041 
p = .803 
.331* 
p =  .037 
.411** 
p = .008 
.129 
p = .427 
.080 
p = .625 
   
BPVS .202 
p = .211 
.417** 
p = .007 
464** 
p = .003 
.408** 
p = .009 
.658** 
p  < .001 
.233 
p = .148 
  
Age .363* 
p = .021 
.540** 
p < .001 
.217 
p = .178 
.346* 
p = .029 
.348* 
p = .028 
.377* 
p = .016 
.244 
 P =.129 
 
KM -.165 
p = .310 
-.069 
p =.672 
-.032 
p = .843 
-.009 
p = .958 
-.176 
p = .276 
-.054 
p = .740 
-.135 
p = .407 
-.221 
p = .170 
 VS AToM ToM 1 ToM 2 ToM 3 SM BPVS Age 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Key: VS – verbal scepticism, ToM 1 – unexpected location task, ToM 2 – 
unexpected contents task (own false belief), ToM 3 – unexpected contents task 
(another’s false belief), SM – spatial monitoring ability, BPVS – (verbal ability), 
KM – kiddie-mach (Machiavellian intelligence). 
 
 
 As can be seen from the matrix a number of associations were found. Most 
importantly, a significant positive correlation was found between AToM and level of 
verbal scepticism, and between age and level of verbal scepticism. This implies that 
both increased AToM ability and age were linked to children’s increased levels of 
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verbal scepticism toward the conjuring demonstration. Further analysis was carried 
out in the form of partial correlations, in order to assess whether items remained 
correlated when age and verbal ability were controlled for. No significant correlation 
remained between AToM and level of verbal scepticism (r = .290, df = 37; p = .073) 
when age was controlled for. However, when verbal ability was controlled for there 
was still a significant correlation (r = .372, df = 37; p = .020). Therefore, although 
verbal ability did not appear to contribute to the association between AToM and level 
of verbal scepticism to the conjuring demonstration, age was an important 
contributing factor and may play an important role in children’s overall verbal 
scepticism towards a violation of object permanence being genuine magic. 
 No significant correlations were found between level of verbal scepticism and 
any of the first-order ToM tasks, or Machiavellian intelligence, or spatial monitoring 
ability. Therefore, these factors were not linked to children’s level of verbal 
scepticism towards a conjuring demonstration being genuine magic. 
 It is worth mentioning other positive correlations that were found. AToM was 
positively correlated with all of the first-order ToM tasks implying that both abilities 
increased in line with each other. However, it is unclear if children needed to succeed 
in a first-order ToM in order to then succeed in AToM. A significant positive 
correlation was also found between verbal ability and all the theory of mind tasks 
(including AToM) implying that verbal intelligence is required in order to 
comprehend the tasks. A number of associations were found in relation to age that 
imply a developmental advance in certain tasks: spatial monitoring ability, first-order 
ToM ability (apart from unexpected location), and AToM ability. Therefore, increased 
proficiency on these tasks was influenced by increase in the age of the child.  
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 A significant positive correlation remained between AToM and first-order 
ToM (unexpected contents for another’s false belief) once the effect of age was 
controlled for (r = .438, df = 37; p = .005). However, no significant correlation 
remained between AToM and first-order ToM (unexpected contents for own false 
belief; r = .247, df = 37; p = .130). When verbal ability was controlled for, a 
significant positive correlation remained between AToM and first-order ToM 
(unexpected contents for another’s false belief; r = .437, df = 37; p = .005). However, 
no significant correlation remained between AToM and first-order ToM (unexpected 
contents for own false belief; r = .246, df = 37; p = .131) or between AToM and first-
order ToM (unexpected location; r = .247, df = 37; p = .130). Therefore, both age and 
verbal ability contributed to the association found between AToM and first-order 
ToM to a certain extent (apart from unexpected contents for another’s false belief).  
  
 
Discussion 
The main aim of Study 5 was to investigate a possible relationship between 4-6-year-
old children’s responses to a conjuring demonstration and an advanced theory of mind 
(AToM). The rationale behind the study (and one of the main hypotheses of the 
thesis) is that children with a high level of theory of mind skill will be less likely to 
reason magically as they are social-cognitively developed. Therefore we might expect 
that children who give consistent “trick” responses will have higher AToM scores 
than those who give consistent “magic” responses, with those giving inconsistent 
responses having intermediate AToM scores. A series of findings appear to support 
this association. 
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Firstly, children who gave “trick” causal responses had higher AToM scores 
than those who gave “magic” causal responses. Secondly, regarding the overall 
response type to the conjuring demonstration (i.e. combined response of whether the 
teddy was the actual teddy that had disappeared or just looked like it, and whether it 
was real magic or a trick), children in the “trick” group had significantly higher 
AToM scores than those in the “magic” group. Thirdly, Study 5 also included a 
measure of children’s level of verbal scepticism towards the conjuring demonstration 
being genuine magic, in order to assess a possible relationship with level of AToM 
ability. Once again, a positive correlation was found, irrespective of verbal 
competence, with children who scored higher in AToM ability showing a higher level 
of verbal scepticism towards the event than those scoring lower in AToM ability. All 
these pieces of evidence suggest that a more advanced theory of mind understanding 
may open the way for detection of trickery that may not be possible in the absence of 
such a mentalistic orientation.  
 However, the above mentioned findings may be attributed to age. Indeed, a 
significant age difference was found between the groups categorized according to 
overall response type. That is, children who gave “trick” type responses were 
significantly older than those who gave “mixed” type responses. A similar pattern was 
found regarding causal responses for the event (i.e. the “trick” response group were 
older than the “real magic” group). An association was also found between increased 
level of verbal scepticism and increasing age, and increased AToM and increasing 
age. Furthermore, age was found to be a contributing factor regarding the association 
between children’s level of verbal scepticism and AToM. As such, this casts doubt on 
the credibility of AToM being singly responsible for children’s “trick” responses in 
Study 5.  
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Nevertheless, there is still reason to maintain that age may not be the main 
attribute and that there is something more than a developmental change  that is 
occurring (i.e. AToM ability), which influences children’s responses towards the 
conjuring demonstration. If children’s causal responses are due to age, why were there 
individual differences, with some older children still stating “trick” while others stated 
“real magic”? Furthermore, Study 4 of the thesis did not find any significant age 
differences in children’s causal responses and suggested that reasoning in relation to 
the conjuring demonstration is not just about age.   
 It could be argued that the significant link found in Study 5 between AToM 
ability and children’s responses to the conjuring demonstration was due in part to the 
inclusion of magical elements (i.e. the experimenter wearing a hat and cloak in order 
to look like a magician, claiming to have special powers, and casting a spell). In 
addition, the distance of the location of the transferred inanimate object (i.e. teddy) 
was manipulated and may have influenced children’s causal reasoning behind the 
transference; children may have suspected deception, taken the stance that the object 
was in a location more proximal to the original location (i.e. the bag) and given an 
explanation in terms of trickery. Alternatively, children may have been more 
credulous, taken the stance that the object was in a location more distant to the 
original location (i.e. the box) and given a magical explanation. Therefore, as the 
“magic box” was at a distant location from the “magician” it had the effect of 
encouraging some children to accept magical reasoning behind the demonstration. 
Conversely, other children may have doubted the plausibility of the transference of 
the teddy from the bag into the box being “real magic” due to the distant location and 
had the effect of discouraging some children to accept magical reasoning and hence 
give “trick” causal responses.   
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  Yet, as Subbotsky (1997) postulated, indirect social influences are a legitimate 
and necessary way to test the firmness and permanence of children’s beliefs in the 
impossibility of certain events. Therefore, if children gave “magic” responses surely 
their thinking was not rational in the sense of having a solid belief in the physical laws 
of nature?  If children do not believe in magic causality then this manipulation should 
not affect them. According to Subbotsky, creating a more magical context that may 
then increase the likelihood that magical explanations would be given by children, 
challenges children’s adherence to a sceptical point of view. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of the experimenter adopting the persona of a magician clarified children’s 
conflicting responses in Study 2, whereby 4-6-year-olds were asked hypothetical 
questions about magicians. In this earlier study, although they had claimed that 
magicians can do magic and have special powers, children also claimed that magic is 
just tricks. As some children in Study 5 gave “magic” causal responses (as opposed to 
“trick” responses), it can be considered as evidence for children’s responses reflecting 
genuine magic and not just tricks.  
There were a series of important findings in terms of children’s responses to 
the conjuring demonstration that need to be addressed. Firstly, on examining 
children’s verbal responses to the conjuring demonstration itself, evidence shows that 
most children adopted a mixed credulous and sceptical stance. In fact, very few 
children were consistently credulous or consistently sceptical throughout. Once again, 
this is consistent with the findings of, and further supports the proposal that was made 
in, Study 4. That is, in order to fully understand children’s interpretation of an 
anomalous event, rather than simply categorising children as believing or disbelieving 
in magic causality,  measures should be incorporated that assess levels of scepticism.  
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Secondly, in terms of causal responses for the demonstration, irrespective of 
whether children felt the bag (where the original teddy was hidden) or not, more 
children gave a “trick” causal response than a “real magic” response (i.e. seven out of 
nine children who did not feel the bag, and 17 out of 31 who did feel the bag stated 
“trick”). Once again, as has been the finding throughout the studies carried out in this 
thesis, it would appear that examining apparatus was not a crucial factor in children 
acknowledging that “trickery” had occurred. Hence, the success of deception to some 
degree did not depend upon the child’s ignorance of the technical details. In fact, two 
children, despite feeling the bag and thereby feeling the teddy hidden inside at the 
bottom of it, still gave a “real magic” causal response. This goes against Chandler and 
Lalonde’s (1994) findings that young children are more likely to discount the notion 
of magic as the cause if they are given an opportunity of exploring the apparatus and 
hence discovering the experimenter’s use of a piece of trick apparatus. However, there 
must have been an element of doubt in the minds of all the nine children as to what 
they were witnessing as “real magic” and whether they believed that the “magician” 
could make the teddy really disappear as a result of “real magic”. Feeling the bag in 
the first place (possibly to justify their doubt) suggests suspicion on their part about 
the legitimacy of the demonstration. It should be noted that no 4-year-olds felt the bag 
where the teddy had originally disappeared from, and as such implies a lack of 
suspicion (at least at a behavioural level).  
 Study 5 also investigated a possible link between children’s responses to the 
conjuring demonstration and first-order ToM ability, by including a series of 
standardised false belief measures (i.e. the unexpected contents task and unexpected 
location task). No significant associations were found in terms of children’s detection 
of trickery, or level of verbal scepticism. The main reason for incorporating a series of 
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first-order ToM tasks was to assess children’s level of ToM skill. The majority of 
children showed that they had an understanding that both beliefs and verbal 
statements can be false by achieving success in all the first-order ToM tasks. This was 
most evident in the ceiling effect found regarding the appearance-reality task which 
proved that children were capable of appreciating that appearance is separate from 
reality. Out of all the first-order ToM tasks, children were least successful on their 
own false belief in the unexpected contents task. One possible explanation for this 
may be that it was the only one to focus upon children’s recall of their own mistaken 
beliefs. Children may have succumbed to the desire to give the “right” answer by 
denying their previous false belief, in order to create a favourable impression of their 
knowledge of things.  
 A positive correlation was found between AToM and first-order ToM 
implying children’s abilities increase in line with each other. However, due to the 
correlational design, it is unclear if children need to succeed in a first-order ToM task 
in order to then succeed in an AToM task. It is important to note at this point that the 
mean score for AToM ability was extremely low (4.52) out of a possible maximum 
score of 24. This would suggest that success on first-order tasks was not predictive of 
good performance on the AToM task (especially as most children were proficient in 
first-order ToM). What is clear is that both increasing age and verbal ability were 
found to be contributing factors regarding the association between AToM and first-
order ToM for own false belief (on the unexpected contents task). That is, the 
correlation disappeared when age and verbal ability were controlled for. This implies 
that verbal competence is required in order to comprehend these tasks and supports 
Happé’s (1995) findings. The developmental pattern found for AToM ability and 
first-order ToM (unexpected contents task) ability is also consistent with previous 
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literature (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Happé, 1994; Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 
1998; Perner et al., 1987).  
 Study 5 also included measures of spatial monitoring ability and 
Machiavellian intelligence to assess a possible relationship between children’s level 
of verbal scepticism in a conjuring demonstration and other forms of social and 
cognitive intelligence. It was hypothesised that increased competence in spatial 
monitoring ability and Machiavellianism may be linked to the likelihood of children 
being more sceptical of genuine magic having occurred. No such correlations were 
found throughout. Spatial monitoring ability was specifically included in the present 
study as it was considered to involve the same required ability as in the conjuring 
demonstration: it required keeping track of a concealed object and identifying where 
the object was after a movement had occurred. The majority of children were 
successful in all aspects of the spatial monitoring task, showing that they were 
competent in monitoring the movement of a hidden object when it was being moved 
(and when it was stable while other objects were moving around it). In keeping with 
previous research by Sophian (1986), on close examination of the spatial monitoring 
trials, children found the single-object condition easier than the three-object condition. 
This was expected as the one-object condition focuses on monitoring just the one box 
that contains an object, whereas in the three-object condition all boxes are equally 
important to monitor. 
  It is worth mentioning that a positive correlation was found between age and 
spatial monitoring, with children’s competence in this task improving with age. 
Therefore, there were developmental advances in children’s understanding of what 
happens to an object when its container is moved, or other containers around it are 
moved. This enabled older children to infer what happened to objects that were 
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concealed from view during the movement more effectively than younger children. 
This fits with the developmental pattern found in other research (e.g., Sophian, 
Larkin, & Kadane, 1985; Sophian, 1986). However, the association found in Study 5 
may reflect improvements in children’s attentional capacity rather than increases in 
their understanding of the movements of the objects, especially as children were 
required to partake in many trials. Hence, many children may have had difficulty 
monitoring objects through movements because of lack of focused attention or 
boredom.  
Regarding Machiavellianism, the questions asked in the task were adapted so 
that they would be age-appropriate and therefore understandable for the ages being 
tested. Indeed, the range of children’s scores varied widely (i.e. between 3 and 11 
points out of a possible score of 14). However, it was not clear if children fully 
understood the questions that were asked. It may be that children were still too young 
to verbally agree (with a “true” response) that for example, “The best way to handle 
people is to tell them what they want to hear”. Yet they may still demonstrate a 
tendency toward behaviour that might be considered as relatively Machiavellian, for 
instance “by lying when cornered” (Repacholi, Slaughter, Pritchard, & Gibbs, 2003, 
p. 78). There may be measurable individual differences in the extent to which 
children’s behaviour tends toward Machiavellianism, compared to verbal statements. 
However, only one study has developed a Machiavellian scale for children under nine 
years of age. Slaughter and Pritchard (2000) developed a 12-item Machiavellian 
rating scale designed to be used by adult informants who were familiar with the 
child’s behaviour within the peer group such as teachers. However, the scale items 
reflect the overt behavioural, but not the subjective attitudinal, components of the 
Mach construct. 
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Conclusion 
Study 5 found a significant association between 4-6-year-old children’s responses to a 
conjuring demonstration and AToM ability: children giving “trick” responses had 
significantly higher AToM scores than those giving “magic” responses. Furthermore, 
there was supporting evidence of an association between AToM ability and levels of 
verbal scepticism towards a conjuring demonstration being genuine magic: children 
scoring higher on AToM showed higher levels of scepticism. This latter association 
points towards the possibility of there being individual differences between children’s 
level of scepticism towards an event being real magic related to social-cognitive 
ability. Children’s level of verbal scepticism towards a conjuring demonstration was 
not found to be associated with specific intelligence factors: spatial monitoring ability, 
verbal ability, or Machiavellianism. However, a developmental change was found for 
specific abilities: AToM, first-order ToM, spatial monitoring, and verbal ability. In all 
cases children showed increased ability with age that is consistent with previous 
literature.  
Children’s ability to understand and identify a conjuring demonstration as 
trickery (i.e. false and misleading) may require sophisticated social-cognitive 
understanding, suggesting the possibility that detection ability is related to AToM.  
However, as age was found to be a contributing factor in results, further investigation 
needs to be carried out if the reliability of the present findings and the possible 
implications which they have for children’s levels of scepticism are to be accepted. It 
is unclear if children’s scepticism in relation to magic causality is specifically age-
related or a developmental process that changes across time. Clearly there were 
individual differences in causal responses for the conjuring demonstration irrespective 
of age, with some children still stating “trick” while others stated “real magic”. 
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Furthermore, Study 4 of the thesis gives clues that imply children’s reasoning is not 
just due to age, as evidenced by the lack of significant age differences in 4-6-year-
olds. Study 6 will test a slightly older group so that age effects may be slightly more 
delineated. As AToM was found to be positively correlated with age in Study 5, and 
as the AToM scores were extremely low for all children, this further confirms the 
importance of testing an older age range.  
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CHAPTER 7: 
STUDY 6: Association between levels of theory of mind and deception 
 
 
“Art is magic delivered from the lie of being truth”. (Theodor Adorno) 
 
 
 Lies are a common social phenomenon that children experience from an early age. 
This includes having lies told directly to them, witnessing lies told to others, and their 
own lie-telling behaviour (Talwar, Crossman, Gulmi, Renaud, & Williams, 2009). A 
lie is a form of deception: it is a verbally false statement intended to deceive (Stern & 
Stern, 1909). Talwar et al. (2009) claim that in order to detect lies, children must first 
be able to identify them. This includes understanding the defining features of a lie: a 
message that a sender knows to be false, but which is told deliberately to mislead. If 
this is not understood, lies can be confused with truth. Similarly, the conjuring 
demonstration used in this thesis is a form of deception, in which children are being 
deliberately misled into thinking that a teddy has spontaneously disappeared from one 
location and reappeared in another location. Therefore, children’s understanding of a 
conjuring demonstration as being an example of trickery may be linked to their 
experience with everyday deception in the form of lies. Study 6 aims to explore 
children’s ability to deceive and to discriminate between truth and lies. Specifically, 
children who can successfully lie or can successfully discriminate between lies and 
truth-telling in other children may be more likely to give “trick” explanations for a 
conjuring event than “magic” explanations as they are tapping into their own 
experiences of deception. Even though they may be unaware of the mechanics behind 
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it, they are appreciative of and acknowledge trickery. In addition, and of foremost 
importance, Study 6 is concerned with providing further support for a link between 
children’s interpretation of a conjuring demonstration and an advanced theory of mind 
(AToM). The findings of Study 5 appear to indicate a link between social-cognitive 
intelligence (in the form of higher levels of AToM) and detection of deception (in the 
form of trickery). However, as age was found to be a contributing factor, it is 
important to assess an older age range in order to delineate age effects, especially as 
Study 4 implies that children’s detection of trickery is linked to more than just age. 
 There has been extensive research on the development of lying that dates back 
to the beginning of developmental psychology (e.g., Binet, 1896; Darwin, 1877; 
Piaget, 1932). Only a limited number of studies have investigated children’s actual 
lie-telling behaviour, most of which have involved preschool children (e.g., Chandler, 
Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Leekam, 1993; Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Newton, 
Reddy, & Bull, 2000; Peskin, 1992; Polak & Harris, 1999; Sodian, 1991; Talwar, 
Crossman, Gulmi, Renaud, & Williams, 2009; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007; Talwar 
& Lee, 2002; Talwar, Murphy, & Lee, 2007). Overall, these studies have found that 
lie-telling behaviour emerges in the early preschool years and the ability to tell 
intentional lies increases with age. Yet the question of how well a child can succeed in 
the deception of lying is largely unexplored. Moreover, little work exists regarding 
children’s ability to be deceptive in more naturalistic situations at any age. Although 
there are some studies on children’s ability to detect deception (DePaulo, Jordan, 
Irvine, & Laser, 1982; Feldman, Devin-Sheeham, & Allen, 1978; Morency & Krauss, 
1982), most of this work has involved children who are six years or older.  
To lie successfully one must have knowledge of another’s knowledge and 
beliefs, recognise the information required to sway the beliefs of the listener, and 
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communicate such that this information, rather than information which suggests one’s 
intent to deceive, is passed on (Vasek, 1984). So, for instance, one must be able to not 
only produce a false statement but also ensure consistency between their initial lie and 
subsequent statements. Any inconsistencies in one’s statements may lead to the 
detection of one’s lies. The ability to maintain consistency between statements during 
deception is referred to as “semantic leakage control” (Talwar & Lee, 2002). Young 
children are poor at concealing their deception in their verbal statements (e.g., blurting 
out the name of a toy that they claimed not to have peeked at: Polak & Harris, 1999; 
Talwar, Gordon, & Lee 2007; Talwar & Lee, 2002, 2008). Indeed, Talwar and Lee 
(2002) have found a developmental trend in children’s ability at semantic leakage 
control. Whereas the majority of children between three and five years blurted out the 
name of a toy that they denied having peeked at, about half of 6- and 7-year-olds 
feigned ignorance of the toy’s identity.  
 A successful lie-teller will also maintain consistency between verbal and non-
verbal behaviour in order to avoid giving any cues to their deceit (e.g., making eye 
contact while lying: Talwar, Crossman, Gulmi, Renaud, & Williams, 2009). Of the 
various studies that have been carried out, results show that by three or four years of 
age children can deceive others by hiding or changing a facial expression or emotion 
(e.g., Cole, 1986; Lewis et al., 1989; Saarni, 1984; Talwar & Lee, 2002). For 
example, Lewis et al. had difficulty sorting out liars from honest children. Children 
who were judged to be telling the truth when they were actually telling lies 
maintained relaxed and smiling expressions as they did so. This suggests that children 
understood that in order to deceive, one should speak a non-truth as though one was 
speaking the truth. In contrast, children who did not confess but remained mute 
tended to wear very nervous facial expressions.  Furthermore, research with both 
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adults and children (aged six years and older) has found evidence that people have 
greater inconsistency between their verbal and nonverbal communication when they 
are lying than when they are telling the truth (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; 
Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Feldman & White, 1980).  
 Miller (2009) argued that as the purpose of a lie is to implant a false belief it is 
difficult to see how lies could be either produced or understood without some 
realization that beliefs can be false. He postulated that an understanding of lying is 
probably the most direct consequence of false belief mastery. As Talwar, Gordon, and 
Lee (2007, p. 804) put it, “Lying, in essence, is theory of mind in action.” Research 
appears to suggest that children’s theory-of-mind understanding may be related to 
their lie-telling abilities (e.g., Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; 
Talwar & Lee, 2002, 2008). With development, the frequency of lying increases and 
the sophistication of the lies also increases. Referring back to the studies by Polak and 
Harris (1999) and Talwar and Lee (2002), initial false denials of peeking at a toy were 
related to children’s first-order belief understanding. Yet maintaining a lie in follow-
up questions was related to a child’s more advanced belief understanding. However, 
the role of false belief understanding in relation to deception is controversial. For 
instance, Newton, Reddy, and Bull (2000) have found no link between genuine 
deception and children passing a false belief task. 
 Currently, children’s ability to detect lies (and whether children can be easily 
deceived by another’s lies) is a relatively understudied issue. Lie detection involves 
using a number of strategies to avoid being fooled by another person’s lies, most of 
which involve detecting certain inconsistencies. A common strategy used by adults is 
to detect inconsistencies between verbal and non-verbal behaviours displayed by the 
lie-teller. Once inconsistencies are detected, a lie recipient may have reason to suspect 
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that the speaker has lied (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). With age children start to be able 
to detect lack of congruence between the lie teller’s non-verbal expressive behaviour 
(which may reveal their true feelings) and their verbal behaviour (e.g., Rotenberg, 
Simourd, & Moore, 1989).  
Another major strategy for detecting lies is based on semantics (Lee & 
Cameron, 2000). It involves comparing the spoken message of the lie teller and the 
listener’s knowledge about the truth, along with the listener’s knowledge about the 
intentions of the lie teller. Research suggests that children even as young as four years 
of age are able to detect lies when they are aware of intention to deceive (i.e. give a 
deliberate false statement), the intent of the deception, and they understand the 
distinction between what is said and what is believed by the speaker and that the two 
do not always correspond (e.g., Bussey, 1992, 1999; Lee & Cameron, 2000). During 
the elementary school years, children become increasingly aware of these 
discrepancies (Cole, 1986; Gnepp, 1983; Gnepp & Hess, 1986; Saarni, 1979).  
Furthermore, individuals can use their world knowledge to identify 
inconsistencies in the content of a lie teller’s statement. Inconsistencies arise when the 
statement violates world knowledge which in turn raises suspicion that the speaker’s 
statement should not be believed. Lee, Cameron, Douchette, and Talwar (2002) found 
that older preschoolers (5-6-year-olds) could use their knowledge of the world to 
detect an implausible, scapegoating lie, which younger children tended to believe. 
Hence, older children could infer a speaker was lying with deceptive intent when they 
heard implausible statements. However, it is important to mention that most research 
on children’s ability to detect lie-telling has focused on lies that are based on fantasy 
versus reality. For instance, Lee et al. (2002) used a storybook paradigm in which a 
protagonist claimed that a ghost in a story jumped out of a book and broke a glass and 
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children questioned as to whether this really happened or not. Furthermore, to date, 
there have been only a handful of studies that have examined children’s abilities to 
detect real, spontaneous true and false statements by other children, and findings have 
been mixed. For instance, two studies found children’s abilities to accurately detect 
other children’s true or false reports about their feelings was at chance level and did 
not improve with age (Feldman & White, 1980; Morency & Kraus, 1982). However, 
Feldman, Devin-Sheehan, and Allen (1978) found that 7-year-old children were able 
to distinguish between facial expressions resulting from untruthful communication 
and truthful communication in other 7-year-old children. Talwar, Crossman, Gulmi, 
Renaud, and Williams (2009) appear to have carried out the only study that has 
examined both children’s and adults’ ability to make judgments of children’s true and 
false reports and found that older children (aged 7- and 9-years old) were better at 
detecting lies than both younger children (aged 4- and 6-years old) and adults.  
 
Study Aim 
The current study aimed to provide a further possible link between levels of theory of 
mind (ToM) skill and responses to a conjuring demonstration. That is, children with 
higher advanced theory of mind (AToM) ability may be more likely to think in terms 
of deception and suspect trickery. Conversely, children with a less sophisticated 
AToM may be more likely to think in terms of genuine magic. In addition, different 
levels of verbal scepticism towards a conjuring demonstration being genuine magic 
may be associated with level of AToM. A standard first-order ToM task was included 
as an additional measure for level of theory of mind. Study 6 also investigated other 
forms of deception (i.e. both active and passive participation in the form of lying) in 
relation to level of scepticism towards the conjuring demonstration. Specifically, 
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children who are more adept in deception (i.e. can successfully lie, or who can 
successfully discriminate between truth and lies in others) may be more likely to 
suspect trickery in the conjuring demonstration. It might be that children’s past 
experience with telling lies both successfully (i.e. they were not detected) and 
unsuccessfully (i.e. they were detected) helps them to understand the features of a 
successful, intentionally false event. Likewise, children who are suspicious of the 
content of a lie teller’s statement may also be suspicious of a violation of object 
permanence (i.e. the conjuring demonstration) being genuine magic. 
A 5-7½-year-old age range was selected in the present study in the likelihood 
that higher scores in AToM ability would be attained and wider variance in scores. 
This in turn might give a greater differentiation between level of AToM ability and 
“trick” versus “magic” interpretations of the conjuring demonstration. 
 
It was hypothesised that: 
1) There will be an association between an AToM and children’s verbal responses to a 
conjuring demonstration. Children who give “trick” responses will have higher AToM 
scores than those who give “magic” responses. 
 
2) There may be an association between children’s ability to successfully lie (i.e. not 
be detected when lying) and level of verbal scepticism towards the conjuring 
demonstration being genuine magic. Children who are successful at lying will have 
higher scepticism scores.  
 
3) There may be an association between children’s level of ability to discriminate 
between truth and lies and level of verbal scepticism towards the conjuring 
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demonstration being genuine magic. Children who are successful at truth/lie 
discrimination will have higher scepticism scores.   
 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight children (25 males and 23 females) took part in the study. They ranged in 
age from five to seven-and-a-half years of age (mean age: 76.12 months). The 
children in the study attended a S.E. London primary school and were predominantly 
from middle class backgrounds although this was not directly assessed. There was a 
mixture of white, black and Asian children (27 white, 18 black and nine Asian). 
Twenty-two volunteer adults also provided data on the lie/truth discrimination task 
used in this study (see Procedure section for details).  
 
Design 
The study included various independent variables including response category (“trick” 
vs. “magic”), ability to lie, and ability to discriminate between truth and lies (both 
high vs. low) and a number of dependent variables including AToM and first-order 
ToM scores and verbal scepticism. There were two experimental groups (as described 
below) each consisting of 24 children. Each group had equal numbers of males and 
females (bar one) and equal ages taken from six separate classes (i.e. eight 5-year-
olds, eight 6-year-olds, and eight 7-year-olds). All statistical tests were two-tailed 
unless otherwise indicated. 
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Materials 
The conjuring trick used the same apparatus as in Study 5 (i.e. a light blue square box, 
a red velvet bag with a rigid rim and a lever attached to a wooden handle that enabled 
an object to be hidden within a cloth pocket when the lever was moved across, and 
two identical small teddy bears; Figure 5.1). The box was placed on a table within 
touching distance of the child and the experimenter who sat on separate chairs.  
The first-order ToM test for unexpected contents (Perner et al., 1987) used the 
same apparatus as in Study 5: a “Smarties” tube containing a red pencil, a green 
pencil and a blue pencil (Figure 5.5); a plasters box containing four 20 pence pieces 
(Figure 5.5); and a toothpaste tube box containing a necklace (Figure 5.5).  
Exactly the same AToM test using the “strange stories” (Happé, 1994), and 
short-form British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1982), were used as 
in Study 5 (details can be found in the Method section of Study 5, and the 
appendices). 
All 48 children were videotaped actively lying and telling the truth using a 
JVC 700x digital zoom, high resolution camcorder mounted on a tripod that stood in 
full view of the participant. A laptop (with a 16.4 inch screen) with headphones 
attached was set up to show pictures and to give instructions. It was positioned so that 
the experimenter could not see the screen. A digitized tape was devised in such a way 
that from a choice of 30 pictures, four were randomly selected separately instructing 
the child to lie and four were randomly selected separately to tell the truth. The 
pictures were chosen from 30 line drawings in the short-form BPVS so that the 
pictures were age-appropriate and were presented in A4 size format on the screen. 
(These pictures with the written instructions can be found in the appendices.) For the 
truth/lie discrimination sessions, a video was shown on a laptop screen of 11 children 
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in Experimental Group 1 or 11 children in Experimental Group 2, who were able to 
correctly lie and tell the truth to all eight pictures that were presented to them. The 
laptop had been set up to store responses keyed in by the experimenter. Each child’s 
responses were entered on the laptop keyboard as follows: “L” for “lie”, “T” for 
“truth”, “D” for “doesn’t know”. 
 
Information stored on the laptop when testing children 
The computer was set up so that the following information would be stored: During 
the recording of children actively lying or telling the truth the participant number and 
the experimental group number was entered. The data logged showed the participant 
number, the experimental group, the session number, picture number and whether it 
was a lie picture or a truth picture that the child was instructed to describe. For 
example, in the case of a truth picture children were shown a picture of a lady and 
man dancing and instructed to state out loud that it was a picture of a lady and man 
dancing. In the case of a lie picture children were shown a picture of a boy and girl 
looking at books from a book shelf and instructed to state out loud that it was a 
picture of a lady and man dancing (see Figure 6.1). 
During each child’s ratings of the videos (i.e. the truth/lie discrimination task), 
the participant number and the experimental group number was entered and the trial 
number selected (e.g., 1 or 2 or 3, etc., up to 8). The data were logged in 
chronological order in the file data so that they showed the participant number, the 
experimental group, and the images shown to the participant (e.g., numbers 1-24 for 
Experimental Group 1, numbers 25-48 for Experimental Group 2). All participants 
were appended to the file so that one session did not overwrite another. The data also 
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showed whether the picture number was actually for a “lie” or “truth” picture, and 
also whether the participant rated the description as a “lie”, “truth” or “doesn’t know”.  
 
Procedure 
All 48 children were tested individually by the same experimenter in a separate room. 
The study consisted of eleven testing sessions. The first three sessions each lasted 
approximately twenty minutes per child. The following eight sessions each lasted 
approximately eight minutes per child. The first session included a first-order ToM 
false belief measure (i.e. the unexpected contents task), followed by the short-form 
BPVS, and lastly the conjuring demonstration. (The conjuring demonstration 
followed the standard ToM test and the short-form BPVS so that the children became 
familiarized with the experimenter, felt less intimidated and hopefully gave an honest 
response.) The second session tested AToM and the third session included the “ability 
to lie” task. Finally, the following eight sessions tested children’s ability to 
discriminate between truth and lies.  
 
First-order ToM Test - The Unexpected Contents Task (Perner et al.,1987) 
The same measures and scoring that was used in Study 5 were used in the present 
study. (See the Procedure section of Study 5 for details.) Since the previous study 
found that most children achieved success on a variety of false-belief tasks and all 
children achieved success on an appearance-reality task, only the unexpected contents 
task was selected for Study 6.  
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AToM Task 
This measure was administered and scored in exactly the same way as described in 
the procedure section of Study 5. (Details of the story types and pictures can be found 
in the appendices.) 
 
The short-form BPVS (Dunn et al., 1982) 
This measure was administered and scored in exactly the same way as described in 
the Procedure section of Study 5. 
 
Conjuring Demonstration 
The procedure was the same as in Study 5, with the exception that the “magic box”, 
instead of being placed on a shelf approximately ten feet away, was placed on a table 
in touching distance of both the child and the experimenter, and the experimenter did 
not wear a hat and cloak.  
As in Study 5, as well as categorising responses to individual questions 
separately, a total verbal scepticism score was calculated according to each child’s 
responses. (Details of questions and scoring can be found in the procedure section of 
Study 5.) 
 
Ability to Lie Task 
In session three, all 48 children individually took part in actively lying. The 
experimenter initially showed them an example of what was required. They were 
given four practice trials beforehand (using pictures from the short-form BPVS that 
were not being used in the actual testing session). The purpose of this was to make 
sure children understood what they were doing (i.e. two lie trials and two truth trials). 
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In order to make the instructions as clear as possible, each child was told that they 
would see on the laptop screen a clip of film with someone either saying, “Ssh” and 
putting their finger to their mouth if the child was being instructed to lie or thumbs 
pointing upwards if the child was being instructed to tell the truth. They were also told 
that they would then see a picture appear on the laptop screen and hear instructions 
via headphones telling them to either lie or tell the truth about the picture that 
appeared on the screen and that the experimenter would not be able to hear or see 
what they were being told or shown. Furthermore, the child was prompted what to say 
the picture was showing via the headphones and a written description appeared on the 
bottom of the screen. A picture then randomly appeared and remained on the laptop 
screen. For example, if a child was required to tell the truth when a picture was shown 
of a bed, they might have been instructed via headphones, “Tell the truth and describe 
the picture as a bed”. When the child was required to lie, they might have seen a 
picture of a bus and been instructed via the headphones, “Don’t describe the picture as 
a bus. Pretend and describe a picture of a bed”. The experimenter then asked, “What 
is the picture on the screen?” and gave the child approximately five seconds to 
respond. The child was then asked (if the child hadn’t already done so) to describe the 
picture if possible by asking, “What else can you tell me about the picture?” The 
experimenter waited five seconds for the child to respond and after the child’s 
response then looked at the picture on the laptop monitor and either verbally 
confirmed or disconfirmed the child’s description by stating for example, “It was a 
bed” or exclaiming, “It wasn’t a bed! It was a picture of a bus”. The experimenter’s 
verbal response was kept light-hearted so that the child did not feel that they had done 
something wrong when lying. 
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For the actual testing session the child was asked randomly to lie four times 
and to tell the truth four times to the experimenter when describing eight individual 
pictures (in the same way as previously described). If too many pictures were 
introduced, then the child may have become bored and distracted and may have 
simply repeated the same description throughout. Alternatively, if only one picture 
from each category was used, the task may not have tapped into whether or not the 
child could consistently or convincingly lie. 
The prompted instructions for the picture descriptions in the lying trials were 
selected from the pictures used in the truth trials for that particular experimental group 
being videotaped at the time. For example, a picture of a lady and a man dancing in 
the truth trial was used as a description when the child was told to lie about an actual 
picture of a boy and girl reading a book (Figure 6.1).  
 
 
                
Lie statement: a lady and man dancing.        Truth statement: a lady and man dancing. 
 
Figure 6.1: Picture and Description for a Lie and a Truth Instruction 
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The videotape had been edited so that 15 pictures were mixed up and 
randomly selected to show eight pictures individually to each child for one 
experimental group and a further 15 pictures randomly selected for the other 
experimental group. Different pictures were shown to each experimental group, so 
that when these same children were trying to discriminate between truth and lies, they 
would not rate according to having recalled pictures they had described themselves. A 
lengthy debriefing period followed at the end of the task with a discussion about the 
advantages of telling the truth.  
 
Scoring Criteria for Ability to Lie    
Children’s individual ability to lie was scored according to the total number of 
incorrect lie ratings and “don’t know” lie ratings made by children in the opposing 
experimental group.  
 
 
Truth/Lie Discrimination Task 
In sessions four to eleven, 47 children were individually asked to watch a video 
recording on a laptop screen and to decide whether each child was lying or telling the 
truth on each trial (or to report if they did not know). One child from the original 
sample was omitted from this task due to his absence from school. The videotape 
showed only 11 children from Experimental Group 1 and 11 children from 
Experimental Group 2. They were selected on their ability to correctly lie and tell the 
truth to all eight pictures that were presented to them. Specifically, 23 children in 
Experimental Group 1 were now required to try to discriminate between truth and lies 
in 11 children in Experimental Group 2. Likewise, all 24 children in Experimental 
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Group 2 were now required to try to discriminate between truth and lies in 11 children 
in Experimental Group 1. The experimenter entered on the laptop keyboard each 
child’s rating as follows: key ‘T’ for “truth”, key ‘L’ for “lie” and key ‘D’ for 
“doesn’t know”. 
The videotape was edited so that 11 children in Experimental Group 1 had 
their eight trials randomly shown on a laptop screen to all 24 children in Experimental 
Group 2 and 11 children in Group 2 had their eight trials randomly shown on a 
computer screen to 23 children in Group 1. This randomization was intended to 
prevent the child who was trying to discriminate between truth and lies (for a total of 
88 pictures) from getting bored. Hence, it hopefully accurately measured how 
convincingly each child could lie. It was also spread over eight sessions in order to 
reduce mental and attentional pressure.  
Children’s ability to fool adults was also explored, in order to investigate how 
good a liar a child was, and in particular to compare children’s ability to discriminate 
between truth and lies with adult’s ability. External raters (adults) were asked to 
watch the videotape of children in both experimental groups (i.e. 22 children) and 
asked to rate whether the child was lying or telling the truth or to indicate if they 
didn’t know, and to indicate their rating by using the key system on the laptop as 
described earlier. Adults watched the videotape in one sitting with a break between 
each trial if required.  
 
Scoring Criteria for Truth/Lie Discrimination 
The children’s and adults’ ability to successfully discriminate between truth and lies 
was assessed by totalling up the number of times they correctly judged whether the 
children in the film clips were lying or telling the truth. 
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  Adults were included in order to compare with children’s ability to 
discriminate between truth and lies. It could be that children are better at truth/lie 
discrimination than adults, but if children do very poorly the data on its own will not 
tell us much. Therefore, adults were included as a comparison group. In addition, it 
might be impossible for anyone to discriminate between children’s lies and truth-
telling in the methodology used. Therefore, as a benchmark, adults were included. It 
would not be inappropriate to suppose that adults would be more skilled at 
discriminating between truth and lies than children. If both adults and children were 
equally unable to discriminate, this might be taken as evidence for children’s lies as 
being undetectable using the current methodology, regardless of whether children 
were not deemed skilled in the “ability to lie” task. Hence, it attempted to expose 
possible chance ratings. 
 
 
Results  
The present study employed measures in the areas of AToM, first-order ToM, verbal 
ability, verbal responses and levels of verbal scepticism in a conjuring demonstration, 
ability to lie, and ability to discriminate between truth and lies. Initially the results 
section presents the descriptive data for these measures, followed by consideration of 
the relationship between AToM, first-order ToM and verbal responses to the 
conjuring demonstration. Finally, the relationship between verbal scepticism to the 
conjuring demonstration, ability to lie and ability to discriminate between truth and 
lies was investigated. Non-parametric statistics are used throughout the current study 
in the form of Kruskal-Wallis tests, Mann Whitney U tests or Spearman correlations 
unless otherwise stated.  
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Examination of Table 6.1 shows that the mean score was within the normal 
range of responses for the short-form BPVS task (mean score 94.77) indicating that 
the children were capable of comprehending instructions given to them and that 
verbal intelligence was in line with age. Although the range of AToM scores varied 
widely between 0 and 12 out of a maximum possible score of 24, the mean score was 
low (6.17). These low scores imply a lack of sophistication in children’s social-
cognitive intelligence. As expected, and in line with past ToM research, children were 
more proficient at passing the first-order ToM task as indicated by the mean scores.  
 
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics for 5-7½-year-olds’ Scores for Short-form BPVS, 
ToM and AToM  (N = 48)  
 
Task 
 
Range 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Median Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Short-form BPVS 55 75 130 92.50 94.77 13.358 
ToM - Unexpected 
contents (own false 
belief) 
3 0 3 3.00 2.27 1.198 
ToM - Unexpected 
contents (another's 
false belief) 
3 0 3 3.00 2.58 .846 
AToM  12 0 12 6.00 6.17 2.927 
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Conjuring Demonstration 
Table 6.2 gives a breakdown of verbal responses obtained in the conjuring 
demonstration. When examining overall totals, the majority of the children stated that 
the teddy was “in the box” (71%) and that it was the “same teddy” that had been in 
the bag (75%). This suggests that the majority of the children believed that the object 
(i.e. the teddy) had transferred from its original location to a new location and may be 
interpreted as children being credulous of a spontaneous transference (i.e. without 
physical intervention). Only a marginal majority of the children stated that the teddy 
had not really disappeared from the bag (52%) and gave a “trick” causal response for 
the movement from the bag into the box (56%). This implies that children were 
overall slightly sceptical of the demonstration being genuine magic. They appeared to 
be aware of the demonstration involving deception in some way. Children’s responses 
throughout the demonstration (as indicated by “pattern of responses throughout”) 
were generally a mixture of scepticism (trickery) and credulity (magic) (75%), rather 
than consistent scepticism (8%) or consistent credulity (17%). This variation in 
responses once again highlights the need for an assessment of levels of scepticism that 
was initially proposed in Study 4. 
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Table 6.2: Frequency and Percentages of 5-7½-year-olds’ Responses in the 
Conjuring Demonstration (N = 48) 
 
Has the 
teddy 
disappeared 
from the 
bag? 
Where is 
the 
teddy? 
Did the 
child feel 
the bag?* 
Is it the same 
teddy that was 
in the bag? 
Was the 
movement 
real magic 
or a trick? 
Pattern of 
responses 
throughout 
Yes = 23 
(48%) 
 
No = 25 
(52%) 
Box = 34 
(71%) 
 
Bag = 14 
(29%) 
No = 35 
(73%) 
 
Yes = 13 
(27%) 
Same = 36 
(75%) 
 
Looks like = 12 
(25%) 
Magic = 21 
(44%) 
 
Trick = 27 
(56%) 
Magic = 8 
(17%) 
 
Trick = 4 
(8%) 
 
Mixture =36 
(75%) 
 
*Observed reactions 
  
 
AToM and the Conjuring Demonstration  
In order to explore a possible relationship between AToM ability and the likelihood of 
children interpreting the conjuring demonstration in terms of trickery, each child was 
allocated to an overall “magic”, “trick”, or “mixed” response category group. This 
was based upon their pattern of overall responses to the same selected questions about 
the demonstration as was used in Study 5. Children were assigned to the “magic” 
category if they stated that the teddy in the box was the same teddy as the one in the 
bag and that the transference was real magic. Children were assigned to the “trick” 
category if they stated that the teddy just looked like the original teddy and that the 
transference was a trick. Lastly, children were assigned to a mixed category if they 
gave a combination of responses throughout. Figure 6.2 shows that children in the 
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“trick” category appeared to have higher AToM scores than children in the “magic” 
category. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Five- to Seven-and-a-half-year-olds’ AToM Score in relation to 
Overall Verbal Response for the Conjuring Demonstration 
 
 
However, there were no significant differences in AToM scores between the 
groups based on the overall response categories (Kruskal Wallis: χ² = 1.399, df = 2; p 
= .497). 
There appeared to be a difference between children’s AToM scores between 
children giving different causal responses as to whether the transference of the teddy 
into the box was “real magic” or a “trick” (Figure 6.3). Children giving “trick” 
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responses appeared to have higher AToM scores than those giving “real magic” 
causal responses.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Five- to Seven-and-a-half-year-olds’ Causal Response in relation to 
AToM Score  
 
 
 However, once again no statistically significant difference was found (Mann-
Whitney U(21, 27) = 232; p = .14, one-tailed), thus failing to support the hypothesis 
that children giving a “trick” causal response would have higher AToM scores than 
those responding “magic”. 
 
 
First-order ToM and the Conjuring Demonstration 
Exactly the same tests were carried out with the first-order ToM unexpected contents 
scores with respect to responses to the conjuring demonstration as were carried out on 
270 
 
the AToM task scores. The purpose was to ascertain whether there might be a link 
between first-order false belief understanding and interpretation of a conjuring 
demonstration in the form of trickery. There were no significant differences in first-
order ToM scores between the overall response category groups. Table 6.3 gives a 
summary of the results found for responses to the conjuring demonstration in relation 
to the first-order ToM and AToM tasks. When comparing children’s false belief 
scores with respect to their causal responses to a direct question of whether the 
movement of the teddy was a “trick” or “real magic”, a significant difference was 
found for another’s false belief (U(21, 27) = 209; p =.035) but not for own false belief 
(U(21, 27) = 260; p = .550). Children giving “trick” responses had a higher ToM 
score for another’s false belief than children giving “real magic” responses. This is 
illustrated in Figure 6.4.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Five- to Seven-and-a-half-year-olds’ Causal Response in relation to 
First-order ToM Score for Another’s False Belief  
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Table 6.3: Summary of 5-7½-year-olds’ Results for the Conjuring Demonstration 
in relation to First-order ToM and AToM tasks 
 
Conjuring 
Demonstration 
ToM 
Unexpected 
contents 
(Own False Belief) 
ToM 
Unexpected 
contents 
(Another’s False 
Belief) 
AToM 
Was the movement 
of the teddy a trick 
or real magic? 
 
Mann-Whitney  
U = 260 
Sig = .550 
 
Mann-Whitney  
U = 209 
Sig = .035 
 
Mann-Whitney  
U = 232 
Sig = .14 one-tailed) 
Overall response  
(magic, trick, 
mixture) 
 
Kruskal-Wallis   
χ² = .082 
df = 2 
Sig = .960 
Kruskal-Wallis   
χ² = 3.685 
df = 2 
Sig = .158 
Kruskal-Wallis   
χ² = 1.399 
df = 2 
Sig = .497 
 
 
Age Trends in the Data 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was then carried out comparing other variables with respect to 
categorization with respect to overall verbal response type. No significant differences 
were found between the groups for age (χ² = 3.190, df = 2; p = .142). Therefore, 
children’s interpretation of the conjuring demonstration was not dependent on this 
factor.  
A Mann Whitney test was carried out to compare age with respect to grouping 
based upon children’s causal responses to whether the movement of the teddy was 
“real magic” or a “trick”. Once again, no significant result was found (U(21, 27) = 
217, p = .166). Therefore, age was not considered an influencing factor in children’s 
causal interpretation of the conjuring demonstration in this study.  
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Relations among the Tasks 
Spearman correlations were carried out in order to assess the relations among all the 
tasks. Total levels of verbal scepticism scores were used for the conjuring 
demonstration (as the majority of the children gave a mixture of responses throughout 
that could be deemed as both magic and trick responses). The verbal scepticism scores 
incorporate responses to the entire set of questions asked in the conjuring 
demonstration. Once again, this follows the same response criteria and justification 
for assessing levels of verbal scepticism as in Study 4 and Study 5. A matrix of results 
can be found in Table 6.4. It was hoped that an analysis of levels of verbal scepticism 
might reveal a link with AToM. 
 
Table 6.4: Matrix of Spearman Correlation Results for 5-7½-year-old Children 
(N = 48) 
 
AToM .124 
p = .401 
    
ToM  
(own false 
belief) 
-.055 
p = .713 
.038 
p = .798 
   
ToM  
(another’s 
false belief) 
.251 
p = .085 
.294* 
p = .043 
.209 
p = .154 
  
Verbal 
ability 
-.071 
p = .630 
.279 
p = .055 
.066  
p = .654 
.037  
p = .805 
 
Age .110 
p = .457 
.369* 
p = .010 
-.010 
 p = .945 
.299* 
p = .039 
-.014 
p = .926 
 Verbal 
Scepticism 
AToM ToM  
(own false 
belief) 
ToM  
(another’s 
false belief) 
Verbal 
ability 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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As can be seen from the matrix above, no significant correlation was found 
between level of AToM and level of verbal scepticism or between age and level of 
verbal scepticism. This reinforces the previous results, implying that both AToM and 
age were not linked to children’s level of verbal scepticism in this study. No 
significant correlations were found between children’s first-order ToM and level of 
verbal scepticism. Therefore, although first-order ToM ability was linked to children’s 
causal responses, it was not linked to level of verbal scepticism throughout the 
demonstration. However, a significant positive correlation was found between age and 
first-order ToM for another’s false belief:  (r = .299, N = 48; p = .039) and between 
age and AToM (r = .369, N = 48; p = .010) that further supports the importance of 
increasing age in passing the theory of mind tasks. A significant positive correlation 
was also found between first-order ToM (for another’s false belief) and AToM (r = 
.294, N = 48; p = .043) implying that as first-order ToM ability increases so too does 
AToM ability. However, as in Study 5, it is unclear if children need to succeed in a 
standard first-order ToM task in order to then perform well in an AToM task. A near-
significant positive correlation was found between verbal ability and AToM (r = .279, 
N = 48; p = .055).  
Further analysis was carried out in the form of partial correlations, in order to 
assess whether the items remained correlated when age and verbal ability were 
controlled for. No significant correlation remained between AToM and first-order 
ToM for another’s false belief once the effect of age was controlled for (r = .197, df = 
45; p = .186). However, a significant positive correlation remained when verbal 
ability was controlled for (r = .333, df = 45; p = .022). These results show that age 
was linked to a child’s increasing AToM and first-order ToM performance whereas 
verbal ability was not.  
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Discriminating Between Truth and Lies 
Forty-seven children were assessed on their ability to discriminate between lies and 
truth-telling in other children and it was initially intended that a subset of 22 children 
would also be assessed on their ability to successfully lie without being detected. 
These 22 children were selected on the basis that they were able to lie and tell the 
truth to all questions when requested by the experimenter during recordings, 
something that the majority of the children proved unable to do.  
The children’s and adults’ ability to successfully discriminate between truth 
and lies was assessed by totalling up the number of times they correctly judged 
whether the children in the film clips were lying or telling the truth. Obviously, it 
would not make any sense to produce separate scores for “truth detection” and “lie 
detection” because of the possibility of response bias. For example, if a respondent 
chose to respond “lie” to every single clip, they would get a score of 100% correct for 
the lie trials, but 0% correct for the truth trials. It would clearly be nonsensical to say 
that this respondent was skilled at lie detection but poor at detecting truth. They 
would simply be showing no ability whatsoever to discriminate between truth and 
lies. By adding together scores on lie trials and scores on truth trials, we end up with a 
measure of the ability to discriminate between the two types of trial that is not 
affected by response bias. As children were only presented with half of the film clips 
for judging (i.e., they were only presented with clips of the children in the 
experimental group that they were not part of), the maximum theoretical score that a 
child could obtain was 88 compared to a maximum theoretical score for an adult of 
176. Table 6.5 shows the mean scores on the discrimination task for both adults and 
children. Given that random deciding whether to respond “true” or “lie” on each trial 
would give a mean score for children of around 44, it is immediately apparent that the 
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children were very poor on this task, typically responding at around the level that 
would be expected on the basis of pure guesswork. The adults, on the other hand, 
appear to be responding at a mean rate somewhat above what would be expected on 
the basis of guesswork alone (i.e., 88). On first inspection, it appears that the children 
are completely incapable of discriminating between lies and truth-telling in other 
children, whereas the adults do show some ability. 
 
 
Table 6.5: Combined Lie and Truth Scores for 5-7½-year-old Children 
 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Adults 22 61 75 136 104.35 103.50 18.131 
Children 47 28 25 53 42.53 43.00 5.897 
 
 
In order to further investigate the performance of the children and adults on 
this discrimination task, performance was assessed at the level of each individual 
respondent using the binomial test (see Appendix D). Trials for which the respondent 
had responded “don’t know” were excluded but it was assumed that the chances of 
being correct for the remaining trials was .5. Thus it was possible to calculate how 
many of the respondents in each age group performed at a level that was significantly 
above (or, for that matter, significantly below) the range that might be expected on the 
basis of chance alone. 
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Table 6.6: Frequency of 5-7½-year-olds’ and Adults’ Scores Outside Chance 
Range 
 
 Children 
N = 47 
Adults 
N = 22 
Score significantly above chance range 3 16 
Score significantly below chance range 0 0 
 
 
Whereas the majority of the 22 adults were able to discriminate between lies 
and truth-telling at a level significantly above mean chance expectation, only 3 of 47 
children were able to do so at the .05 level of significance (unadjusted for multiple 
testing). This clearly indicates that as a group the children were simply unable to 
discriminate between other children telling the truth or telling lies in this experimental 
context. Thus, no further analyses were made of these data. 
 
 
Discussion 
The main aim of Study 6 was to extend and further investigate the findings of Study 
5. Specifically, it investigated a possible link between 5-7½-year-old children’s level 
of advanced theory of mind (AToM) and responses to a conjuring demonstration. It 
was proposed that children with a higher AToM ability would be less likely to reason 
magically, as they are social-cognitively more adept. The statistical findings did not 
support the proposal (and findings of Study 5) that children giving a “trick” causal 
response for a violation of object permanence would have higher AToM scores than 
those giving “real magic” responses. Study 6 also included a measure of children’s 
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level of verbal scepticism towards the conjuring demonstration being genuine magic. 
Once again, no relationship was found with level of AToM ability.  
 One potentially important finding is that children who gave “trick” 
responses for the conjuring demonstration had significantly higher first-order ToM 
scores for another’s false belief compared to those who gave “real magic” responses. 
Furthermore, no significant differences were found between age and children’s causal 
statements and so it would appear that age was not a contributing factor in this 
respect. This evidence points to first-order ToM ability being associated with 
acknowledgement of trickery. Hence, the findings of Study 6 suggest that it is not 
specifically AToM ability that is linked to children’s detection of trickery in a 
conjuring demonstration, as indicated by the results of Study 5. It is unclear why the 
results of Study 5 and Study 6 are discrepant in this respect. Future replication 
attempts may help to answer the question of which set of results (if any) reflects the 
true state of affairs. 
 Despite a wide variation in individual AToM scores, children did not appear 
to be accomplished in advanced social-cognitive reasoning skills. This is made 
evident by the low scores attained. Having said that, the mean AToM score was 
higher in Study 6 than in Study 5, so the lack of association between AToM scores 
and responses to the conjuring demonstration cannot be due to low scores on the 
AToM measure. The “strange stories” task was selected as an AToM measure as it is 
possible to measure an advanced theory of mind in typically developing children 
across the age range of five to twelve years. In addition it is a powerful measure in 
which to assess level of AToM ability as it has a possible score between 0 and 24 
points. Yet children found stories about forgetting, sarcasm, and persuasion, difficult 
to understand compared to stories about lies, white lies, pretence, appearance-reality, 
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and joking. These latter story types are more straightforward examples of false 
statements than the former ones. In particular, children found stories about double 
bluff, and contrary emotion too difficult. These story types are even more complex as 
they require an even higher understanding than the other types. As Happė (1994) 
states, contrary emotion and double bluff require understanding at a third-order theory 
of mind level (e.g., double bluff; he knows they think he will lie).  
Age was found to be a contributing factor towards an association between 
AToM scores and ToM (another’s false belief) scores, suggesting that both abilities 
increase according to increasing age. In all instances first-order judgments proved to 
be easier than advanced judgments and in most instances substantially so. Indeed 
Study 6 (and Study 5) found evidence for this in the fact that majority of children 
achieved maximum possible scores in first-order ToM tasks (i.e. 33 out of 48 children 
in the own false belief, 37 out of 48 for another’s false belief), but less than half the 
maximum possible scores in the AToM task (i.e. 46 out of 48 children). There was 
also a positive correlation between AToM and first-order ToM for another’s false 
belief, implying that both abilities increase in line with each other. However, due to a 
correlation design, it is unclear if first-order understanding is a necessary component 
in advanced reasoning. As Miller (2009) acknowledges, it may simply reflect the fact 
that relatively competent children tend to remain competent, with no functional 
relation between the measures.  
  On examining children’s verbal responses in the conjuring demonstration, a 
number of similarities were found between Studies 5 and 6 of the thesis. Firstly, the 
majority of the children’s responses throughout questioning were a mixture of 
credulity and scepticism towards the conjuring demonstration being genuine magic. 
These findings further support the proposition made in the thesis that children tend to 
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sway between the two modes. Therefore, levels of scepticism might be an appropriate 
measure in which to additionally assess children’s interpretation of an event whereby 
a violation of known physical laws has occurred. Secondly, evidence points towards 
examining apparatus not being crucial in children’s acknowledgement of trickery and 
dismissal of genuine magic. Although the majority of the children did not feel the bag 
(and thereby did not feel the teddy hidden inside the bottom of it), they were still 
more inclined to give a “trick” causal response for the transference into the box (i.e. 
21 out of 35 children). Furthermore, despite 13 out of 48 children feeling the bag (and 
thereby the teddy hidden inside the bottom of it), children were just as likely to give a 
“real magic” or “trick” causal response. Once again findings refute the importance 
made by Chandler and Lalonde (1994) of children examining apparatus and 
discovering how a trick is performed in order for them to acknowledge trickery has 
occurred.  
 Another aim of Study 6 was to explore the possibility that children’s previous 
experience and awareness of deception in a more naturalistic context may be 
associated with levels of verbal scepticism. So, children who are more adept at lying, 
or discriminating between truth and lies in others may be more likely to detect 
trickery in a conjuring demonstration as opposed to interpreting such demonstrations 
as genuine magic. However, the present study was unable to pursue this line of 
investigation due to the children’s general inability to discriminate between other 
children lying and telling the truth. Study 6 did find evidence of a significant 
difference between adults and children in their ability to discriminate between truth 
and lies, with adults capable of doing so whereas children were not able to do so. 
Similarly, Talwar, Crossman, Gulmi, Renaud, and Williams (2009) found that overall 
adults perform better than children in detecting when other children are lying. In 
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Study 6 of the current thesis, the majority of the children did not score above mean 
chance expectation in the discrimination task. In fact only 3 out of 47 children were 
able to do so above chance expectation. These findings are in keeping with research 
carried out by Vasek (1984) who examined children’s abilities to recognise a lie 
occurring in a particular social context and found that young children (5-6 years old) 
had difficulty detecting a lie.  
 There are various explanations that may account for children and adults not 
being equal in their ability to discriminate between lies and truth-telling. Firstly, there 
may have been insufficient cues to deception for children to detect. For instance, there 
may not have been enough information in the verbal statements made by children who 
lied for other children rating them to detect falsity and hence state that they were lies. 
This is highlighted by the fact that the majority of the children, after having given an 
initial prompted lie statement, then repeated exactly the same statement for a further 
description or gave very basic further descriptions such as, “It’s small”, or else did not 
give any further description to enable children to detect lies. In fact only eight out of 
22 children were able to give further descriptions of all lie pictures. In comparison, 17 
out of 22 children were able to give further descriptions of truths. Seven children were 
unable to give further descriptions at all. Therefore, this lack in verbal information 
resulted in children who were rating trying to rely on fairly unreliable non-verbal 
clues (such as facial expression) in order to make a decision as to whether a child was 
lying or telling the truth. However, children in Study 6 may not have acquired a high 
level of this skill and this might account for adults being more successful than 
children at discriminating between truth and lies. This lack of skill is in keeping with 
past research: most studies report that children under nine years of age fail to use 
nonverbal information effectively to determine the truth when encountering verbal-
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nonverbal inconsistencies (DePaulo & Jordan, 1982; Feldman, Jenkins, & Popoola, 
1979). Also, adults may have used the relative paucity of description on some trials as 
an indication in itself that the child was lying (not very persuasively). Furthermore, 
children are not as adept as adults at detecting inconsistencies between verbal and 
non-verbal behaviours displayed by a lie-teller (Ekman & Friesen, 1969).  
A second possible explanation that may have affected children’s ratings is that 
the ability to successfully discriminate between truth and lies in Study 6 required 
children to partake in a task that was repetitive and time-consuming. Attempts were 
made to try and reduce the length of the task by testing children over eight sessions. 
However, children were still required to watch and rate a total of 88 picture 
descriptions. Hence they may have become bored with the task or cognitively 
exhausted and simply guessed or repeated the same responses in order to finish the 
sessions quickly. It is important to stress that this quantity of pictures was chosen in 
order to attain robust scores rather than analysing only a few ratings. Thirdly, children 
may have interpreted a lie as a truth because it was purely a statement about an 
observation, such as, “It’s a picture of a man digging” and was not necessarily 
considered a statement that someone is not supposed to say. Piaget (1932, 1965) was 
one of the first to look at children’s conceptions of lying and found that children prior 
to the age of six equated lies with things that one is not supposed to say. 
 In terms of lie-telling ability, only ten out of 22 children were able to 
successfully lie for more than 50 percent of the time (i.e. give initial false statements 
followed by further lie descriptions). However, methodological limitations may 
account for this. Although the lying tasks were meant to provide a naturalistic context 
in which to assess children’s deceptive abilities, children’s ability to successfully lie 
may have been affected by them being instructed and prompted what to say initially in 
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terms of giving either a “true” or “false” statement. It was designed so that there 
would be sufficient videotaped footage of children verbally lying and not just sitting 
silently. Even so, these were not natural and spontaneous utterances made by the 
children. Hence, children may not have believed the false statements as they were not 
of their own doing. As a consequence they may not have the inclination to deceive 
when required to give further descriptions. Furthermore, as mentioned at the 
beginning of Study 6, a skilled liar will attempt to conceal their deception in their 
nonverbal expressive behaviour, as well as their verbal expressive behaviour, to avoid 
giving any cues to their deceit. However, children had to concentrate on the 
instructions being given to them through headphones and on the laptop screen and 
may not necessarily have been concentrating on deliberately trying to conceal their 
deception. It should be noted that although children were prompted with initial 
statements they were subsequently required to independently lie. This involved 
engaging in spontaneous acts of deception more prolonged than an initial false 
statement. Specifically, children were asked to give further true or false descriptions 
that went beyond the prompted statement that the child was given regarding pictures 
presented to them (i.e. without any assistance).  
As was mentioned earlier, methodologically, the lie stimuli used were 
videotapes of children who were instructed to tell the truth and to lie. These reports 
may not be similar to the natural, day-to-day situations in which people spontaneously 
lie. For example, research has found that examining motivated deceivers is more 
representative of the lies told in day-to-day settings (Frank & Ekman, 1997; Frank & 
Feeley, 2003). An alternative method of examining children’s lies might involve an 
adaptation of the temptation-resistance paradigm originally pioneered by Sears, Rau, 
and Alpert (1965). In this paradigm, children are told explicitly not to peek inside a 
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closed container or to touch a toy, they are left alone, and upon the experimenter’s 
return they are asked whether they have complied with the instructions. According to 
Talwar et al. (2009), the advantage of this paradigm is that it creates a situation in 
which children can make a decision of their own accord either to lie or to tell the 
truth, and so it elicits spontaneous lies from children attempting to conceal their 
transgression and who are self-motivated to lie. In such situations, children reveal 
subtle, non-verbal cues to their deceit (e.g., big smiles), which even children are able 
to detect (Crossman & Lewis, 2006). However, due to time constraints, it was not 
possible to use this paradigm in Study 6 of the thesis, as it would require testing 
children until an adequate sample of children was attained who could spontaneously 
lie or tell the truth.  
 The findings of Study 6 imply that it was possible to detect whether children 
were lying or telling the truth in the lie/truth-telling discrimination task used as 
evidenced by most adults correctly rating above chance expectation (and despite 
rating 176 statements in one sitting). However, as majority of children’s scores did 
not differ significantly from chance expectation, they were deemed not to have skill in 
this task. Furthermore, children were not more adept than adults at discriminating 
between lies and truths in their peers even though they may have more experience of 
interacting with them. Nevertheless, although it was not inappropriate to use the 
specified lying stimuli task in Study 6, as discussed previously, children were exposed 
to task overload: they were required to not just lie, but were also given auditory and 
verbal stimuli. Therefore, a simpler task may have been more productive in 
addressing individual differences.  
Based on the findings of Studies 5 and 6, there are a series of proposals for 
future research. Firstly, despite conflicting results in the final two studies of the thesis 
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regarding links between level of AToM ability and an understanding of witnessing 
trickery, it is important not to dismiss the possibility of an association outright. Until 
further studies are carried out using other AToM tests, we cannot assume that levels 
of sophistication in advanced theory of mind cannot assist children in their detection 
of trickery. Like the understanding of first-order ToM, there are different aspects of 
AToM understanding that may appear at different points of development (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). As children’s individual scores were extremely low for a 
specific AToM test, future studies should be conducted that will assess an alternative 
to the “Strange Stories” task or incorporate it with a series of other AToM tests: 
namely, the “Eyes task” (Baron-Cohen, Jolliff, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001) or the “Faux-Pas task” 
(Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999). The Eyes Task is a 
presentation of photos of the eye region of the face, and the task is to identify what the 
target is thinking or feeling. This may assess children’s ability to read social clues, 
and may also be considered more appropriate than the complex task on lying that was 
administered in Study 6. The Faux-Pas task is a presentation of a series of stories in 
which a character inadvertently says something awkward or embarrassing and 
measures the ability to identify the awkward statement.  
Indeed, the Strange Stories task is considered higher-order reasoning that 
requires abilities not only more advanced than those tapped by the standard first-order 
tasks, it is considered more difficult than second-order false beliefs (Miller, 2009). 
O’Hare et al. (2009) found that the total score of the strange stories did not reach 
ceiling level even at the age of twelve years. With this in mind, perhaps children 
would show greater ability in second-order tasks. Second-order reasoning requires 
children to distinguish between the cause of an outcome and the reason for believing 
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in the outcome (Astington, Pelletier, & Homer, 2002). Research has shown successful 
attribution of second-order beliefs in 6-year-olds (Perner & Howes, 1992) and even in 
some 5-year-olds (Leekam, 1990). Moreover, in one study Leekam (1990) found that 
4-year-olds succeed in attributing a second-order intention.  
Specifically, a future study should be conducted using a second-order false 
belief scenario as a measure of advanced theory of mind (e.g., Perner & Wimmer 
1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994). This task offers a simpler, more 
child-friendly assessment, due to it being shorter, having fewer characters and fewer 
scenes, and containing frequent reminders and probe questions. Furthermore, it 
includes deception and Sullivan et al. reported some success even among 4-year-olds 
and close to perfect performance at age five that is relevant to the age range that was 
tested in Study 5 of the thesis. 
Finally, as a significant relationship was found between first-order ToM and 
children’s interpretation of the conjuring demonstration, further research might test 
children’s ability to deceive by using first-order ToM tasks that require them to leave 
false trails and thereby incorporating an element of deliberate deception. For instance, 
Chandler, Fritz, and Hala (1989) have shown that even 2½- and 3-year-olds can be 
induced to deceive in the form the fabrication of false evidence. A person could not 
know that treasure is hidden in a particular vessel if they had not seen it in there and 
had no clues as to its whereabouts. If they had not seen it there, they would be 
depending on clues. If clues are destroyed, they will remain in a state of ignorance. If 
they are supplied with false clues, then they will formulate a belief as to the 
whereabouts of the treasure, but one that is false. Hence, being able to destroy 
evidence and fabricate false evidence tells us something about the child’s competence 
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in understanding how information is essential to the mind and how the mind can be 
host to misinformation and, therefore, duped. 
 
 
 Conclusion 
Study 6 explored how children’s understanding of trickery may be linked to social-
cognitive intelligence in the form of level of theory of mind understanding. The 
findings of this study do not appear to indicate an association between AToM ability 
and detection of trickery in a conjuring context, in contrast to the findings of Study 5. 
Furthermore, there was no supporting evidence of an association between AToM 
ability and level of verbal scepticism in response to a conjuring demonstration. 
Therefore, advanced understanding of knowledge and belief did not appear to 
facilitate detection of trickery in children in this study. However, and most 
importantly, a significant link was found between first-order ToM ability (i.e. 
another’s false belief) and children’s “trick” causal responses for the transference of 
an object from one location to another, irrespective of age. Study 6 did find a 
developmental trend for AToM ability and first-order ToM ability in relation to age. 
Hence, the findings of Study 6 suggest that it is not specifically AToM ability that is 
linked to children’s detection of trickery in a conjuring demonstration, as indicated by 
the results of Study 5. Instead, evidence points to first-order ToM ability being 
associated with acknowledgement of trickery. It is unclear why the results of Study 5 
and Study 6 are discrepant in this respect. Future replication attempts may help to 
answer the question of which set of results (if any) reflects the true state of affairs. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE THESIS 
 
 
The current thesis was concerned with extending previous research regarding how 
children conceive of actual or potential violations of natural laws of physics as they 
understand them. Specifically, it was concerned with exploring why and to what 
extent some children think in terms of magic and others think in terms of trickery. To 
this end, the thesis aimed to provide identification and examination of a variety of 
factors and their links to individual differences in children’s interpretation of an 
anomalous event. The primary questions that the thesis set out to answer are: What 
factors, apart from the acquisition of the knowledge that magical events are 
incompatible with physical events, enable children to understand they are being 
fooled (i.e. tricked)? What factors increase suspicion (i.e. levels of verbal scepticism) 
toward an event being based upon trickery?  
The thesis started in a very general place and then focused on children’s 
interpretation of a live conjuring trick that appeared to violate the physical law of 
object permanence. In actual fact, the demonstration involved deception in the form of 
a hidden compartment which allowed an object to “spontaneously” disappear and 
transfer without a visible trace in a way that was not obvious to the viewer. These 
experiments were aimed at providing an insight into why some children grasp what 
they are witnessing as trickery faster than others. 
   As magic covers a vast area, the first study concentrated on children’s beliefs 
and dealings in a common everyday phenomenon that researchers class as “thought 
over matter” magic: namely wishing. Findings established that most children ranging 
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from the ages of four to twelve years are familiar with wishing. Older children (11-12-
year-olds) tended to be more sceptical about its efficacy than younger children (4-
year-olds and 6-7-year-olds). Regrettably, at no point were children asked directly 
about the link between wishing and magic. Instead, the link with magic can only be 
inferred from the children’s responses to certain questions, such as whether one needs 
to use a special object such as a magic wand for a wish to come true. Although there 
was not strong evidence in support of the suggestion children believe that wishing is a 
magical process, a few younger children did spontaneously mention magical 
properties. 
As discussed in Study 1, wishing for something that comes true can be 
considered as magical thinking if it involves belief in the ability of a person’s own 
thought or desire alone producing direct effects on physical objects (i.e. mental-
physical causality). Children in general did not regard wishing to be more or less 
effective in directly having an effect on the physical world than other mental 
processes (i.e. imagination). In fact, findings indicated children’s reasoning to be 
rational and subscribing to natural laws of physics as evidenced by children being 
more likely to claim that wishing and imagination cannot directly cause objects to 
materialise. However, a sizeable minority of children believed that the items would 
appear and this may be an indication of those children having irrational beliefs about 
the mind and mental-physical causality. Study 1 provided evidence of significant age 
differences in claims of mental-physical causality: young children were more likely 
than the oldest age group to believe that imagination and wishing can directly cause 
physical objects to materialise. As such, this suggests that understanding the 
limitations of the mind appears to be age-related. 
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  A problem with Study 1 was that it did not specifically address children’s 
concept of “magic”. Initially, a key issue of the thesis was to identify children’s 
meaning when they use the term “magic” in their causal response for an event that 
apparently violates laws of physics. The purpose of this was to clarify whether 
children’s responses actually mean that such a violation is caused by “real magic” (i.e. 
genuine suspension of the laws of physics)  and the extent to which children truly 
believe that “magic” causation (seen as a supernatural force or mechanism) is 
possible. Alternatively, children may merely use “magic” as another label for “tricks”. 
Therefore, Studies 2 and 3 assessed whether there is an underlying difference between 
children labelling a conjuring trick “magic” or “trick”.  
Children’s responses to a single viewing of a videotaped coin trick (whereby a 
stack of coins seemingly disappear spontaneously) in Study 2 gave an idea of what 4-
6-year-old children mean by “magic” and “trick”. Evidence points to children using 
the two terms in a distinct and appropriate way: they tended to give “trick” causal 
responses when they claimed to know how the demonstration worked and were aware 
of being deceived and gave “magic” causal responses when they claimed not to know 
how the demonstration worked and were not aware of being deceived. Furthermore, 
findings suggest that children who gave “magic” causal responses regard magic as 
inexplicable and genuine rather than fake and explicable as in tricks. Only 5% who 
had given “magic” causal responses for the coin demonstration and claimed to know 
how the coins had disappeared also claimed that magic is “just tricks”. It should also 
be noted that no child who had given “magic” causal responses and claimed to know 
how the coins had disappeared then gave “trick” explanations. The majority of the 
children also associated “magic” with requiring special powers and were quite 
selective in qualifying entities as being able to do “magic” (i.e. only a magician and 
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family members). In this respect, the findings support Subbotsky (2009) who 
distinguished between the two terms by claiming that “real magic” violates known 
physical principles and “tricks” resemble magical events but can be accounted for 
with non-magical, e.g., physical, explanations.  
In contrast, Study 3 found that 9-11-year-olds regard “magic” as fake and, 
therefore, trickery. Whatever term they use, they understand that an object cannot 
spontaneously disappear. This was shown in their understanding that a stack of coins 
had not truly vanished implying that they were aware of them being hidden. The only 
difference between children’s responses is that with “trick” responses they know 
where something is hidden whereas with “magic” responses they do not know where. 
The majority of the children in Study 3 provided further evidence of disbelief toward 
genuine magic as referenced by claiming that “magic is just tricks” and a belief that 
anyone can learn magic. Therefore, this implies that older children consider “magic” 
to involve conjuring rather than supernatural processes and indicates older children’s 
clear understanding of the concept of “magic” as trickery.  
The central question of the thesis that was relevant and required further 
exploration is, “What factors are associated with children’s acknowledgement of an 
event as being a trick as opposed to it being magic?”  Studies 2 to 6 addressed this 
issue. 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, an individual difference factor that Phelps and 
Woolley (1994) argue is critical in children’s explanations of causal events is 
children’s level of knowledge of physical mechanisms. They claim that children with 
more physical knowledge should be less likely to invoke “magic” as an explanation. 
Past research has proposed that one way of achieving this is to allow children to 
examine apparatus or allow repeated viewing of an event (e.g., Chandler & Lalonde, 
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1994). Yet the studies carried out throughout the thesis (and in particular Studies 2 
and 3) did not find evidence in support of this proposal. Exploring apparatus or 
allowing repeated viewing of a demonstration did not appear to be an important 
contribution to children’s understanding and acknowledgement of having witnessed 
trickery or shifting to non-magical explanations. As such, contrary to Chandler and 
Lalonde, an evolving pattern does not emerge whereby children realize that what they 
are witnessing is trickery. Furthermore, findings in the current thesis did not support 
Chandler and Lalonde’s view that by being given repeated demonstrations of the same 
event, children search when given the opportunity for an explanation compatible with 
standard causal principles.  
However, apparent variability in the findings of past research regarding 
children’s causal judgments may be due to task issues rather than children’s actual 
beliefs. Therefore, one aim of the current research was to provide additional insight 
into factors that compromise or enhance the amount and accuracy of the information 
interviewers gain from young children. As such, the thesis investigated the effect of 
two types of social influence on children’s interpretation of a conjuring event:  
Studies 2 and 3 focused on a direct social influence in the form of repeated 
questioning by an adult, and Study 4 focused on an indirect social influence in the 
form of a visual clue hinting at trickery.  
Study 2 found evidence that 4-6-year-olds are susceptible to social influence 
as they switched causal responses regarding a demonstration of vanishing coins when 
prompted to do so by repeated questioning in conjunction with repeated viewing 
across three trials. One cannot say definitively that children change responses as a 
consequence of succumbing to a demand characteristic rather than a genuine change 
in children’s understanding of the situation. However, it certainly muddied the waters 
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in terms of understanding children’s underlying concepts of “magic” versus “trick”. In 
contrast to a single viewing, children overall were just as likely to give a “magic” or 
“trick” response to a conjuring trick, regardless of claiming to know or not know how 
an object had disappeared. Furthermore, regardless of whether children had given 
“magic” or “trick” responses, most children were unable to explain how an object had 
disappeared. Instead of repeated viewing assisting children in realizing that what they 
are witnessing is trickery, the current thesis has found that it appears to cause 
confusion in children.  
In contrast to 4-6-year-olds, the majority of the 9-11-year-olds in Study 3 did 
not conform to experimenter pressure as they did not show a tendency to drop their 
scepticism toward “magic”. Unlike younger children, the majority of the older 
children’s beliefs are not undermined or swayed by the suggestion of the event being 
“magic” as a result of repetitive questioning. According to Subbotsky (2004), those 
children who do not abandon magical explanations, that is do not waiver, are 
“entrenched believers” whose magical beliefs are stable, and those children who do 
not abandon natural physical explanations are “entrenched non-believers” whose 
sceptical beliefs are stable. Although Subbotsky found that 4- and 5-year-old children 
have an entrenched belief in magic, Study 2 of this thesis found that 4-6-year-olds 
belief towards “magic” was not entrenched as referenced by swaying in causal 
responses between “magic” and “trick”. However, as with Subbotsky, it is only in 9-
year-olds that the scepticism toward “magic” appears to be sufficiently entrenched to 
withstand a personal encounter with anomalous causal events and not switch away 
from “trick” responses.  
Subbotsky (2004) reported that the belief in the universal power of physical 
causality or magic can vary in its degree of entrenchment. Studies 4 to 6 of the thesis 
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took this into account by assessing children’s level of verbal scepticism towards an 
event as being genuine “magic”, rather than simply categorising children as sceptical 
(i.e. disbelievers in “magic” causation) or credulous (believers in “magic” causation). 
By including a sensitive measure of children’s responses to a conjuring 
demonstration, the extent to which they subscribe to “magic” causality was tested as 
children’s interpretation may be subtle. In doing so, Study 4 (as with Study 2) points 
towards social influence being somewhat linked to 4-6-year-old children’s 
interpretation of a live conjuring trick. When exposed to a visual clue of deception, 
they were significantly more likely to verbally suspect trickery as evidenced by higher 
levels of verbal scepticism scores. However, it did not affect the likelihood of 
specifically giving a “trick” causal response. As such, these findings somewhat 
support Subbotsky (2004) who reported that 5-year-olds do not depart from “magic” 
explanations when they witness anomalous events even when they are given a hint of 
trickery. 
Study 4 investigated another task issue that might be related to apparent 
differences in children’s causal responses and which researchers report should be 
considered in evaluating conclusions about children’s belief in magic causality: 
whether verbal judgments or behaviour is observed. Verbal judgments may have been 
muddying the waters if children really don’t understand the difference between 
“magic” and “trick”, as tasks designed to test children’s understanding almost 
invariably require a degree of language comprehension. Therefore, both nonverbal 
and verbal responses were measured. The study did not find a conflict between these 
two measures (i.e. verbal responses and behavioural reactions) in 4-6-year-old 
children’s responses towards a conjuring trick as reflected in a positive correlation 
between the two. These findings reinforce the view that children’s verbal statements 
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to a single viewing of a conjuring demonstration are a true representation of their 
beliefs. 
According to Subbotsky (2004), social influence tests the firmness and 
permanence of children’s beliefs in the impossibility of certain events. Therefore, 
children’s changing of responses as a consequence of social influence displays a lack 
of firmness of children’s beliefs and disbeliefs in magic and natural-physical 
causality. Yet the current thesis proposed that children’s inconsistent causal responses 
might be linked to children’s level of confidence in a social situation. Study 4 
assessed children’s level of social confidence with a stranger (i.e. the experimenter). 
While no evidence was found in support of a link between 4-6-year-old children’s 
level of social confidence and level of verbal scepticism, findings did point towards 
an association with level of behavioural reactions. Specifically, the more confident 
children were socially, the more likely they were to engage in active monitoring 
behaviour (i.e. tactile exploration of apparatus, or look back and forth at apparatus 
during aspects of the conjuring demonstration). These findings suggest that children’s 
failure to search the apparatus is not necessarily linked to an underlying belief in 
“magic”. A child may be suspicious of deception in the form of trickery but not search 
for an object in a compartment where it has disappeared from if lacking in social 
confidence. Therefore, they do not necessarily spontaneously examine material if 
sceptical.  
To summarise, Studies 1 to 4 of the current thesis have met the original aim of 
not only presenting evidence relating to young children’s concepts of “magic” and 
“trick” but also of extending the empirical examination of task issues that may have 
affected some of the key previous findings in research. However, the aim of the 
current thesis was to provide an assessment of possible internal factors that may 
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contribute to individual differences in children’s causal thinking. As such, Studies 5 
and 6 investigated individual differences in aspects of social and cognitive 
development that may be related to young children’s causal responses and level of 
verbal scepticism towards a conjuring demonstration being genuine magic.  
Neither study found evidence for a link between children’s level of verbal 
scepticism towards a conjuring demonstration in relation to levels of competence in 
certain social (i.e. Machiavellian) or cognitive (i.e. verbal and spatial monitoring) 
intelligence factors. Despite this, the most important findings of the thesis were 
gained from evidence pointing towards the possibility of there being individual 
differences between children’s interpretation related to specific socio-cognitive 
ability. Study 5 found that 4-6-year-old children’s ability to understand and identify a 
conjuring demonstration as trickery was related to level of Advanced Theory of Mind 
(AToM) skills. However, age was found to be a contributing factor and as so it was 
difficult to ascertain if this is the crucial link in children’s detection of trickery or a 
developmental process that changes across time.  
 With this in mind, Study 6 tested a slightly older age group (5-7½-year-olds). 
In doing so, even though no association was found between AToM ability and 
detection of trickery, or level of verbal scepticism, a degree of significance was found 
in a relationship between first-order ToM ability and trickery ratings for the 
transference of an object from one location to another, over and above age effects. 
More specifically, understanding false beliefs (i.e. namely that beliefs involve 
representations of reality and so can be mistaken) appears to be important in order to 
understand what they are witnessing as trickery (i.e. detect deception) and thereby 
dismiss magic causality. Hence, the findings of Study 6 suggest that it is not 
specifically AToM ability that is linked to children’s detection of trickery in a 
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conjuring demonstration as indicated by the results of Study 5. At first glance, the 
findings of Study 6 suggest that children’s AToM ability was not advanced enough 
and that is why no significant relationships were found with regard to these scores. In 
contrast, standard ToM tapped into children’s actual ability level and then revealed a 
significant relationship, over and above age. However, the mean AToM score was 
higher in Study 6 than in Study 5, so the lack of association between AToM scores 
and responses to the conjuring demonstration cannot be due to low scores on the 
AToM measure. Studies 5 and 6 suggest a link between children’s interpretation of a 
conjuring event and level of theory of mind ability. However, as the two studies 
produced discrepant results, it is unclear why and which set of results (if either) 
reflects the true state of affairs.  
The current thesis sought to provide clarification of whether children’s causal 
interpretation of a conjuring event lends support to Piaget’s (1929, 1930) progressive 
stage-based model of causal development or Subbotsky’s (1984) coexistence model. 
As Chapter 1 discussed, Piaget theorized that children’s logical reasoning (rational 
beliefs in physical causality) gradually replaces pre-logical reasoning (magical 
thinking) regardless of the context and domain in question. Young children up to 
seven years of age are severely limited in their understanding of causal relations in the 
world and so are especially susceptible to magical thought. In contrast, Subbotsky 
hypothesised that children possess two belief systems that allow for a coexistence of 
magical reasoning and natural physical causal reasoning that persist throughout the 
lifespan and depend on the situation encountered.  
There is evidence throughout the thesis of age-related differences regarding 
children’s magical versus sceptical thinking. As such, it adds to previous research 
(presented in Chapter 1) supporting Piaget’s view that children develop into rational, 
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sceptical thinkers. In general, it has established that 4-6-year-old children are more 
likely to think magically than children nine years of age and older. Indeed, the 
majority of the 9-11-year-old children in Study 3 adopted a “trick” stance toward a 
conjuring event and so were more sceptical of the demonstration being “magic” than 
4-6-year-old children in Study 2. Furthermore, they were more likely to retain an 
initial “trick” response as opposed to a “magic” response following repeated questions 
across trials. This implies that older children have an increased awareness of being 
deceived and an understanding of what they are witnessing as trickery. Study 5 also 
found a developmental pattern in 4-6-year-olds, with older children more likely to 
take a sceptical stance compared to younger children who were more likely to take a 
magical stance.  
Although findings in the current thesis imply that older children may be more 
adept at detecting trickery and that younger children are more susceptible to “magic” 
explanations, age changes were not clear-cut. No developmental trend was found in 
Study 2 or Study 4 between 4-6-year-olds subscribing “trick” causality or suspension 
of beliefs in the permanence of perceived objects, nor was there in Study 6 between 5-
7½-year-olds. In addition, the existence of a small group of believers in “magic” 
among the more sceptical in Study 3 for example, as referenced by “magic” responses 
in the coin trick and references to “magic” concepts in general, suggests that there is 
not a simple developmental influence that characterizes children’s responses to 
information about magical events during childhood. Indeed, although children were 
more inclined to claim that “magic is just tricks” that anyone can learn, they also 
showed an understanding that magic is real in the sense that they claimed it really 
happens (whereas tricks are not real and involve hiding something or fooling 
someone). Although this may be interpreted as children believing in the authenticity 
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of magic, it does not necessarily signify their belief in its existence in reality. A 
similar theme ran throughout the current thesis: children appeared to make a similar 
distinction between “real magic” and “trick” in their causal responses, but it is unclear 
if they were just saying what the demonstrations were. Therefore, doubt is cast on 
whether children are believers in genuine magic being possible in the real world. 
Subbotsky (1994) accounts for such a discrepancy in children’s causal 
thinking by claiming that children’s causal belief systems are dependent on the 
situation that is encountered as to whether they consider an event in rational or 
magical terms. Naturalistic (physical) causal thinking dominates everyday reality and 
unusual circumstances (transformations) encourage children’s latent magical beliefs 
to surface. Furthermore, these inconsistent belief systems are reflected in 4-6-year-old 
children’s verbalisations and behaviour, with rational (physical) causal thinking 
governing at the level of verbal judgments while magical causality rules at the level of 
practical actions. However, as discussed previously, Study 4 of the current thesis did 
not find a discrepancy between children’s verbal and behavioural responses. Yet, the 
thesis has found that the context in which an anomalous event is witnessed has a 
bearing on children’s verbal judgments.  
The research described in this thesis has found that despite children 
understanding how the physical world operates, they still sometimes appear to 
subscribe to magical thinking. Therefore, this does not support Piaget’s (1929, 1930) 
theory that young children’s magical thinking may be a consequence of having 
limited understanding of physical laws of causality. According to Subbotsky (2004), 
young children revert to “magic” responses as they may not have an “entrenched” 
belief in the universal power of physical causality and still hold magical beliefs. 
Conversely, older children do have an entrenched belief in the universal power of 
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physical causality and, even if they hold magical beliefs, physical causality 
dominates. Furthermore, Subbotsky (2005) suggested that children develop an 
ontological theory of mind (ToM) along with a cognitive ToM. That is, along with 
being able to hold cognitive false beliefs, children and adults can also hold ontological 
false beliefs. In the same way that cognitive false beliefs misguide people in their 
search for hidden objects, ontological false beliefs can lead people to conclusions and 
behavioural reactions that are incompatible with known physical principles. 
Woolley (1999) also appears to support Subbotsky’s claim of children having 
two belief systems by proposing a magic domain that is separate from a ToM domain 
to account for this inconsistency in children’s causal thinking. She arrived at this 
proposal for a separate ToM domain and magic domain based on the assumption that 
children from three years of age have a ToM and therefore can distinguish the mental 
from the physical. She suggested that children may sustain beliefs in wishing as an 
effective form of mental-physical causality by viewing it as a magical process and 
therefore lies in a magic domain whereas imagination lies in a theory of mind domain.  
Yet Woolley appears to have overlooked empirical evidence showing that 
there are different aspects of ToM understanding that may appear at different points of 
development. For instance, as mentioned in Study 5, research has established that 
although nearly all children achieve success on standard false-belief tasks at 
approximately the same age (between four and five years of age), there are individual 
differences in that achievement, with some researchers (e.g., Chandler & Sokol, 1999; 
Repacholi & Slaughter, 2003) arguing that children’s understanding of others’ minds 
is a skill that develops for several years after children are successful on a typical false-
belief task. In contrast to Woolley, Chandler and Lalonde (1994) suggest that young 
people can make effective use of the concept of “magic”, but only “parlour magic”, as 
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a way of “mentally quarantining” evidence that appears to contradict their emerging 
theories of mind and matter. Later, after a developmental time when children’s ToM 
has broadened, children do think much about magic that is truly supernatural.   
The current thesis proposes that, based on the findings of Studies 5 and 6, 
there is good reason to suggest that children’s ability to understand that they are being 
tricked in a conjuring event is linked to level of theory of mind skill that a child is 
proficient in and is, therefore, subject to their ToM. Therefore, magic beliefs are not 
in a separate domain from a ToM domain. Level of ToM ability may also account for 
individual differences in children’s belief in the efficacy of wishing and imagination 
causing a direct effect on the physical world in Study 1. Those children who are 
sceptical towards the efficacy of magic, including wishing, may have a more 
sophisticated and developed ToM.  Indeed, the fact that some children (even older 
children) acknowledged that both wishing and imagination can bring about direct 
change, implies that irrespective of age, these children may not have a fully developed 
ToM.   
Furthermore, children’s non-commitment to causal beliefs (as referenced by 
the changing of responses in Study 2) may also be linked to ToM ability. Perhaps 
younger children are susceptible to changing responses as a result of social influence 
due to not having a developed ToM. 
 
Future Studies 
The current thesis has explored a variety of internal individual difference factors and 
their possible links with children’s interpretation of a conjuring event. There does 
appear to be something there in terms of social confidence and Machiavellianism that 
warrants further exploration. As such, concrete future studies are required regarding 
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these factors. Furthermore, the inclusion of an adult comparison should be used in 
some way. Specifically, the questions used to test children’s level of 
Machiavellianism in Study 5 were too complex for children to comprehend (e.g., “It is 
smartest to believe that all people will be mean if they have a chance: True or false?”). 
However, to date there has only been one measure that has been designed for children 
under nine years of age, and that has not been validated (i.e. the 12-item 
Machiavellian Scale: Slaughter & Pritchard, 2000). Furthermore, it only measures 
children’s overt behaviour within the peer group via adults’ subjective views. It does 
not measure the child’s attitude. Therefore, a different way to test Machiavellian 
levels should be found. 
Social confidence and individual differences warrant further research in order 
to better understand how children at different ages interact with strangers. Future 
studies need to look at different ways of measuring social confidence. Indeed, as 
discussed in Study 4, many factors may be involved, including shyness, sociability, 
social anxiety, and social competence. If, as research has suggested, these are distinct 
personality traits related to social behaviour, they may need to be examined 
individually (Cheek & Buss, 1981). A key ingredient would be to examine adults and 
see what they do in terms of social confidence and then apply this to children. In 
addition social confidence measures need to be further explored in a setting whereby 
children are being tested on their responses to a magic occurrence, as opposed to 
Study 4 in which children were given a pre-test “hiding game” that was separate from 
the conjuring demonstration.  
The current thesis was mainly focused on children’s cognition and why some 
children are more sceptical than others. Although there were not very strong 
conclusions, Studies 5 and 6 suggest that ToM ability may be a relevant factor. This 
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opens up the scope for further research in terms of different aspects of children’s ToM 
reasoning and beliefs about magic. As discussed in Study 6, there is a need to include 
other ToM tasks. For instance, a future study might use a reverse false-belief contents 
condition and a false-belief contents condition (He, Bolz, & Baillargeon, 2011). The 
false-belief condition presents children with an unexpected-contents situation, 
whereas the reverse false-belief condition presents them with a change of location 
situation. This involves switching back an item in a container after an agent has been 
shown their belief is false (e.g., crayons in a cereal box but the agent thought they 
were in the crayon box. Then change back to the crayon box again). The agent is 
present when the contents of a package are found switched but absent when the 
experimenter restores the box’s original contents. Therefore, the child is required to 
understand that the agent falsely believes that the cereal box holds crayons.  
Furthermore, it is suggested that future studies should incorporate a second-
order ToM task. Studies have found that including an ignorance question followed by 
a false belief question improves second-order reasoning (Coull et al., 2006; Sullivan 
et al., 1994). For instance, in a story J thinks that M thinks X. But the child being 
tested knows that M thinks Y. Miller (2006) points out these are two incompatible 
representations of the same reality. Ignorance requires only attending to lack of 
critical information (e.g., does J know that M knows where?) followed by a false 
belief question (where does J think that M thinks X?). A legitimate question that 
might be asked is, “Does a person who correctly answers a second-order false belief 
task that includes an ignorance question believe in magic?” Children who give a 
“magic” causal response for an event may be more likely to do so if they are unable to 
pass judgements of ignorance and judgements of false-belief. Conversely children 
may give a “magic” causal response even if they correctly make ignorance 
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judgements. In conjunction with further probing of children’s meaning of magic, their 
causal response might not represent a belief in magic.  
The thesis has highlighted a need for reformulating and adapting established 
AToM tests as a means for assessing children’s level of ability at all ages. To date, six 
AToM tests have been designed: “Strange Stories” (Happé, 1994), “Eyes task” 
(Baron-Cohen, Jolliff, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997), “Faux-Pas” (Baron-Cohen, 
O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999), “Preadolescent Theory of Mind” (Bosaki 
& Astington, 1999), “Awkward Moments” (Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 
2000), “Stories from Everyday Life” (Kaland, Moller-Nielsen, Callsen, Mortensen, 
Gottlieb, & Smith, 2002). However, all of these tasks bar one (i.e. Preadolescent 
theory of mind) were designed to test autistic children, with normal children only used 
as a control. Furthermore, they require children to reason about and articulate 
interpersonal interactions (i.e. why) and not just about a person’s actions. To date, 
(apart from the current thesis) only two studies have tested children under seven years 
of age (Adrian, Clemente, Villaneuva, 2007; Brent, Rios, Happé, & Charman, 2004). 
Yet, both used a reduced version of the strange stories test whereby only two types of 
false statements were made (i.e. irony and white lie). Therefore, this is not a powerful 
measure with which to test children’s level of AToM skill. There is a need to simplify 
the AToM tasks so that they do not require verbal justifications.  
Regarding magic itself, future research should explore how we can get at what 
children mean by “magic” and “tricks”. Past research (including the current thesis) 
has highlighted the difficulties involved in defining “magic” and that the term covers 
a variety of phenomena. For the purpose of the current thesis the main focus was on 
children’s interpretation of violations of object permanence in a conjuring context. As 
such, the research looked at a constrained example of magical beliefs in the form of a 
304 
 
conjuring trick. A broad range of things may be categorized as “magic”. This could be 
done in some way by having conditions that incorporate different types of magic. For 
example, a study could use different mind-reading events and get participants to 
categorize them as “magic or not” and “magic or trick”.  
Future studies should also look further at children’s behavioural reactions, and 
include cost and reward consequences. As discussed previously in this thesis, past 
research has found children show behaviours compatible with magical thinking if they 
are put in a context where disregarding the possibility of magic involves a potentially 
high cost, such as refusing to place a personal item in a box for fear of damaging it 
(Subbotsky, 2001). In the current thesis, the behavioural measure only focused on 
children searching the apparatus and the direction in which children were looking at a 
particular point in time. It would be worthwhile to address specific facial reactions 
such as “gawping”. However, it should be noted that this would not necessarily 
address children’s belief in the existence of magic, but simply a reaction of surprise. 
As Woolley (2006) states, “Behavioural measures can reflect emotional responses or 
other goals rather than cognitions” (p. 1551). Therefore, further exploration of 
children’s use of the word “magic” is needed. This might involve using or adapting 
the Magical Thinking Questionnaire (MTQ) (Bolton, Dearsley, Madronal-Luque, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2002). The MTQ is applicable through the age range from childhood to 
adolescence. It comprises 30 questions asking whether something is possible. A 
“thought” subscale questions whether it is possible to make some events happen just 
by thinking about them (e.g., “Is it possible to move an object across a room just by 
thinking about it?”). An “action” subscale questions whether it is possible by some 
actions to make events happen, the specified actions being causally unrelated to the 
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specified events (e.g., “Is it possible to make something bad happen by standing on 
cracks in the pavement?”).  
Finally, future research may also consider children trying to do the conjuring 
trick (that was performed in the thesis) themselves in order to ascertain whether 
children are capable of carrying out the trick and tricking others.  
This thesis essentially looked at children’s gullibility but was framed in a 
different way by focusing on magical thinking. This topic is more relevant than ever 
before with many adults showing gullibility, as referenced by an increase in television 
programmes featuring psychics and mediums. The question remains, what makes us 
gullible? Conversely what makes us break the rules? What makes children not 
gullibly conform versus gullibly conforming? It is not necessarily about children’s 
ability but about expectation. Indeed, the current thesis has shown that children 
conform to social expectation in specific situations. Study 2 found that 4-6-year-olds 
made a distinction between real magic and tricks, but that direct social influence in the 
form of repetitive questioning influenced children’s offered verbal causal 
explanations. It would make sense to explore this concept further by testing children 
working in pairs to assess whether children are influenced by their peers.  
Imitation studies explore children’s problem-solving skills and have found that 
children interpret what they witness visually as “what are you expecting me to do?” 
and hence copy actions. Even adults gullibly conform in over-imitation studies 
whereby irrelevant actions are demonstrated to open apparatus (e.g., Flynn & Smith, 
2012). Nielsen and Tomaselli (2010) had an adult show children between two and 13 
years old how to retrieve a toy from a closed box (e.g., by pushing open a trap door). 
Although the box could be easily opened by hand, the adult complicated the 
demonstration by using a miscellaneous object to open the door after first wiping it 
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across the top of the box in a way that was clearly unrelated to the outcome. 
Remarkably, the children replicated the model’s object use and incorporated the 
irrelevant actions into their response. A pertinent question might be, “Is there a link 
between children and adults who copy purposeless actions and belief in sympathetic 
magic?” Specifically, do children who gullibly conform by over-imitating, believe 
that there can also be a transfer of properties from one object to another by brief 
contact? For example, Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff (1986) found that drinks that had 
briefly contacted a sterilized, dead cockroach became undesirable to drink. 
To summarise, the current thesis has highlighted the need for adapting and/or 
re-designing a variety of social and cognitive measures in order to assess individual 
differences in children of all ages: namely AToM ability, social confidence, and 
Machiavellianism.  
Furthermore, children’s meaning of “magic” and “trick” needs to be further 
explored by assessing the types of things that they categorize as magic. This would 
involve children witnessing different types of magical occurrences. The inclusion of 
verbal and behavioural reactions, and an adult comparison should also be used in 
some way. Finally, further exploration of children’s social expectations involving 
different categories of magic occurences is required. 
 
 Final Conclusions 
In Western society, where the framework is secular, magic is still part of our culture. 
A pertinent question is whether magical thinking and beliefs start at a young age. The 
current thesis illustrates that young children do engage in magical thinking. A broad 
remit of the thesis was to assess why some children are quicker at interpreting 
ostensibly anomalous events as tricks than others. In doing this, the research reported 
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has found evidence which supports and extends previous findings concerning young 
children’s interpretation of anomalous events. It has identified a variety of factors that 
may contribute to individual differences in how an anomalous event will be 
interpreted by children. One hypothesis is that children do not understand physical 
laws which results in magical thinking. However, the thesis has found that children do 
understand the physical world. Yet understanding of the physical world was not a 
requirement for arriving at a “trick” conclusion in response to the presentation of a 
conjuring demonstration. The research supported the proposal that there are numerous 
task issues that must be considered in drawing conclusions about children’s causal 
responses to violations of apparent physical laws. Factors, such as context appears to 
over-ride physical understanding of how the world works. The thesis questioned 
whether children’s causal thinking is a developmental process. It has found evidence 
that age is important but may not be the only factor involved. Indeed, age was an 
important factor in younger children but not in older children. By incorporating an 
older age range in the thesis, evidence pointed to children being gullible to start with 
and then getting to an age where most are sceptical and not taken in. Yet some older 
children were found to still believe in “magic”. In addition, the thesis has shown 
children of all ages to be variable and inconsistent in their causal beliefs. The research 
reported suggests that disbelief in magic is linked to social factors such as social 
cognition. Most importantly, theory of mind (ToM) appears to be possibly more 
predictive of how children will interpret a situation rather than simple physical 
understanding of how the world operates. Therefore, social understanding may be 
more important than physical understanding. Indeed, this may account for why both 
adults and children have been found to subscribe to magical thinking and beliefs. 
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Specifically, this thesis has presented evidence to suggest that ToM may play a role in 
children’s understanding of trickery and level of scepticism towards genuine magic.  
At present there is only limited evidence in support of such an account and 
future studies are needed in order to fully examine whether level of ToM skills 
provides a valid account of individual differences in children’s interpretation of 
anomalous events. The current thesis is the first to put forward the suggestion of a link 
between ToM ability and responses towards a conjuring demonstration and is the first 
empirical assessment of the proposed association between the two areas for preschool 
aged children. In conclusion, level of ToM ability is a new approach to the study of 
children’s causal reasoning regarding interpretation of an anomalous event and it 
offers the promise of a social-cognitive view of development within children’s 
magical thinking. The differences found between responses in a conjuring 
demonstration may be due to real underlying differences in understanding of mental 
states (i.e., theory of mind). Therefore, it is important to study their possible 
associations further. 
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APPENDIX A – “Strange stories” task materials 
 
Story Type: Appearance-Reality 
It’s Halloween and Chris is 
going to a fancy-dress party dressed 
as a ghost. He wears a big white 
sheet with eyes cut out to see 
through. As he walks to the party in 
his ghost costume he bumps into Mr 
Brown. It’s dark and Mr Brown says 
“Oh! Who is it?” Chris answers 
“I’m a ghost Mr Brown”. 
 
Question: Is it true what Chris says? 
Question: Why does Chris say this? 
Mental state justification: He’s pretending. 
Physical state justification: Because he looks like one. 
 
 
 
Story Type: Lie 
One day, while she is playing 
in the house, Anna accidentally knocks 
over and breaks her mother’s favourite 
crystal vase. Oh dear, when mother 
finds out she will be very cross! So 
when Anna’s mother comes home and 
sees the broken vase and asks Anna 
what happened, Anna says, “The dog 
knocked it over, it wasn’t my fault!” 
 
Question: Was it true what Anna told her mother? 
Question: Why did she say this? 
Mental state justification: She’s lying. 
Physical state justification: So she won’t get told off. 
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Story Type: Figure of Speech 
Emma has a cough. All 
through lunch she coughs and coughs 
and coughs. Father says, “Poor 
Emma, you must have a frog in your 
throat!” 
 
 
 
Question: Is it true what Father says to Emma? 
Question: Why does he say that? 
Mental state justification: It’s just an expression people use. 
Physical state justification: Because she’s coughing. It sounds like it. 
 
 
 
Story Type: White Lie 
Helen waited all year for Christmas, 
because she knew at Christmas she could 
ask her parents for a rabbit. Helen wanted a 
rabbit more than anything. At last 
Christmas Day arrived, and Helen ran to 
unwrap the present her parents had given 
her. She felt sure it would contain a rabbit. 
But when she opened it, with all the family watching, she found her present was just a boring 
old set of books which Helen didn’t want at all! Still, when Helen’s parents asked her how she 
liked her Christmas present, she said, “It’s lovely, thank you. It’s just what I wanted.” 
 
Question: Is it true what Helen said? 
Question: Why did she say that to her parents? 
Mental state justification: reference to white lie or wanting to spare her parents feelings (e.g., 
she doesn’t want to upset them). 
Physical state justification: more general reference to trait (e.g., she’s well brought up) or 
emotion (e.g., she got a present and thinks it’s better than no present at all). 
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 Story Type: Pretend 
Katie and Jack are playing in 
the house. Jack picks up a banana 
from the fruit bowl and holds it up to 
his ear. He says to Katie, “Look! This 
banana is a telephone!” 
 
 
 
Question: Is it true what Jack says? 
Question: Why does Jack say this? 
Mental state justification: He’s just pretending. 
Physical state justification: Because it looks like a telephone. 
 
 
 
 
Story Type: Misunderstanding 
A burglar has just robbed a shop and 
is making a getaway. As he’s running home 
a policeman sees him drop his glove. He 
doesn’t know the man is a burglar. He just 
wants to tell him he’s dropped his glove. But 
when the policeman shouts out to the burglar 
“Hey, you, stop!” the burglar turns round, 
sees the policeman, puts his hands up and 
admits he did the break-in at the local shop. 
 
Question: Was the policeman surprised by what the burglar did? 
Question: Why did the burglar do this, when the policeman just wanted to give him back his 
glove? 
Mental state justification: reference to burglar’s ignorance of policeman’ true 
intention/knowledge state (e.g., he didn’t know the policeman just wanted to return his glove. 
He thought the policeman was going to arrest him). 
Physical state justification: more general reference to burglar’s state of mind (e.g., he had a 
guilty conscience) or outcome (e.g., he thought the police might shoot otherwise or because 
the policeman was chasing him). 
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Story Type: Joke 
James is going to Claire’s 
house to see her dog for the first 
time. When James arrives at 
Claire’s house, her dog jumps up to 
greet James. Claire’s dog is huge, 
it’s almost as big as James! When 
James sees Claire’s huge dog he 
says, “Claire, you haven’t got a dog 
at all. You’ve got an elephant!” 
 
Question: Is it true what James says? 
Question: Why does James say this? 
Mental state justification: He’s joking. 
Physical state justification: Because the dog is big. 
 
 
 
 
Story Type: Irony 
Ann’s mother has spent a 
long time cooking Ann’s favourite 
meal; fish and chips. But when she 
brings it in to Ann, she is watching 
TV, and she doesn’t even look up. 
Or say thank you. Ann’s mother is 
cross and says, “Well that’s very 
nice isn’t it! That’s what I call 
politeness!”                                              
 
Question: Is it true what Ann’s mother says? 
Question: Why does Ann’s mother say this? 
Mental state justification: She’s cross. 
Physical state justification: Because Ann doesn’t say thank you. 
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Story Type: Forget 
John was not at school today 
because he was ill. All the rest of 
Ben’s class was at school though. 
When Ben got home after school his 
mum asked him “Was everyone in 
your class at school today?” Ben 
answers, “Yes mummy”. 
 
 
Question: Is it true what Ben said? 
Question: Why did Ben say that? 
Mental state justification: He forgot. 
Physical state justification: He didn’t want to get told off. 
 
 
 
Story Type: Double-bluff 
During the war, the green army captures a 
member of the brown army. They want him to tell 
them where his army’s tanks are: they know they 
are either by the sea or in the mountains. They 
know the prisoner will lie to save his army. The 
prisoner is clever and will not let them find his 
tanks. The tanks are really in the mountains. Now 
when the other side ask him where his tanks are he 
says “They are in the mountains”. 
 
Question: Is it true what the prisoner said? 
Question: Where will the other army look for his tanks? 
Question: Why did the prisoner say the tanks were in the mountains? 
Mental state justification: reference to fact that other army will not believe and hence look in 
other place, to prisoner’s realisation that that’s what they’ll do, or reference to double bluff 
(e.g., to trick them). 
Physical state justification: reference to outcome (e.g., to save his army’s tanks or so they will 
look in the wrong place) or simple lying (to mislead them, to lie). 
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       Story Type: Contrary emotion 
Jane and Sarah are best friends. 
They both entered the same painting 
competition. Jane wanted to win very 
much but it was her best friend Sarah 
who won, not her. Jane was very sad she 
hadn’t won but she was happy for her 
friend. Jane said to Sarah “I’m so happy 
you won!” Jane said to her mum “I’m 
sad I didn’t win the competition!” 
 
Question: Is it true what Jane said to Sarah? 
Question: Is it true what Jane said to her mum? 
Question: Why does Jane say she is happy and sad? 
Mental state justification: She feels happy her friend won but sad she lost. 
Physical state justification: Because she won the competition. 
 
 
 
Story Type: Persuasion 
Jill wanted to buy a kitten, so she 
went to see Mrs Smith, who had lots of 
kittens. Now Mrs Smith loved the kittens and 
she wouldn’t do anything to harm them, but 
she couldn’t keep them all herself. When Jane 
visited she wasn’t sure she wanted one of Mrs 
Smith’s kittens. Mrs Smith said, “If no one 
buys the kittens I’ll just have to drown them!” 
 
Question: Was it true what Mrs Smith said? 
Question: Why did Mrs Smith say this to Jane? 
Mental state justification: reference to persuasion, manipulating feelings, trying to induce 
pity/guilt. 
Physical state justification: reference to outcome (e.g., to sell them). 
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APPENDIX B – Spatial monitoring task materials 
 
 
NB: “X” represents a specific object hidden in a box that needs to be located. The other box is 
empty. The arrows show the movement of specific box(es).  
1a shows the left box containing object “X” swapped over with the empty box on the right. 
1b shows the right box containing object “X” swapped over with the empty box on the left. 
1c shows the movement of the empty box only over to the left side. 
1d shows the movement of the empty box only to over to the right side. 
1e and 1f show no movement of boxes. 
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NB: “X” represents a specific object hidden in a box that needs to be located first.  “y” and 
“z” represent non-designated objects each hidden in a different box. The arrows show the 
movement of specific box(es).  
 
2a shows the far left box containing object “X” swapped over with the middle box containing 
object “y”. 
2b shows the middle box containing object “X” swapped over with the far left box containing 
object “y”. 
2c shows the far right box containing object “X” swapped over with the far left box 
containing object “y”. 
2d shows the far left box containing object “X” swapped over with the far right box 
containing object “z”. 
2e shows the middle box containing object “X” swapped over with the far right box 
containing object “z”. 
2f shows the far right box containing object “X” swapped over with the middle box 
containing object “z”. 
2g shows the movement of the middle box with the far right box. 
2h shows the movement of the far right box swapped over with the far left box. 
2i shows the movement of the middle box swapped over with the far left box. 
2j, 2k, and 2l show no movement of boxes. 
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APPENDIX C - Practice lie and truth pictures and statements 
         
  
                                  
Lie statement: flowers in a vase.                                 Lie statement: a bed. 
 
 
 
           
                                   
Truth statement: a bed.                                              Truth statement: flowers in a vase.
           
      
      
NB: Lie statements and Truth statements represent what the participant is instructed to 
say each picture shows. 
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APPENDIX C - Lie pictures and statements for Experimental  
Group 1 
 
                                          
Lie statement: a baby crawling.                              Lie statement: a lady delivering a  
                                                                                 baby. 
 
                                       
Lie statement: a boy walking.                               Lie statement: a boy drinking from a  
                                                                               glass. 
 
                             
Lie statement: two men arguing.                          Lie statement: a lady vet fixing a  
                                                                              dog’s leg. 
                                    
                               
Lie statement: a man jumping over a hurdle.       Lie statement: a lady fixing a bicycle. 
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APPENDIX C - Truth pictures and statements for Experimental Group 1 
 
                                     
Truth statement: two men arguing.                           Truth statement: a lady fixing a  
                                                                                   dog’s leg. 
 
                                      
Truth statement: a man jumping over a hurdle.          Truth statement: a lady fixing a  
                                                                                      bicycle. 
 
                                    
Truth statement: a lady delivering a baby.                   Truth statement: a boy walking. 
 
                                     
Truth statement: a boy drinking from a glass.            Truth statement: a baby crawling. 
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APPENDIX C - Lie pictures and statements for Experimental Group 2 
 
                          
Lie statement: someone peeling an apple.        Lie statement: a boy taking biscuits out   
                                                                          of a jar.                         
 
                        
Lie statement: an ambulance.                           Lie statement: a lady and man dancing.      
                                                               
                            
Lie statement: a girl crying.                             Lie statement: a boy and girl skating. 
 
                        
Lie statement: a boy and girl playing a             Lie statement: a man washing a floor. 
board game.      
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APPENDIX C - Truth pictures and statements for Experimental Group 2 
  
                                      
  Truth statement: a girl crying.                          Truth statement: an ambulance. 
 
                                  
Truth statement: someone peeling an apple.       Truth statement: a boy taking   
                                                                             biscuit out of a jar. 
 
                               
Truth statement: a lady and man dancing.            Truth statement: a man washing a  
                                                                               floor. 
 
                         
Truth statement: a boy and girl playing a     Truth statement: a boy and girl  
board game.             skateboarding.         
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APPENDIX D – Binomial Test Results  
 
Adults 
Subject Total 
correct 
truth 
Total 
correct lie 
Total combined 
correct lie and truth 
ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
successes - X) 
Total 
incorrect 
truth 
Total 
incorrect 
lie 
Total 
combined 
incorrect lie 
and truth 
Total combined 
correct & 
incorrect lie and 
truth ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
trials) 
P  
(X ≤)* 
P  
(X ≥)** 
1 65 48 113 18 31 49 162 .999 .0001 
2 56 68 124 31 20 51 175 .999 .0001 
3 70 64 134 12 19 31 165 1 .0001 
4 50 60 110 37 25 62 172 .999 .0001 
5 38 55 93 41 30 71 164 .963 .050 
6 76 47 123 10 40 50 173 .999 .0001 
7 46 35 81 40 51 91 172 .246 .799 
8 69 49 118 16 35 51 169 .999 .0001 
9 32 43 75 51 39 90 165 .137 .893 
10 63 35 98 21 51 72 170 .980 .027 
11 54 49 103 32 37 69 172 .996 .0058 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Subject Total 
correct 
truth 
Total 
correct lie 
Total combined 
correct lie and truth 
ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
successes - X) 
Total 
incorrect 
truth 
Total 
incorrect 
lie 
Total 
combined 
incorrect lie 
and truth 
Total combined 
correct & 
incorrect lie and 
truth ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
trials) 
P  
(X ≤) 
P  
(X ≥) 
12 40 47 87 40 32 72 159 .897 .133 
13 61 75 136 18 10 28 164 1 .0001 
14 58 60 118 27 18 45 163 .999 .0001 
15 65 64 129 16 19 35 164 .999 .0001 
16 55 33 88 29 48 77 165 .824 .218 
17 21 70 91 66 18 84 175 .727 .325 
18 51 43 94 31 33 64 158 .993 .010 
19 44 34 78 31 38 69 147 .795 .254 
20 61 43 104 26 41 67 171 .998 .0028 
21 53 43 96 28 35 63 159 .996 .0054 
22 63 44 107 23 45 68 175 .998 .0019 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Children 
Subject Total 
correct 
truth 
Total 
correct lie 
Total combined 
correct lie and truth 
ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
successes - X) 
Total 
incorrect 
truth 
Total 
incorrect 
lie 
Total 
combined 
incorrect lie 
and truth 
Total combined 
correct & 
incorrect lie and 
truth ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
trials) 
P  
(X ≤) 
P  
(X ≥) 
1 15 30 45 29 14 43 88 .625 .457 
2 24 24 48 20 20 40 88 .831 .227 
3 29 16 45 15 28 43 88 .625 .457 
4 19 20 39 25 24 49 88 .168 .879 
5 7 33 40 36 10 46 86 .295 .774 
6 18 26 44 24 17 41 85 .667 .414 
7 17 24 41 17 13 30 71 .923 .117 
8 12 36 48 32 8 40 88 .831 .227 
9 14 28 42 30 16 46 88 .374 .702 
10 17 24 41 25 17 42 83 .5 .586 
11 22 16 38 20 28 48 86 .165 .882 
12 11 22 33 26 16 42 75 .177 .875 
13 22 25 47 22 19 41 88 .772 .297 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Subject Total 
correct 
truth 
Total 
correct lie 
Total combined 
correct lie and truth 
ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
successes - X) 
Total 
incorrect 
truth 
Total 
incorrect 
lie 
Total 
combined 
incorrect lie 
and truth 
Total combined 
correct & 
incorrect lie and 
truth ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
trials) 
P  
(X ≤) 
P  
(X ≥) 
14 35 6 41 6 33 39 80 .631 .455 
15 8 21 29 26 11 37 66 .194 .866 
16 29 24 53 15 20 35 88 .978 .034 
17 13 22 35 18 6 24 59 .941 .096 
18 10 39 49 34 5 39 88 .879 .168 
19 14 21 25 16 13 29 54 .341 .751 
20 16 24 40 23 15 38 78 .632 .454 
21 28 18 46 16 25 41 87 .739 .334 
22 13 22 35 25 10 35 70 .547 .547 
23 27 25 52 17 19 36 88 .965 .054 
24 18 28 46 25 16 41 87 .739 .334 
25 17 24 41 23 17 40 81 .58 .5 
26 10 32 42 32 10 42 84 .543 .543 
27 44 0 44 0 44 44 88 .542 .542 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Subject Total 
correct 
truth 
Total 
correct lie 
Total combined 
correct lie and truth 
ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
successes - X) 
Total 
incorrect 
truth 
Total 
incorrect 
lie 
Total 
combined 
incorrect lie 
and truth 
Total combined 
correct & 
incorrect lie and 
truth ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
trials) 
P  
(X ≤) 
P  
(X ≥) 
28 14 22 36 29 17 47 83 .136 .906 
29 31 16 47 13 28 41 88 .772 .297 
30 20 23 43 22 18 40 83 .669 .413 
31 31 15 46 13 29 42 88 .702 .374 
32 38 7 45 6 37 43 88 .625 .457 
33 28 16 44 16 28 44 88 .542 .542 
34 44 1 45 0 43 43 88 .625 .457 
35 23 16 39 14 15 29 68 .909 .137 
36 12 22 34 26 18 44 78 .154 .893 
37 27 12 39 16 29 45 84 .292 .777 
38 28 14 42 11 29 40 82 .629 .456 
39 12 24 36 30 17 47 83 .136 .906 
40 33 20 53 11 24 35 88 .978 .034 
41 21 24 45 23 19 42 87 .665 .415 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Subject Total 
correct 
truth 
Total 
correct lie 
Total combined 
correct lie and truth 
ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
successes - X) 
Total 
incorrect 
truth 
Total 
incorrect 
lie 
Total 
combined 
incorrect lie 
and truth 
Total combined 
correct & 
incorrect lie and 
truth ratings 
(i.e. Number of 
trials) 
P  
(X ≤) 
P  
(X ≥) 
42 25 19 44 19 25 44 88 .542 .542 
43 15 37 52 25 2 27 79 .998 .003 
44 9 34 43 33 7 40 83 .669 .413 
45 25 17 42 18 26 44 86 .457 .626 
46 30 18 48 14 25 39 87 .858 .195 
47 22 25 47 21 17 38 85 .861 .192 
 
* Cumulative probability that the value of getting less than or equal successes falling within the specified range.  
**Cumulative probability of getting more than or equal to successes falling within the specified range.  
 
 
NB: Probability of success on a single trial set at 0 .5. 
 
 
 
 
